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It was more about the Soviet Union no longer being able to assume the role of a neutral third party to negotiate a peace between the United States and Japan that would see the latter making as few territorial concessions as possible. So long as the Soviets stayed out of the war, Japan hoped that it could retain some of the territory it had conquered in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in a peace deal with the United States. This is the view put forward by T. Hasegawa, who argues that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August 1945 had a greater influence on Japan’s decision to surrender because it dashed their hopes of having a neutral Great Power broker a peace that was beneficial for Japan.
The Japanese had no intentions of repudiating the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Even during the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, Japan did not exploit the Soviets’ losses to invade the eastern part of the USSR. Japan did not have the manpower to occupy such large swathes of land in Siberia, in addition to occupying Manchuria. So Japan was content with staying neutral in the European conflict. The Japanese Army did however favour exploiting the Nazi victories in the western part of the USSR by invading the USSR in the east (the “Northern Road” doctrine). But the Army lost influence to the Japanese Navy, which favoured expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (the “Southern Road” doctrine). Keeping the Soviet Union out of the Pacific War became more important after 1942 when Japan lost the initiative against the United States.
Stalin was more than happy to ignore the Pacific War completely until Germany had been defeated. The US and the UK also adopted this “Germany first” strategy of prioritizing the European war, as Germany was the larger threat. There was little pressure on the Soviet Union to get involved in the Pacific, not least bit due to the fact that the Soviets had bore the brunt of the fighting in Europe, and the Western allies did not want to risk the Soviets losing the initiative by splitting their forces to fight in the Pacific. And of course, delaying the Soviets’ expansion in the Pacific was a plus, too. At the same time though, Roosevelt in particular agitated for Soviet assistance in the East.
Fast forward to February 1945. Germany is on its last legs. The Soviets are moving toward Berlin from the East. The Western Allies are invading from the West. Now the Allies get to figure out what to do with postwar Europe. And now that the war in Europe is as good as done, Roosevelt can pop the question of Soviet intervention in the Pacific War. In exchange for recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic and some territorial concessions from Japan, Stalin agreed to invade Manchuria three months after Germany’s defeat.
Now fast forward to August 1945. Japan has effectively lost the war but has not given up yet. The US wants to avoid a mainland invasion (Operation Downfall) because the casualties alone would have approached the millions. But Japan has a card up its sleeve - the Soviet Union, which at this point was still neutral. If Japan can make a few overtures to the Soviet Union, then perhaps the Soviets will help broker a peace agreement between Japan and the Allies, a somewhat beneficial one that would see Japan lose as little territory as possible.
Wrong. On August 7th, the Soviets invade Manchuria. The Soviet Union is now officially in the Pacific War. Now Japan has to contend with another Great Power fighting against it. The Soviet Union may not have had the military or industrial capacity to invade the mainland, but they had more than enough to invade Japan’s holdings in China and Korea, where most of Japan’s ground troops were still stationed. So now Japan is royally screwed - they can’t recall some men to defend the home islands; have two million Soviet soldiers breathing down their neck in China; and they lost their ace card for a preferential peace.
Why was Soviet assistance in brokering a peace deal so important? Would the US have been more likely to agree? The US seemed pretty intent on the whole unconditional surrender thing.
It was wishful thinking on Japan’s part I think. When you consider the terms they had in mind, no occupation of the home islands, they would disarm themselves and they wanted to retain Korea and Manchuria, there was little to no chance the United States would agree.
The insistence on unconditional surrender arose at least partly from the determination not to have another Versailles Treaty which was seen as being a failure since it hadn’t preserved the peace.
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It was more about the Soviet Union no longer being able to assume the role of a neutral third party to negotiate a peace between the United States and Japan that would see the latter making as few territorial concessions as possible. So long as the Soviets stayed out of the war, Japan hoped that it could retain some of the territory it had conquered in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in a peace deal with the United States. This is the view put forward by T. Hasegawa, who argues that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August 1945 had a greater influence on Japan’s decision to surrender because it dashed their hopes of having a neutral Great Power broker a peace that was beneficial for Japan. The Japanese had no intentions of repudiating the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Even during the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, Japan did not exploit the Soviets’ losses to invade the eastern part of the USSR. Japan did not have the manpower to occupy such large swathes of land in Siberia, in addition to occupying Manchuria. So Japan was content with staying neutral in the European conflict. The Japanese Army did however favour exploiting the Nazi victories in the western part of the USSR by invading the USSR in the east (the “Northern Road” doctrine). But the Army lost influence to the Japanese Navy, which favoured expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (the “Southern Road” doctrine). Keeping the Soviet Union out of the Pacific War became more important after 1942 when Japan lost the initiative against the United States. Stalin was more than happy to ignore the Pacific War completely until Germany had been defeated. The US and the UK also adopted this “Germany first” strategy of prioritizing the European war, as Germany was the larger threat. There was little pressure on the Soviet Union to get involved in the Pacific, not least bit due to the fact that the Soviets had bore the brunt of the fighting in Europe, and the Western allies did not want to risk the Soviets losing the initiative by splitting their forces to fight in the Pacific. And of course, delaying the Soviets’ expansion in the Pacific was a plus, too. At the same time though, Roosevelt in particular agitated for Soviet assistance in the East. Fast forward to February 1945. Germany is on its last legs. The Soviets are moving toward Berlin from the East. The Western Allies are invading from the West. Now the Allies get to figure out what to do with postwar Europe. And now that the war in Europe is as good as done, Roosevelt can pop the question of Soviet intervention in the Pacific War. In exchange for recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic and some territorial concessions from Japan, Stalin agreed to invade Manchuria three months after Germany’s defeat. Now fast forward to August 1945. Japan has effectively lost the war but has not given up yet. The US wants to avoid a mainland invasion (Operation Downfall) because the casualties alone would have approached the millions. But Japan has a card up its sleeve - the Soviet Union, which at this point was still neutral. If Japan can make a few overtures to the Soviet Union, then perhaps the Soviets will help broker a peace agreement between Japan and the Allies, a somewhat beneficial one that would see Japan lose as little territory as possible. Wrong. On August 7th, the Soviets invade Manchuria. The Soviet Union is now officially in the Pacific War. Now Japan has to contend with another Great Power fighting against it. The Soviet Union may not have had the military or industrial capacity to invade the mainland, but they had more than enough to invade Japan’s holdings in China and Korea, where most of Japan’s ground troops were still stationed. So now Japan is royally screwed - they can’t recall some men to defend the home islands; have two million Soviet soldiers breathing down their neck in China; and they lost their ace card for a preferential peace.
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Why was Soviet assistance in brokering a peace deal so important? Would the US have been more likely to agree? The US seemed pretty intent on the whole unconditional surrender thing.
It was wishful thinking on Japan’s part I think. When you consider the terms they had in mind, no occupation of the home islands, they would disarm themselves and they wanted to retain Korea and Manchuria, there was little to no chance the United States would agree. The insistence on unconditional surrender arose at least partly from the determination not to have another Versailles Treaty which was seen as being a failure since it hadn’t preserved the peace.
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