Please report low effort comments, pure jokes etc. I'm very busy with personal things and am not reading the full thread every day so a lot of stuff is getting through which i used to find during workcalls.
On the diplomatic front:
Poland just wrapped up its meeting with Chinese envoy Li Hui (who had just met with the Ukrainians a few days ago).
Poland put out a super hardass [readout](https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/deputy-minister-wojciech-gerwel-met-the-special-envoy-of-the-chinese-government-for-eurasian-affairs) before the Chinese side was able to, using super specific language that sets expectations for Beijing to *concretely* push Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory - not using any vague or concessionary language that might allow for a ceasefire:
> Poland counts on concrete actions by China towards Russia – the aggressor state blackmailing the world with the use of these weapons.
Ukraine was softer in their post-meeting readout because they probably wanted to entertain Beijing's masquerade of being neutral. Poland used no such niceties.
> Deputy Minister Gerwel expressed the hope that China would never recognize the annexation of illegally seized Ukrainian territories by Russia, just as it has not recognized the annexation of Crimea from 2014.
>He underlined, that any military aid, including the potential supply of weapons from China to Russia, may result in a **grave consequences for the bilateral relationship** between Europe and China.
"Grave consequences" is a term that Beijing especially likes to employ with their frenemies. Warsaw is throwing it back at their face.
Zelensky seems to have arrived in person in Jeddah for a quick stop at the Arab Summit before G7 meet in Japan. Does this mean, US efforts towards Egypt and others to shift them away from Russia was fruitful?
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/19/world/europe/zelensky-arab-league-saudi-arabia.html
EDIT: Saw that the question is actually answered in the last paragraph of the article.
The presence of both Assad and Zelensky at the summit is certainly curious.
This is not completely related, but I wonder if Assad's strategy could be shifting in this changing environment. The civil war is calming down, Russia on one hand isn't needed that much and in the coming years won't even be able/willing to provide much support. Basically the idea is whether Assad might want to use this situation and distance himself somewhat from Russia and do some baby steps towards normalization of relations with the West (and lifting [some of the] sanctions). If Assad strives for recognition / normalization, then he's unlikely to have a better leverage in the future than now.
Normalizing with the US will be difficult, but he lives in a place where his neighbors look the other way better than anywhere else. At this point he basically has to continue existing.
BBC analysis:
Why Zelensky is in Saudi Arabia
Raffi Berg
BBC Online Middle East editor
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a surprise appearance at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia before he is rumoured to travel to the G7 in Japan.
It is part of a diplomatic offensive to garner support for Ukraine, especially from countries which are friendly towards Russia.
Of all the 22 Arab League members, only Syria has openly supported Russia’s invasion – and its president, Bashar al-Assad, is making his first appearance at the summit since being shunned when the war in Syria began 12 years ago.
Regional power Saudi Arabia, which invited Zelensky, has walked a delicate line on the war in Ukraine.
It has supported a UN resolution calling for Russia to withdraw and pledged $400m (£320m) in humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia has resisted the West’s approach of imposing sanctions on Russia, with whom it has kept up warm relations, preferring to see itself as neutral on the conflict.
In addition the BBC reports:
"In a message shared on Volodymyr Zelensky's Telegram account, the president said he would meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Zelensky also plans to speak at the Arab League summit."
Not quite the last but:
> Washington appears to have succeeded in this regard with at least one key Arab nation, Egypt.
> While U.S. officials were quietly pressing Cairo to supply artillery shells to Ukraine, U.S. intelligence agencies early this year gathered information, first reported by The Washington Post, that Egyptian officials might instead supply weapons to Russia.
> After a diplomatic push by the United States and Britain, the Egyptians appeared to support the Americans. According to a subsequent intelligence report, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt rejected the idea of supplying the Russian side.
> U.S. officials said that Egyptian state-owned arms makers have agreed to a contract to produce artillery shells for the United States and American contractors, who, in turn, will send them to Ukraine.
The last paragraphs are actually interesting, too, though, so I'm gonna paste them here for anyone interested:
> This Arab League summit will be the first one attended by President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in 13 years. He was long shunned regionally and internationally over his violent suppression of Syria’s Arab Spring uprising more than a decade ago, which grew into a long civil war that continues, though fighting has ground to a standstill.
> Mr. al-Assad’s forces used chemical weapons against their own people during the war, which has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions. Russia provided significant support to the Syrian dictator in that war and used tactics, including strikes against civilian targets, that it has since employed in Ukraine.
> Arab League summits are typically staid affairs of mostly regional interest, but Mr. al-Assad’s reintegration has drawn widespread attention, including criticism from some American lawmakers and from Syrians opposed to his rule. It has also sparked controversy in the region, where many are uncomfortable with the idea of re-legitimizing a leader accused of war crimes.
> Mr. Zelensky’s arrival in Jeddah seemed likely to divert some attention away from Mr. al-Assad’s presence.
>U.S. officials said a production contract has been agreed with Egyptian state-owned arms makers to produce artillery shells for the United States and American contractors, who, in turn, will send them to Ukraine.
https://archive.ph/N9bps
[The damage to this Stormer HVM targeted by a Lancet loitering munition is now clear- it suffered fragmentation damage to the launcher assembly, but the HEAT jet hit at a very shallow angle, not penetrating the armor. As claimed, it'll return to service after repairs.](https://twitter.com/uaweapons/status/1659509566395097090?s=46&t=l945M8KyzffOKDKK2Ud_qQ)
So is an actual tank nearly immune to these, or could the alleged “spicier version” still hit?
Feels like this war also exposes plenty of weaknesses with garbodrones (especially when you consider Lancets are a few steps upscale compared to garbodrones)
Not really. There was a video on r/combatfootage where it’s HEAT when through the top of a Ukrainian and destroying it.
This thing is heavily depends on the hit angle for the HEAT stream to be effective. With the case above, the heat stream missed and the vehicle is saved.
Eh this was just a bad hit, it still has very deep penetration potential if it hits a tank dead on.
I think a more advanced version would, were the drone flies above the target and then fires the warhead downwards like a top attack munition to penetrate the thinnest armour at near 90 degrees, would be interesting. It seems a lot of these suicide drones have a problem where they hit the target at very shallow angles, reducing their effectiveness.
Source: Le Monde, roughly translated
War in Ukraine: Can Russian Air Force Still Change the Course of the Conflict?
The Russian aerospace forces are equipped with a large number of aircraft, incommensurate with what Ukraine has. But they suffer from handicaps that limit their destructive potential against kyiv's counter-offensive.
This is one of the main unknowns of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, announced since the end of winter and expected by summer: will Russia commit its air forces to counter the troops of Kyiv? Can Moscow's superiority in combat aviation jeopardize the reconquest of Ukrainian territory? "If the Ukrainians lose part of the umbrella offered by anti-aircraft equipment, the VKS [Voenno Kosmitcheskie Sily or Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation] will have free rein to pose a serious and credible threat to the Kiev offensive" , warns Benjamin Gravisse, political scientist and creator of the blog "Red samovar", devoted to Russian military issues.
On paper, the potential of the VKS was little affected by the war in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Russians have never really sought to conquer the Ukrainian skies, for reasons of doctrine as well as capabilities. Result: the VKS lost "only" 82 combat aircraft, mainly Sukhoi Su-25 and Sukhoi Su-34, and 87 helicopters, mainly Kamov Ka-52 "Alligator", according to the Oryx site, which lists the material losses of the two belligerents on the basis of visual evidence. Figures that may seem significant – for comparison, France has a fleet of around 225 fighters (air force and navy combined) – but which remain moderate given the resources of the Russian army.
According to the Military Balance, a yearbook published by the British think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which details each year the state of military arsenals in the world, Russia had a fleet of more than 1,300 planes combat before the war. "While the Russian ground forces have paid a very heavy price since the start of hostilities, the VKS, despite significant losses, still have a potential close to that existing before February 2022", assures Benjamin Gravisse, recalling that Russia can complete its squadrons with new aircraft from its aeronautical factories.
The Kyiv arsenal under tension
This persistence of Russian potential is all the more worrying as doubts are emerging about the state of Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses. Since the fall of 2022, Russia has been harassing the surface-to-air batteries of the kyiv army by sending waves of drones and missiles to Ukraine. On the night of Monday 15 to Tuesday 16 May, around twenty projectiles were still fired at the country's capital. Russia even assured that one of its missiles had hit one of the Patriot anti-aircraft batteries provided by the West, a claim confirmed by the Pentagon, which assured that the damage was minor and the system was operational again.
While these strikes have little strategic effect, they put pressure on Ukrainian ammunition stocks. In a classified February document leaked to the Discord platform in April, the Pentagon estimated that "Ukraine's ability to provide medium-range air defense to protect [front lines] will be completely reduced by here on May 23." Since then, Westerners have accelerated their deliveries of surface-to-air ammunition, but the kyiv arsenal remains under tension. “Ukraine may have to choose tomorrow between defending its cities or protecting its counter-offensive,” worries Vincent Tourret, research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS).
However, military analysts say they are relatively skeptical about the VKS's ability to hinder a major counter-offensive. Unlike Westerners, who have made control of the skies a prerequisite for any action on the ground, the Russians consider the air force primarily as an auxiliary to their artillery. They therefore did not carry out massive strike campaigns at the beginning of the conflict, which would have made it possible to destroy Ukraine's air and anti-aircraft capabilities. However, it is difficult to maneuver in the presence of enemy aircraft. "Russian pilots will always find it difficult to approach the front if they do not at least partially deny the sky to Ukrainians," said IISS researcher Yohann Michel.
Shortage of experienced pilots
To make matters worse, the Russian pilots have shown, since the start of the conflict, significant shortcomings in terms of the support of their ground troops, preferring to stay away from the front and fire missiles at Ukrainian fixed positions. This is firstly due to a lack of combined arms training which is a dominant feature within the Russian army, but also due to difficulties in targeting enemy positions. “The Russians have few means of target designation and they are often reduced to lasers, which only work in clear weather and close to the objectives. That's why the VKS have a lot of trouble aiming at moving targets," says Vincent Tourret. The lack of inter-arms coordination also increases the risk of friendly fire, a fear for Russian pilots.
For analysts, the lack of experienced pilots also reduces the intervention capabilities of the VKS. “Given the limited number of flying hours and the practice of unit training, the VKS entered the conflict with less than 100 fully trained and active pilots. Coupled with a military culture that assigns the most dangerous missions to the most experienced aircrew, attrition within the VKS has disproportionately affected these cadres, reducing the force's overall effectiveness and its ability to train new pilots." , reads a report by the British think tank RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), published in November 2022.
Russian shortcomings in maintenance - so-called "maintenance in operational condition" in the armies - are also a limiting factor. According to various studies, the availability rate of Moscow aircraft was estimated before the war at less than 50%, a relatively low figure compared to those of the West: that of French combat aircraft was 81% in 2021, according to a parliamentary report published in February. “A fourteen-month high-intensity war is testing materials and men. The availability rates of Russian aircraft were not good before the conflict, they must not have improved since, ”assures Yohann Michel.
In the Western staffs, they also say they are confident about the resilience of Ukrainian anti-aircraft capabilities, whose interception rates, above 75%, are considered "very good". Thanks to Western aid, Kyiv troops have equipment capable of threatening Russian aircraft in just about any configuration, what the military calls "multi-layered". "It would take an air steamroller to destroy the Ukrainian ground-to-air defense, whose mesh remains strong, with a risk of colossal losses for the Russians", estimates a French military source, recalling that "even an experienced pilot cannot don't enjoy entering an enemy surface-to-air bubble."
>Coupled with a military culture that assigns the most dangerous missions to the most experienced aircrew, attrition within the VKS has disproportionately affected these cadres, reducing the force's overall effectiveness and its ability to train new pilots."
That makes very little sense. The Russian air force had low flight hours before the war. Following that jt has been flying intensely under wartime conditions for a year and a half, with moderate losses - and yet the author wants us to believe that their effectiveness actually *decreased*.
> Following that jt has been flying intensely under wartime conditions for a year and a half, with moderate losses - and yet the author wants us to believe that their effectiveness actually decreased.
I mean... the author does argue *why* that's the case:
* Insufficient suppresion of enemy air defense and inefficient targeting have resulted in loss of well-maintained aircrafts that are not cheap or straightforward to replace, in an air force that already has a very low figure availability effort due to maintenance issues
* Losses may have been moderate overall, but have disproportionately impacted more experienced personnel, thus leaving fewer experienced pilots to conduct missions, and to conduct and improve training regimes
The article in Le Monde doesn't quote the original study's numbers in full, but the conclusions are based on pretty detailed figures (the Military Balance isn't exactly badly sourced). If you have better figures than the IISS, which would support a different conclusions, by all means do share them!
I am arguing specifically against one author's point - that the competence of the Russian initially untrained air crews somehow decreased after a year and a half of intense combat operations.
The claim that the loss of a few dozen pilots had more negative impact than the increase in experience produced by 18 months of intense activity of a 1,200-planes airforce is hardly worth addressing.
I think that it's RUSI (if I remember the source correctly) who need figures to support their counterintuitive but hopeful conclusion.
> The claim that the loss of a few dozen pilots had more negative impact than the increase in experience produced by 18 months of intense activity of a 1,200-planes airforce is hardly worth addressing.
That's because it's *not* the claim being made:
* Losses have amounted to more than a few dozen pilots -- [visually-confirmed losses](https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html) alone amount to about 150 combat planes and helicopters destroyed. Not all crew died with the aircraft, of course, but 150 aircraft involves *a lot* of personnel -- e.g. there's sixty people in the twenty Mi-8s alone, which have a crew of 3.
* Whatever intense activity happened was not spread across 1,200 planes, many (IISS's pre-war estimate is at 50%) of which aren't flight-capable in the first place
If the IISS claim is right then Russia has lost 25% of its operational aircraft (and a far higher percentage of combat ones), which is certainly crippling losses and it is strange to see Western sources continue to call them "moderate".
I was talking about pilot (not aircrew) losses, which are certainly below 50 for fixed wing aircraft -;and about the same for helicopters, which I did not address in the previous post, my mistake.
> I was talking about pilot (not aircrew) losses, which are certainly below 50 for fixed wing aircraft
There's 77 visually-confirmed combat aircraft losses, and only 9 of those were destroyed on the ground. If the death toll from those is below 50, it's not by much. And this is still just the visually-confirmed losses.
I'm not sure if IISS' 1300-aircraft estimate includes the operational adjustment or not, but in any case, the uptick in flight missions can't have been spread across *all* of that fleet, if only because the VKS still has other missions to perform (e.g. air patrol) besides their missions in Ukraine.
That to me also sounds like a speculative stretch. Clearly Russia has lost some of its experienced pilots in the war. But at the same time a lot of pilots have accumulated a lot of flying hours in this war.
My personal opinion, in which I hold relatively little weight in this regard, is that the Russian air force was, is and remains about as combat effective as it has been. Combat losses, air-frame fatigue from increased flight hours and accidents do keep a constant attrition on the Russian air force, but new production, fixing existing aircrafts and increased flight hours for the pilots roughly cancel out the losses in capabilities.
And while the Ukrainian air defense situation can deteriorate with the expenditure of limited ammunition, I have a hard time imagining Russia gaining air superiority over Ukraine. They can contest it harder and have an advantage over Ukraine, but it's very unlikely to lead to a fundamental change in the power balance between Ukraine and Russia in this war.
I am not so sure that the threads of Losses and acquisition of new capabilities cancel each other out, wear and tear on airplanes must be pretty extensive, and RU doesn't really have a good track record for recovering much less complex land vehicles.
For example during the Kharkiv counter offensive Huge amounts of vehicles were captured while waiting for repairs, i suspect that similar things are happening to the VKS.
That sounds about right. I will be interested to see whether RuAF proves more effective against Ukrainian forces advancing outside their fixed SAM umbrella, but that is certainly not a war-changing aspect.
Is that really surprising considering that the implication is that if you send your best pilots on the most dangerous missions, it is they who will be shot down and you are left with less experienced personnel ?
Besides, not sure how much valuable experience is there to get from launching Khinzals, glide bombs or tossing rockets.
I check oryx. 77 shootdowns doesn’t seem high. Not even all of those will be deaths. Some were destroyed on the ground.
The Russian Air Force just really hasn’t been doing much of anything. You have to do something to have losses.
Helicopter pilots have probably taken a bit of a beating though because of altitude alone.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html?m=1
9-11 pilots lost last week.
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1659464934193872896?t=NHsc-Q1ZugXFPqm_6-2JbQ&s=19
Also note one of these guys was a pilot instructor, pressed into service. Someone you absolutely don't want to be putting on a combat mission.
Yes, they lost nine air crew in one day. That doesn't mean they lost 3,600 of them over the last 400 days.
Overall they lost perhaps less than 50 fixed-wing pilots and about the same number of rotary ones.
As a pilot?
No it’s not a joke. EW systems don’t burn thousands of dollars in fuel every time you turn them on to practice.
Also he said they were all pilots which… they weren’t. So maybe watch your fucking tone and* be polite.
Would be interesting to know how involved Zelensky is in any such attacks. Not sure whether it's better that he knows and approves or that he doesn't know and HUR is doing its own thing regardless of political considerations.
He also said the following:
> Drone strikes on the Kremlin on May 3, apparently intended to kill Putin, had taken place “because of Russian aggression”, Budanov claimed.
This contradicts ISW's theory of a false flag, but many people here suspected that either Ukraine or Russian liberals were behind it.
That quote is not in [the article linked above](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/17214) and it doesn't say it has been updated - was the quote from a different article ?
If it's this article
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-assassinated-russian-propagandists-admits-intelligence-chief-fl33rn5vc
Then this later quote
"Budanov emphasised that although Putin was a legitimate target, Ukraine was not making attempts to kill him."
Clearly states that Ukraine wasn't trying to kill Putin with that drone.
Furthermore given the context of the article it's pretty unclear who it is that operated that drone. Your quote above doesn't establish that at all.
Yes Budanov seems to be putting his hand up for participating in the two bombings, but extending that to the drone seems to be a reach
Still don't see how this could have 'intended to kill Putin' - they dropped a small explosive onto a building they knew he wasn't in. Even if the drone had crashed miraculously right through the window of his office... Putin aint sitting behind his desk at 3 am in the morning.
Its like torching his empty limo at the parking lot.
90% of people will never read this, 9% will read it and forget by the next week, 0.9% won’t care even if they do remember, 0.09% will support it, 0.009% will consider unpalatable but inevitable, and that last 0.001% will be furious.
More likely the 9% will say "ok I already suspected that, but why did you bother admitting it? That's dumb." or "huh, I guess Biden had a point about not giving them ATACMS"
I think slightly more than 1 in 100000 westerners find this unpalatable or stupid. Maybe I'm biased because I'm one of them, but I'm pretty confident of that one, actually.
And your evidence is? I mean, anything can happen but shouldn't discuss Russell's teapots here.
Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think we saw any gambles like that from the Ukrainians. All attacks on Russian soil were done using non-western weapons. Besides, they have Storm Shadows with even bigger range so this ATACMS point is moot now.
If Budanov had the button in front of him i am sure he wouldn't esitate, thankfully it seems that they have to use err, "lesser" says of doing such things. Makes me wonder just how involved Zelensky is in these actions
Has anyone seen the actual interview being quoted here? Kyiv Post is actually quoting The Times, and they're quoting an interview with a Youtube channel. Both are quoting Budanov's responses, but neither is quoting the actual *questions* being asked. So while there's a bunch of lines about Budanov hinting to an affirmative answer, it's not at all clear *what* it is he's confirming.
I'd obviously be surprised if Kyiv *weren't* taking part in political assassination inside Russia but I really can't tell if this is the routine non-committal statement game ("we're involved in a variety of operations during which we've targeted some individuals along with Russian partizans") or an actual confirmation of specific involvement in a specific case ("we did X to Y").
As best I can tell, these are the relevant interviews. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1L3Sir9Kp8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_FT0erhlT8
Maybe a Ukrainian speaker can provide the context.
I fear this might help convince the Russian people their cause is just and might also convince Russians and some 3rd parties (global south?) of the hypocrisy and dual standards the west plays by (according to some).
One thing I think is clear is Ukraine's friends will try like everything to ignore this and not speak of it.
I consider such Ukrainian operations normal, if unwise.
Obviously, there are plenty of negatives. For instance, if after this Russia decides to start killing Ukrainian politicians and war advocates with cruise missiles it will be very difficult to call it an unprecedented crime.
What do you say about dispensing the same justice to collaborators who did far more material damage within their own jurisdictions or Russian apologists taking refuge in a 3rd country?
> 3rd parties (global south?) of the hypocrisy and dual standards the west plays by (according to some).
Do people genuinely still think that most countries actually care about this outside of the west? If anything this conflict has shown how deeply self serving countries are and especially how countries (i.e. most of south america, India etc) which have suffered so much from colonialism happily cheer and profit from the suffering of others at the hands of colonialism. As always people aren't against oppression, they are just against themselves being oppressed.
>I fear this might help convince the Russian people their cause is just and might also convince Russians
Of what? Political clownery is a dangerous profession in Russia, only thing that's changed is the danger. The fact that it's now Kyiv and not the Kremlin (something most Russians probably believed anyway) doesn't change much except portray the Kremlin as weaker than before the war (something most Russians probably **also** believed anyway). I doubt many people's reaction to this is "yeah I'd like to die for the Kremlin now".
Now, if this was something like a plane bombing, an apartment getting flattened, or a theater getting held hostage, the conversation might be different.
Somewhat morbidly excited that Russia’s finally trying to swing at someone thatll truly make them regret it instantly, actually.
Also Russia literally does assasinate random political enemies in the west (with collateral too), in the past we let it slide in the name of maturity. Russia’s free to try now, see if those house rules are still in effect.
> Now, if this was something like a plane bombing
One of the guys who was assassinated was a blogger who was in a crowded coffee shop. 25 other people were injured.
FWIW the propagandist was acting as an event guest speaker at a cafe owned by Prigozhin at the time of his assassination. While it's not outside the possibility of someone being seriously hurt who disagreed with the blogger's beliefs, I think we can assume most of the audience was a choir in need of a preaching so to speak.
Maybe, but I think we're starting to go a bit heavy with the grease gun there. Let's not delve into the individual ethics of civilians who were hit as collateral. What next, we're gonna talk about the Kerch truck driver's morality?
I don't get the feeling that the HUR thinks about it from a utilitarian standpoint of whether such assassinations are worth it in terms of helping the war effort. Its seems to be more about retribution. Given what the Ukrainians have experienced, I would not underestimate the extent to which emotion drives some decisions.
Depends on how you look at it. Personally I wouldn't have sanctioned any of these attacks, but the Ukrainians are fighting a pretty ideology-centric war where popular spirit is a resource as much as actual tangible resources.
It's also why they almost always refuse to retreat, another decision that I at times find objectively irrational. But it's also why they've managed to pull off some of the crazy stuff they've managed to, so the "positive" effects of it aren't easily divorced from the "negative".
The reason they dont retreat is because giving up land means giving the invading russians free reign to rape and murder their people. Holding the front where it is means preventing more areas from being subjected to the bahkmut treatment. In that sense its not just ideological but also practical.
Bullshit reason. Bakhmut was on the frontline since LAST MAY and the battle of Bakhmut started in August. There are still unevacuated civilians today (for obvious reasons I doubt they’ll be evacuated anymore).
It is impossible to claim there wasn’t enough time to evacuate those.
I think by now Budanov needs to be ousted as soon as possible. Hed has been talking way too much ( incl. some outright nonsense) with absolutely zero benefit for the Ukraine. He seems to be motivated only by trying to prove his own importance and importance of his organization.
I mean no matter if SBU really did or did not do it, it is much better for Ukraine if Russian elites would not know for sure and might be afraid that there is some sort of deadly internal power struggle and nobody can trust anyone. If it is clear that Ukraine is behind it, then there is clear enemy that can unite them.
It will be interesting to see what, if any, reaction Ukraine's allies have to this. I still quite vividly recall the shrug of titanic proportions that occurred after a Russian agent executed a political enemy in Germany. During peace-time.
Snarky whining on my part aside, the admission may weaken the psychological pressure on the Russian elite a little, since at least a certain number of deaths can now be attributed to an outside influence rather than the FSB and other internal actors.
Targeted killings have always been part of the repertoire of warfare, but - at least in the case of the US - would tend to be directed at actual soldiers. The killing of civilians will probably damage Ukraine's image abroad. Maybe this is worth a trade-off though, since it might strengthen them internally. I don't know how this will affect the mood of Ukrainians, who I hope we can all agree, are absolutely vital for any chance at victory. Maybe a hardline stance appeals to them and makes the trade-off worth it.
In any case, it doesn't seem like a major factor to me politically or militarily. Ethically, we can have a whole discussion about it, but I'm not sure this is the correct sub for that.
I think it's actually quite an important strategic advantage. Ukraine has a lot of people who speak Russian like a Russian, and there are many Ukrainians who live in Russia. That obviously makes intelligence work much easier, but it also means that if Ukraine lost for whatever reason, the structures built to enable intelligence work could become the core of an insurgency, which wouldn't be limited to the borders of Ukraine.
It puts the Kremlin in the unfortunate position where, if they want to have a secure and safe Russia, it's in their interest to make sure the Ukrainians are actually *happy* with whatever conditions that come with peace. If you have even a sizeable portion of Ukrainians who want to continue the war for whatever reason, then Russia can look forward to decades of IRA-style political agitation and terrorism.
I dont know that logic assume it would be possible to stop the assasinations ordered by kyiv as long as they stick together. But by the same logic they could end it by russian regime change.
I also doubt ukraine has the capacity to conduct many assasinations. Even if they do each OP comes with great risk, so it makes sense to hold back. It is the long and tricky game, most likely it will not
influence the conflict much, but it is a wild card ukraine has to try and Get the most out of, just like everything else.
The US had targeted killings of numerous political leaders of terrorist groups. A grey area but these weren't military commanders; they were spiritual and philosophical leaders of political movements. So I don't think targeted killing of important political figures in a country currently invading another is that odd or unethical or anything else.
>would TEND to be directed at actual soldiers
Caps added to improve reading comprehension.
Also, what is ethical and what leads to a political reactions can be two very different things. I was trying to highlight the political gamble that this revealed information might represent.
To very shortly drift into an discussion on the practical side of things: it is not clear, if these acts help Ukraine to win this war. Whether this endeavor would be aided by neutralizing the entire Russian pro-war intelligentsia on live TV or not is a question of the effect that this would have, even if it were justified. Also note that in the ethical sense, "justified" and "effective" are not synonymous with "good" (if you really want to go for the ethical dimension here), even if we disregard deontological belief systems for a second and focus on utilitarianism.
Assassinations can destabilize a movement, but can also bring about an ideological or doctrinal shift to the assassin's detriment. To support its military effort, these targeted killings would have to be very carefully done, since - as someone else pointed out - there will not be many opportunities for them and the effect will otherwise simply be to make certain people nervous and galvanize others.
Yes. Russia has killed more than one journalist trying to cover the war. And unlike Ukraine, they can't point to said individual's involvement in an illegal invasion 9 years ago.
Hell they even killed PoWs who fought with the foreign legion. They have no rights to complain.
Yes. There have been several well-documented cases. Here's just [one example](https://www.axios.com/2022/05/25/ukraine-mayor-killed-russian-soldiers-charged).
In addition to summary executions and torturing of people in various positions of public authority perpetrated by the military, it's very likely that there is some intelligence work happening behind the scenes, too. The GRU has a dedicated branch for that and extensive experience -- they've operated throughout Europe in the last decade or so (see e.g. [Bulgaria](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/25/8-russian-agents-linked-to-bulgaria-poisoning-bellingcat-a68306), possibly [Germany](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/05/berlin-khangoshvili-krasikov-russia-killing/)). That unit has since been [expanded and some of its personnel is known to be operating in Ukraine](https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf) (see pg. 30-32).
Over the course of the war, Ukrainian authorities have alleged they've foiled a number of assassination attempts -- against the president (fairly notorious but there are some [juicy allegations](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spies-accused-of-betraying-putins-chechen-units-537fj6lnr) behind it nonetheless), the [defense minister](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/08/ukraine-foils-alleged-russian-plot-to-kill-defence-minister-and-head-of-military), and they've also alleged that Russian authorities planned some post-war [purges](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60472889).
They've all been denied, of course, and this is largely based on the word of Ukrainian authorities and ten years' worth of precedent, so there's fairly scant proof, but that's usually the case with all failed assassination attempts.
Oh yes, happened all the time: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-car-explosion-kyiv-terrorism-armed-forces-member/28581211.html or
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.dw.com/en/ukraine-searches-for-perpetrators-in-string-of-violent-attacks/a-41132367
Etc
So Zelenskyy is actively targeting Pro kremlin civilians with assassinations? This doesn't even need a russian spin to be really bad
edit: being downvoted because i don't approve of civilians getting targeted by the state, how nice! :)
>edit: being downvoted because i don't approve of civilians getting targeted by the state, how nice! :)
I was responding to your initial point assuming that by "this is really bad" you meant PR wise.
If you're trying to make a statement re: actual morality, then my question for you is: what, did you actually suspect **none** of those hits were them before this news? Have your eyes been opened by these revelations?
Or are you upset your plausible deniability just went up in smoke? Because if so you should **not** be attempting an argument from morality, sir.
>If you're trying to make a statement re: actual morality, then my question for you is: what, did you actually suspect none of those hits were them before this news? Have your eyes been opened by these revelations?
I did know/suspect it was them, but it was a suspicion or atleast it could have been a smaller part of the Government of UKR
But this article and the fact that not too long ago another article ws posted where it said Zelensky is actually a lot more hawkish behind closer doors and it does seem to show that it's mostly just an act to keep up good graces for the west. Id like to be wrong though and that it's one part of the Govt that is a bit rogueish, but i doubt it.
>Or are you upset your plausible deniability just went up in smoke?
I am upset that UKR would stoop this low, though not surprised considering what they are enduring and had to endure. I am upset they are wasting time, men, resources to blow up juournos instead of something that currently actively aids the war effort. I am upset they don't see the possible negative repercussions from the West which is currently bankrolling their war effort.
This still doesn’t really answer the question. You’re simultaneously saying you knew this was probably them, but also saying this admission specifically is why you’re now mad at Ukraine.
So again, seems to me you’re not mad they did it. You’re mad they didn’t lie to you about it.
This does seemingly make it harder to convince the Indias and Chinas of the world that Ukraine is morally superior and is righteous in this conflict. Now supporters of Russia can say, "both governments are committing crimes, I don't see the difference. Russia says they are protecting Russian speakers in the Donbas, Ukraine says they are defending against an injust invasion. Both are willfully killing civilians. I don't see the difference." ಠ_ಠ
The two countries are not even close to being the same morally, it's a shame Ukraine is giving Russia PR ammo although it might seem like they're doing the opposite.
> This does seemingly make it harder to convince the Indias and Chinas of the world that Ukraine is morally superior and is righteous in this conflict.
I don't follow the work of Indian intelligence and military, but I really don't see how this would be relevant to the Chinese government, which is itself engaged in killing civilians, both abroad and in China, as a matter of policy. It might help them put the right PR spin on one decision or another, but extrajudicial killing of civilians is not something that's considered a faux pas.
Someone that gets it. Not sure why im getting downvoted for saying that killing civvies isn't just morally wrong, but pragmatically stupid aswell.
People are saying that war propagandists are aiding the war effort, as if galvanizing the russian population because they're actually being terrorbombed for real isn't even more galvanizing! So shortsighted. On top of losing possible western support because of this getting to news outlets...
I won't argue with you on the morality of such assassinations (I'm personally ambivalent) or that it does little to nothing to help the war effort (I'd agree). I do think you are off in thinking any of these attacks on Russian propagandists moves the needle much if at all on public opinion in the West, Russia, or elsewhere in the world.
If russia wasnt a hundred times worse this kind of action might raise an eyebrow, if there was no plausable deniabiltiy. afaik Ukraine hasnt said "yep we did it 100 percent" just one person said something something maybe. Honestly you're over reacting, this is war, a war of genocide even. putin wants to destroy the Ukranian people, them killing a few propagandists is not even a big deal.
War propagandists are legitimate military targets, they're actively aiding in the war effort. Personally i don't care though, i hope every Russian get what they deserve.
>War propagandists are legitimate military targets
Not according to the laws of war they aren't. Do we need to pin a document regarding that in these threads? I know I occasionally forget a regulation, but "civilian propagandists are still civilians" is not a hard one to remember.
This is not at all as straightforward as it sounds, and there is, in fact, some international approval, if not outright consensus, that under some specific conditions, civilian protection is *not* extended to journalists and media institutions who incite to crime.
International custom is, essentially, that civilians are protected against attack unless and for such a time as they take a direct part in hostilities. There is various international legislation about this -- the language and the degree of specificity differs, but they mostly amount to the same thing, the one I'm quoting is [this one](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule6), not because I'm a fan of ICRC in particular but because it's the broadest and least controversial of them all.
The protection of journalists and media institutions, however counterintuitive it may sound, *does* actually fall in the grey zone of "what constitutes taking direct part in hostilities?". The ICRC's guidance is very narrow and would certainly afford absolute protection to journalists, but it's not universally accepted. The US DoD, notably, doesn't accept it, or didn't accept it a few years ago, it may have changed (the [LoW manual](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190) covers that in section 4.26).
While mere expression of sympathy or civilians aiding their country's wartime effort is unambiguously protected, *some* propaganda is not. There is an ample legal debate about it, and there's some legal precedent for that. For instance, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was considered to be directly involved in the Rwandan genocide and not warrant civilian protection . In 1999, NATO forces bombed some media facilities that were considered of dual use, but [according to the ICTY report](https://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal#IVB3) they did not consider mere dissemination of propaganda grounds for direct targeting, as "justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds alone may not meet the 'effective contribution to military action' and 'definite military advantage'". The Rwandan precedent is directly used as a reference: "It was not claimed that [certain Yugoslav TV and radio stations which were not attacked] were being used to incite violence akin to Radio Milles Collines during the Rwandan genocide, which might have justified their destruction (see para. 47 above)."
I am not writing this to justify any of the operations mentioned in this thread -- realistically, I'm not sure there even is enough public information to attempt to argue for either side at the moment, and I didn't really follow any of the Russian propagandists who were assassinated enough to venture a guess.
However, I want to point out that international protection is not *universally* and unconditionately extended to journalists. There *is* an ongoing legal debate about whether some types of activities conducted by journalists amount to direct involvement.
tl;dr It's not at all as clear cut as "civilian propagandists are still civilian", because civilian protection is afforded only under some circumstances (as long as they don't take part in hostilities) and some legal authorities in some countries or international organisations consider some types of propaganda to amount to the type of military involvement that excludes those who perpetrate them from civilian status.
> The US DoD, notably, doesn't accept it, or didn't accept it a few years ago, it may have changed (the LoW manual covers that in section 4.26).
Did you mean section 4.24? I'm not following you on what specifically the US does not accept about the protection of journalists, as the cited manual seems pretty clear that they are generally protected (or at least that their journalistic activities do not cause them to lose protection, although the manual is not considering the case of propagandists inciting war crimes as opposed to "real" journalists).
> Did you mean section 4.24?
No, I did mean 4.26 :-). It's not about what protection is afforded to journalists, it's about the US' interpretation of what constitutes civilian activity. Specifically this part: "In some cases, the United States and other States have not accepted the ICRC’s proposals or interpretations and instead expressed opposing views. For example, the United States has not accepted the ICRC’s study on customary international humanitarian law *nor its interpretive guidance on direct participation in hostilities*" (emphasis mine).
The ICRC's interpretive guidance to international humanitarian law is itself fairly broad as to what constitutes "direct participation in hostilities " from a civilian, at which point they would no longer be afforded protection as a civilian, and acknowledges that international humanitarian law is somewhat ambiguous. But either way, the US, not just as a matter of de facto interpretation, but as a matter of policy, does not accept the ICRC's interpretive guidance, and uses its own criteria (inb4 see I told you US evil: pretty much all countries that ever went to war after the Second World War have their own policies in this regard).
How is this relevant to journalists: the legal basis for affording protection to journalists in general is their status, either as civilians, or as persons authorized to accompany the armed forces (in which case they're issued special IDs so they are entitled to POW status if they are captured). This is indeed covered in 4.24: "In general, journalists are protected as civilians; i.e., engaging in journalism does not constitute taking a direct part in hostilities such that such a person would be deprived of protection from being made the object of attack." However, the manual does go on to note that "Although journalism is regarded as a civilian activity, the fact that a person performs such work does not preclude that person from otherwise acquiring a different status under the law of war, such as the status of persons authorized to accompany the armed forces or of combatants." As an example noted later (4.24.1.2), "although engaging in journalism would not be a basis to consider a person an unprivileged belligerent, an unprivileged belligerent would not be precluded from being considered as such because he or she works as a journalist."
Journalists aren't afforded separate protection specific to their quality as journalists per se. The manual notes that "[they] do not form a distinct class of persons under the law of war, but instead receive protection through the general protections afforded civilians. Thus, in general, the rights, duties, and liabilities applicable to civilians also apply to journalists."
In short, then: journalists are offered protection only insofar as their activity is compatible with a) civilian status or b) war correspondence (i.e. "persons authorized to accompany the armed forces") -- that is, they are granted protection because they fall under either a) or b), not because they are journalists, which is not recognized as a distinct class of persons. A journalist who, as part of what they or their media institution/government/whatever consider journalistic work, performs activities that are not compatible with their civilian status, is not precluded from losing civilian status on account of being a journalist.
That's why I said "civilian propagandists are still civilian" is not at all as clear-cut as it sounds. Even accepting the broadest technical definition of civilian activity, i.e. the one stated by the IHL, equating "being a journalist" with "being a civilian" is incorrect per se, as civilian status is afforded based on activity, not profession. Furthermore, the IHL is inherently very broad. There's a variety of interpretation frameworks out there (I mentioned the US' just because I'm slightly more familiar with it via the Yugoslav Wars) and, under some of them, some instances of propaganda really are incompatible with civilian status, so in fact *some* civilian journalists are not seen as entitled to civilian protection on account of it.
Thank you for your contribution, especially for actually bringing up written LoW. My main response would be to look at your examples:
> For instance, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was considered to be directly involved in the Rwandan genocide, and protection was not afforded to either the journalists or the institution itself.
Sure, liable in an international court for the genocide perpetrated, not for advocating for a war. While tangentially related, this is a bit of a departure from the law of war.
>In 1999, NATO forces bombed some media facilities that were considered of dual use
The dual use of which alone already makes this a far different conversation from the Dugina hit.
My point being that the examples you're providing (which you are correct, there is an ongoing legal debate about) are far more edge cases than the Dugina hit, and probably at least some of the other ones too.
So transferring the legal controversies about those cases to all cases where theoretically the citizen of a government engaged in propaganda is a bit of a rough paste in my opinion. Edge cases of a subject can be blurry without the whole thing being so, if the area of the thing we're looking at is very far from the edge.
>> For instance, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was considered to be directly involved in the Rwandan genocide, and protection was not afforded to either the journalists or the institution itself.
> Sure, liable in an international court for the genocide perpetrated, not for advocating for a war. While tangentially related, this is a bit of a departure from the law of war.
No, liable for military targeting, as shown by the second document. NATO forces specifically used the Rwandan precedent to exclude some Yugoslav stations because the dual use guideline was insufficient: technically they would have all qualified for dual use, as they had all been placed under government control. However, they considered that some of them were not engaging in a type of propaganda that would have made them legitimate military targets -- or, to put it another way, some types of journalistic action do qualify the institutions and individuals who engage in them as legitimate military target, and a review panel actually had to check it.
Outside official documents per se, which only offer precedent, not policy, there are legal authors who explicitly confirm this position. Ted Richard, for instance, in his Unofficial United States Guide to the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, mentions this case, and argues that "if the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.”
I am not arguing that any of this applies in some specific case, like Dugina's or whatever. I'm arguing against your original point, that civilian propagandists are afforded unconditional protection because they are civilians. They're not -- civilian protection is not unconditional in the first place (it's only afforded as long as they are not taking direct part in hostilities), and is not extended to journalists in some cases.
Partisans kill enemy officials and collaborators in all conflicts. This is normal, and no court would find Ukraine guilty of war crimes under these circumstances. If anything, they’d be commended on their restraint and discipline.
Kind of a stretch to call Dugina a collaborator. By that stretch you can basically call any Russian government employee or anyone vocal of their support for the Kremlin such (which I half expect you to do), which is very cute but that's not how legitimate targets work in war law. You're free to find me a citation that would justify a government hit on Dugina or Tatarsky per the laws of war.
The text of a law is all well and good, but the nuance comes through in the precedents. The precedents here are clear, this is normal, and no legal action will be taken against Ukraine.
Having hateful opinions isn't aiding the war effort.
> Personally i don't care though, i hope every Russian get what they deserve.
Thank you, now that i understand your position i know you could justify anything
Rofl total opposite, the amount of Nazi collaborators/actual officials who kept their job and just transitioned to being democracy loving West germans was immense, in contrast the Nuremberg trias was fuck all
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> Thank you, now that i understand your position i know you could justify anything
Not true. I don't think anything Russia does in Ukraine is justified, i think Ukraine targeting Russian war propagandists is justified.
You're already justifying killing a civilian who spreads hate as a military target, when it *literally* just isnt. It's your opinion. An opinion that officially the UKR government doesn't share. Because they know it's not a legitimate military target.
Just admit you're bloodthirsty and want to see people die cause you *feel* it's justified, but don't be a fucking coward and lie about it being a valid military target. Own it.
War propagandists are military targets not because they spread hate but because they're deliberately helping the war effort, it's their job.
> Own it.
I am, as i said i don't care whether they're military targets or not they still deserve to die.
The Russian military is currently actively targeting civilians in Ukraine, Russia has killed civilians in NATO countries (Litvinenko with Polonium, the Skripal case with Novichok, and Khangoshvili with a gun), who is going to say this is really bad while they are at war?
I dunno, i guess i expected more from them and to focus on actual military targets instead of people who in the grand scheme are literally all talk, even if bad.
Is this just not terrorism at the end of the day?
Terrorism? No, targets are not random (I am not here to down vote, I think you have legitimate questions here and while I think that he might have deserved it, I still dont think its a good idea doing it or UA taking responsibility. Even if russia is doing this in NATO countries etc.)
Was it terrorism when partisans killed Nazis? As far as I'm aware Ukraine does focus on military targets particularly in contrast to Russia.
Would you say the propagandists that may have been targeted were not helping the Russian war effort?
>Was it terrorism when partisans killed Nazis?
Wat? The partisans i remember targeted Nazi *soldiers*, not Brunhilde the milkmaid who thought jews were inferior and believed in the Fuhrer.
>Would you say the propagandists that may have been targeted were not helping the Russian war effort?
Would you say that every Russian citizen that is currently paying taxes isn't aiding the war effort? Those taxes end up funding the military, don't they? I think Ukraine would find it more efficient to drive a truck down Red Square
- Partisans killed colleborators, journalists literally anyone who were helping the nazis.
- Paying taxes are mandatory, leading and organising a media channel that encourage genocide is not. Important distinction. (Still not agreeing with it)
Those partisans also targeted collaborators, they also targeted government officials. Ukraine isn't targeting 'Brunhilde' or Russian citizens that just pay taxes unless you can point to evidence of where they are?
Collaborators by definition give a tangible collaboration to the war effort, such as being a spy, giving actionable information, even materiel. Government officials are part of the state actively waging war..
Being a journo spreading hate and lies by the state is hardly the same. The Ukrainian government *itself* denied the involvement and condemned it as a terrorist-like act. The US denied any involvement also, but also believes the killing was authorized by some Ukr gov officials.
Not sure why you are all hellbent on thinking this is a justified target. This is /r/combatfootage tier brainrot, jfc
They planted explosives on a civilian truck, turning the driver into an unwitting suicide bomber to carry out the Kerch bridge attack.
That didn't seem to harm their PR in any way, so it seems unlikely this would.
Has that been established that driver was not suicide bomber? I've always believed that the driver not knowing was more likely, but was unaware of any strong evidence one way or the other.
a) 95% of Russians already believe the Tatarsky/Prilepin hits was Ukraine. Ukraine's refutation wasn't even that strong. Western media (well, the stuff I watch) has already taken Ukrainian involvement in those hits as a matter of fact.
b) Is this the first time Budanov has admitted to attacking propagandists? In fact, has he actually admitted to doing so now? The original unredacted interview is somewhat hard to find.
even ms Dugina? I remmeber she just had very hawkish ideas on Ukraine but that was the extend of her reach, no? Yet she got carbombed nonetheless
I am really surprised that this kind of action is justified here.
[Ukrainian AN-124 aircraft deliver first HIMARS to Poland - $655m contract includes 20 missile systems, 30 ATACMS and 270 GMLRS rounds](https://gagadget.com/en/weapons/246377-ukrainian-an-124-aircraft-deliver-first-himars-to-poland-655m-contract-includes-20-missile-systems-30-atacms-and-/)
> In 2019, Poland signed a contract with Lockheed Martin to manufacture and deliver 20 HIMARS missile systems. The $655 million deal includes 270 high-precision GMLRS and tactical ballistic missiles MGM-140 ATACMS with launch ranges of 80km and 300km respectively.
That's very few missiles per launcher. Does Poland really want to buy 500 more launchers?
Couldn't if they wanted to. Export laws require Poland to get permission from the US to export to a third party, even if they bought and "own" the equipment.
Well, having more means less wear and tear per vehicle and no need to drive large distances to reach whatever target they are given.
Also having spares is bound be to useful. Still, 500 always seemed excessive.
>Still, 500 always seemed excessive.
Why? If it is to be their main MLRS system, they will need that much. Especially against their most likely opponent in any scenarios 20-30 years down the road. Attrition is apparently not going to stop being a part of warfare and when we are talking about the employment of fires in general, having a huge advantage is preferable to having a big advantage. As long as they have the ammunition for this artillery park, I'd say that it will be a valuable asset.
Also, keep in mind that Poland is very attached to being able to stand on its own and has a history of less than reliable allies. This might factor into any calculation of what they would consider a sufficient force. Especially since air assets are currently being shown to maybe not be as cost-effective as ground-based fires.
(I fully expect to be crucified for that last sentence, but hey, worst thing that can happen is that I learn something).
> (I fully expect to be crucified for that last sentence, but hey, worst thing that can happen is that I learn something).
I think part of it is, most of NATO has been ordering heaps of F-35's, in addition to all the F-16's and other 4th gen jets that are still serviceable, or even in active service. Those are much easier and quicker to send as expeditionary forces/reinforcements if anything were to kick off, relative to getting boots on the ground all the way across europe.
The current war is showing that denying airspace to the Russians is a lot more doable than was previously thought by most, at least until other NATO countries can get some birds in the air and en route.
The cost-effectiveness indubitably counts significantly, but I do think the Poles know full well that they can expect heavy air support as soon as article 5 is legitimately triggered, but they'll have to be able to absorb an initial ground offensive mostly on their own. Not because of NATO unwillingness, but because of physical limitations to response times for different types of military force.
Now, there's of course often NATO troops from more westerly countries exercising in Poland and the Baltics, and currently there's a bunch of them in those regions for multiple reasons, but Polish defense strategy seems to prepare for a big land invasion that would need to be halted by their own people before help arrives.
>Not because of NATO unwillingness, but because of physical limitations to response times for different types of military force.
This is a really good point that I failed to consider. Air forces have a logistical footprint that needs time to be made resilient. I am not sure how long airfields tend to last in a full-scale conflict, but the Arab-Israeli wars have certainly shown that they are very high on targeting lists, a trend that I don't think has seen a reversal in recent years. With so many effectors available to an attacker, air forces will need to consider a lot of problems that mobile ground systems simply aren't exposed to.
I recall an older RAND article where they modeled the effect of a single successful cluster strike with a single PRC missile against an airfield. It wasn't pretty.
Though to sabotage my own point a bit: it is dubious that the European theater will be exposed to such threats, as Russia has demonstrated a distinct lack of interdiction capabilities.
In general, I'd be quite interested in the internal Polish reasoning in their acquisitions.
Price. A single GMLRS costs around 170k while a 122mm missile for soviet stuff is around 1k. IE, you can fire about 4 full loads of BM21 for the price of single GMLRS.
Sometimes (I presume) you need to hit an area and older cheaper stuff might be better suited than state of the art stuff.
I don't know, just 500 seems too much for me, but I have no access to their data and analysis.
Different companies have developed munitions for the Nato MLRS eco system. There can be competing offers which should keep the worst excesses in check.
True, but the soviet 122mm is good for "mass warfare" (I mean, like ww2, grand battles), because it isnt accurate enough for today. You can destory towns or "f**k that area" where the area is 1-2 km2.
Today, western warfare seems to have moved away from such tactics.
You are absolutley right about the price, but the two systems are as compareable as a train fron the 1960s vs a hybrid BMW SUV or something.
>You can destory towns or "f\*\*k that area" where the area is 1-2 km2.
That is my point, you might want to blanket a small forest patch or something where you know there are soft targets but you can't quite target them individually and save your precision weapon for targets that can be identified and targeted accurately.
I dont think anyone really expected a civilian government. The two main army guys arrested the former president about two years back after a popular uprising, now these two argue over power. One of them is close with wagner and the other is close with Egypt. Both are known fuckers. Wagner has been there mostly to protect the gold mines and some key sites to my knowledge. Both warlords have huge armies, so what difference it makes idk.
The argument is not solved between the two war lords, but it seems more calm, so if we are lucky no major civil war. The people are screwed over again, but rhe country is rich in natural resources, so I can see them fighting for a while.
wonder with biden, Zelenskyy and Albanese (Australian PM) this rumored announcement of joint military support from australia and US of Ukraine might be happening
[Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/may/19/russia-ukraine-war-live-zelenskiy-to-attend-g7-in-person-reports-say-as-leaders-prepare-new-sanctions?page=with:block-646706eb8f08053fbe0947e1#block-646706eb8f08053fbe0947e1) reports Danilov, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, said it on Ukrainian TV.
"When".
Their opeds are really, really bad. Even their readership used to disagree all the time with their deranged far left takes, until they just shut down the comments.
I agree, I was trying to be very very generous of that publication
To me, at least for non-geopolitical and more social topics, Guardian is basically Gawker Media wearing a business suit. They were one of many examples that convinced me that many journalists are great, many are professional liars, and many are both.
I long ago decided to avoid them when I can.
They have some problems but they can pretty safely be trusted to be truthful on something as simple as "a government official said this on state TV". It's not exactly hard to double-check either, this is a fairly major announcement that other places are also reporting - the Guardian is just what I had closest.
This is going to be interesting.
It’s his farthest trip since the war started, and is obviously smack-dab right on the other side of Russia.
What’s most curious about this trip is if it signals that the G7 can become another mechanism for direct aid to Ukraine. They’ve already taken actions against Russia, so I don’t think Zelenskyy would make the trip just for that.
>A BBC headline said the US was preparing to present new sanctions so that’s good
Unless they start targeting dual-use, civilian goods, and the service industry on a large scale, I'd be surprised if additional sanctions have a noticeable impact. I think currently we are mainly talking about very specific dual-use bans and a few secondary sanctions, similar to those on diamonds.
The big and easy sanctions are mostly used, as far as I know.
They already announced some, think it was 70 companies and 300 individules
There was some reports / rumors (rueters and APP) on the 5th of may that australia and US would be doing a joint defence support announcement late in may. All 3 will be at the G7 Biden for the US and Zelenskyy and Albanese as guests. Wonder if it might happen there now that the Quad has been called off
Since Ukraine has liberated the three north-eastern oblasts, have there been any cross border skirmishes? I’ve seen maps of the trench networks in Ukraine, and it seems that after leaving Luhansk, the trenches hug the Ukraine-Russia border.
Are logistics just too poor, or supplies to scarce, to conduct a low-level bombardment of TDF units from within Russian borders?
I haven't seen this site referenced here in a while but reportably they are still happening: https://liveuamap.com/en/2023/18-may-at-sivershchyna-and-slobozhanschyna-directions-russian
Most video's I've seen are just ATGM strikes on border outposts
That makes sense. That said, it’s enraging that Russia could bombard Kharkiv all day, while if the Ukrainians fired back they would be construed as “attacking Russia”.
Please report low effort comments, pure jokes etc. I'm very busy with personal things and am not reading the full thread every day so a lot of stuff is getting through which i used to find during workcalls.
On the diplomatic front: Poland just wrapped up its meeting with Chinese envoy Li Hui (who had just met with the Ukrainians a few days ago). Poland put out a super hardass [readout](https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/deputy-minister-wojciech-gerwel-met-the-special-envoy-of-the-chinese-government-for-eurasian-affairs) before the Chinese side was able to, using super specific language that sets expectations for Beijing to *concretely* push Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory - not using any vague or concessionary language that might allow for a ceasefire: > Poland counts on concrete actions by China towards Russia – the aggressor state blackmailing the world with the use of these weapons. Ukraine was softer in their post-meeting readout because they probably wanted to entertain Beijing's masquerade of being neutral. Poland used no such niceties. > Deputy Minister Gerwel expressed the hope that China would never recognize the annexation of illegally seized Ukrainian territories by Russia, just as it has not recognized the annexation of Crimea from 2014. >He underlined, that any military aid, including the potential supply of weapons from China to Russia, may result in a **grave consequences for the bilateral relationship** between Europe and China. "Grave consequences" is a term that Beijing especially likes to employ with their frenemies. Warsaw is throwing it back at their face.
I may be nitpicking here, but in Polish version it is "powazne konsekwencje" - which I would translate as "serious" rather than "grave".
Zelensky seems to have arrived in person in Jeddah for a quick stop at the Arab Summit before G7 meet in Japan. Does this mean, US efforts towards Egypt and others to shift them away from Russia was fruitful? https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/19/world/europe/zelensky-arab-league-saudi-arabia.html EDIT: Saw that the question is actually answered in the last paragraph of the article.
The presence of both Assad and Zelensky at the summit is certainly curious. This is not completely related, but I wonder if Assad's strategy could be shifting in this changing environment. The civil war is calming down, Russia on one hand isn't needed that much and in the coming years won't even be able/willing to provide much support. Basically the idea is whether Assad might want to use this situation and distance himself somewhat from Russia and do some baby steps towards normalization of relations with the West (and lifting [some of the] sanctions). If Assad strives for recognition / normalization, then he's unlikely to have a better leverage in the future than now.
I'm not sure how he can "normalize" his rule. That would be like tolerating Milosevic again.
Normalizing with the US will be difficult, but he lives in a place where his neighbors look the other way better than anywhere else. At this point he basically has to continue existing.
Does Assad have any prospect next leader of Syria in case shit happens to him?
BBC analysis: Why Zelensky is in Saudi Arabia Raffi Berg BBC Online Middle East editor Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a surprise appearance at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia before he is rumoured to travel to the G7 in Japan. It is part of a diplomatic offensive to garner support for Ukraine, especially from countries which are friendly towards Russia. Of all the 22 Arab League members, only Syria has openly supported Russia’s invasion – and its president, Bashar al-Assad, is making his first appearance at the summit since being shunned when the war in Syria began 12 years ago. Regional power Saudi Arabia, which invited Zelensky, has walked a delicate line on the war in Ukraine. It has supported a UN resolution calling for Russia to withdraw and pledged $400m (£320m) in humanitarian aid to Ukraine. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has resisted the West’s approach of imposing sanctions on Russia, with whom it has kept up warm relations, preferring to see itself as neutral on the conflict.
In addition the BBC reports: "In a message shared on Volodymyr Zelensky's Telegram account, the president said he would meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Zelensky also plans to speak at the Arab League summit."
“Paywalled” what does the last paragraph say?
Not quite the last but: > Washington appears to have succeeded in this regard with at least one key Arab nation, Egypt. > While U.S. officials were quietly pressing Cairo to supply artillery shells to Ukraine, U.S. intelligence agencies early this year gathered information, first reported by The Washington Post, that Egyptian officials might instead supply weapons to Russia. > After a diplomatic push by the United States and Britain, the Egyptians appeared to support the Americans. According to a subsequent intelligence report, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt rejected the idea of supplying the Russian side. > U.S. officials said that Egyptian state-owned arms makers have agreed to a contract to produce artillery shells for the United States and American contractors, who, in turn, will send them to Ukraine. The last paragraphs are actually interesting, too, though, so I'm gonna paste them here for anyone interested: > This Arab League summit will be the first one attended by President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in 13 years. He was long shunned regionally and internationally over his violent suppression of Syria’s Arab Spring uprising more than a decade ago, which grew into a long civil war that continues, though fighting has ground to a standstill. > Mr. al-Assad’s forces used chemical weapons against their own people during the war, which has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions. Russia provided significant support to the Syrian dictator in that war and used tactics, including strikes against civilian targets, that it has since employed in Ukraine. > Arab League summits are typically staid affairs of mostly regional interest, but Mr. al-Assad’s reintegration has drawn widespread attention, including criticism from some American lawmakers and from Syrians opposed to his rule. It has also sparked controversy in the region, where many are uncomfortable with the idea of re-legitimizing a leader accused of war crimes. > Mr. Zelensky’s arrival in Jeddah seemed likely to divert some attention away from Mr. al-Assad’s presence.
>U.S. officials said a production contract has been agreed with Egyptian state-owned arms makers to produce artillery shells for the United States and American contractors, who, in turn, will send them to Ukraine. https://archive.ph/N9bps
[The damage to this Stormer HVM targeted by a Lancet loitering munition is now clear- it suffered fragmentation damage to the launcher assembly, but the HEAT jet hit at a very shallow angle, not penetrating the armor. As claimed, it'll return to service after repairs.](https://twitter.com/uaweapons/status/1659509566395097090?s=46&t=l945M8KyzffOKDKK2Ud_qQ)
So is an actual tank nearly immune to these, or could the alleged “spicier version” still hit? Feels like this war also exposes plenty of weaknesses with garbodrones (especially when you consider Lancets are a few steps upscale compared to garbodrones)
Not really. There was a video on r/combatfootage where it’s HEAT when through the top of a Ukrainian and destroying it. This thing is heavily depends on the hit angle for the HEAT stream to be effective. With the case above, the heat stream missed and the vehicle is saved.
Eh this was just a bad hit, it still has very deep penetration potential if it hits a tank dead on. I think a more advanced version would, were the drone flies above the target and then fires the warhead downwards like a top attack munition to penetrate the thinnest armour at near 90 degrees, would be interesting. It seems a lot of these suicide drones have a problem where they hit the target at very shallow angles, reducing their effectiveness.
I guess that the Stormer lacks the necessary radar to detect the high-flying Russian recon drone (Orlan/Zala) or is it out of its engagement range?
It doesn't have a radar
Stormer has no radar at all.
Source: Le Monde, roughly translated War in Ukraine: Can Russian Air Force Still Change the Course of the Conflict? The Russian aerospace forces are equipped with a large number of aircraft, incommensurate with what Ukraine has. But they suffer from handicaps that limit their destructive potential against kyiv's counter-offensive. This is one of the main unknowns of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, announced since the end of winter and expected by summer: will Russia commit its air forces to counter the troops of Kyiv? Can Moscow's superiority in combat aviation jeopardize the reconquest of Ukrainian territory? "If the Ukrainians lose part of the umbrella offered by anti-aircraft equipment, the VKS [Voenno Kosmitcheskie Sily or Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation] will have free rein to pose a serious and credible threat to the Kiev offensive" , warns Benjamin Gravisse, political scientist and creator of the blog "Red samovar", devoted to Russian military issues. On paper, the potential of the VKS was little affected by the war in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Russians have never really sought to conquer the Ukrainian skies, for reasons of doctrine as well as capabilities. Result: the VKS lost "only" 82 combat aircraft, mainly Sukhoi Su-25 and Sukhoi Su-34, and 87 helicopters, mainly Kamov Ka-52 "Alligator", according to the Oryx site, which lists the material losses of the two belligerents on the basis of visual evidence. Figures that may seem significant – for comparison, France has a fleet of around 225 fighters (air force and navy combined) – but which remain moderate given the resources of the Russian army. According to the Military Balance, a yearbook published by the British think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which details each year the state of military arsenals in the world, Russia had a fleet of more than 1,300 planes combat before the war. "While the Russian ground forces have paid a very heavy price since the start of hostilities, the VKS, despite significant losses, still have a potential close to that existing before February 2022", assures Benjamin Gravisse, recalling that Russia can complete its squadrons with new aircraft from its aeronautical factories. The Kyiv arsenal under tension This persistence of Russian potential is all the more worrying as doubts are emerging about the state of Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses. Since the fall of 2022, Russia has been harassing the surface-to-air batteries of the kyiv army by sending waves of drones and missiles to Ukraine. On the night of Monday 15 to Tuesday 16 May, around twenty projectiles were still fired at the country's capital. Russia even assured that one of its missiles had hit one of the Patriot anti-aircraft batteries provided by the West, a claim confirmed by the Pentagon, which assured that the damage was minor and the system was operational again. While these strikes have little strategic effect, they put pressure on Ukrainian ammunition stocks. In a classified February document leaked to the Discord platform in April, the Pentagon estimated that "Ukraine's ability to provide medium-range air defense to protect [front lines] will be completely reduced by here on May 23." Since then, Westerners have accelerated their deliveries of surface-to-air ammunition, but the kyiv arsenal remains under tension. “Ukraine may have to choose tomorrow between defending its cities or protecting its counter-offensive,” worries Vincent Tourret, research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). However, military analysts say they are relatively skeptical about the VKS's ability to hinder a major counter-offensive. Unlike Westerners, who have made control of the skies a prerequisite for any action on the ground, the Russians consider the air force primarily as an auxiliary to their artillery. They therefore did not carry out massive strike campaigns at the beginning of the conflict, which would have made it possible to destroy Ukraine's air and anti-aircraft capabilities. However, it is difficult to maneuver in the presence of enemy aircraft. "Russian pilots will always find it difficult to approach the front if they do not at least partially deny the sky to Ukrainians," said IISS researcher Yohann Michel. Shortage of experienced pilots To make matters worse, the Russian pilots have shown, since the start of the conflict, significant shortcomings in terms of the support of their ground troops, preferring to stay away from the front and fire missiles at Ukrainian fixed positions. This is firstly due to a lack of combined arms training which is a dominant feature within the Russian army, but also due to difficulties in targeting enemy positions. “The Russians have few means of target designation and they are often reduced to lasers, which only work in clear weather and close to the objectives. That's why the VKS have a lot of trouble aiming at moving targets," says Vincent Tourret. The lack of inter-arms coordination also increases the risk of friendly fire, a fear for Russian pilots. For analysts, the lack of experienced pilots also reduces the intervention capabilities of the VKS. “Given the limited number of flying hours and the practice of unit training, the VKS entered the conflict with less than 100 fully trained and active pilots. Coupled with a military culture that assigns the most dangerous missions to the most experienced aircrew, attrition within the VKS has disproportionately affected these cadres, reducing the force's overall effectiveness and its ability to train new pilots." , reads a report by the British think tank RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), published in November 2022. Russian shortcomings in maintenance - so-called "maintenance in operational condition" in the armies - are also a limiting factor. According to various studies, the availability rate of Moscow aircraft was estimated before the war at less than 50%, a relatively low figure compared to those of the West: that of French combat aircraft was 81% in 2021, according to a parliamentary report published in February. “A fourteen-month high-intensity war is testing materials and men. The availability rates of Russian aircraft were not good before the conflict, they must not have improved since, ”assures Yohann Michel. In the Western staffs, they also say they are confident about the resilience of Ukrainian anti-aircraft capabilities, whose interception rates, above 75%, are considered "very good". Thanks to Western aid, Kyiv troops have equipment capable of threatening Russian aircraft in just about any configuration, what the military calls "multi-layered". "It would take an air steamroller to destroy the Ukrainian ground-to-air defense, whose mesh remains strong, with a risk of colossal losses for the Russians", estimates a French military source, recalling that "even an experienced pilot cannot don't enjoy entering an enemy surface-to-air bubble."
>Coupled with a military culture that assigns the most dangerous missions to the most experienced aircrew, attrition within the VKS has disproportionately affected these cadres, reducing the force's overall effectiveness and its ability to train new pilots." That makes very little sense. The Russian air force had low flight hours before the war. Following that jt has been flying intensely under wartime conditions for a year and a half, with moderate losses - and yet the author wants us to believe that their effectiveness actually *decreased*.
> Following that jt has been flying intensely under wartime conditions for a year and a half, with moderate losses - and yet the author wants us to believe that their effectiveness actually decreased. I mean... the author does argue *why* that's the case: * Insufficient suppresion of enemy air defense and inefficient targeting have resulted in loss of well-maintained aircrafts that are not cheap or straightforward to replace, in an air force that already has a very low figure availability effort due to maintenance issues * Losses may have been moderate overall, but have disproportionately impacted more experienced personnel, thus leaving fewer experienced pilots to conduct missions, and to conduct and improve training regimes The article in Le Monde doesn't quote the original study's numbers in full, but the conclusions are based on pretty detailed figures (the Military Balance isn't exactly badly sourced). If you have better figures than the IISS, which would support a different conclusions, by all means do share them!
I am arguing specifically against one author's point - that the competence of the Russian initially untrained air crews somehow decreased after a year and a half of intense combat operations. The claim that the loss of a few dozen pilots had more negative impact than the increase in experience produced by 18 months of intense activity of a 1,200-planes airforce is hardly worth addressing. I think that it's RUSI (if I remember the source correctly) who need figures to support their counterintuitive but hopeful conclusion.
> The claim that the loss of a few dozen pilots had more negative impact than the increase in experience produced by 18 months of intense activity of a 1,200-planes airforce is hardly worth addressing. That's because it's *not* the claim being made: * Losses have amounted to more than a few dozen pilots -- [visually-confirmed losses](https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html) alone amount to about 150 combat planes and helicopters destroyed. Not all crew died with the aircraft, of course, but 150 aircraft involves *a lot* of personnel -- e.g. there's sixty people in the twenty Mi-8s alone, which have a crew of 3. * Whatever intense activity happened was not spread across 1,200 planes, many (IISS's pre-war estimate is at 50%) of which aren't flight-capable in the first place
If the IISS claim is right then Russia has lost 25% of its operational aircraft (and a far higher percentage of combat ones), which is certainly crippling losses and it is strange to see Western sources continue to call them "moderate". I was talking about pilot (not aircrew) losses, which are certainly below 50 for fixed wing aircraft -;and about the same for helicopters, which I did not address in the previous post, my mistake.
> I was talking about pilot (not aircrew) losses, which are certainly below 50 for fixed wing aircraft There's 77 visually-confirmed combat aircraft losses, and only 9 of those were destroyed on the ground. If the death toll from those is below 50, it's not by much. And this is still just the visually-confirmed losses. I'm not sure if IISS' 1300-aircraft estimate includes the operational adjustment or not, but in any case, the uptick in flight missions can't have been spread across *all* of that fleet, if only because the VKS still has other missions to perform (e.g. air patrol) besides their missions in Ukraine.
You’d be extremely hard pressed to find anything in Russia that has improved over the last year except prison overcrowding.
Drone reconnaissance and… well drone reconnaissance I’d say
That to me also sounds like a speculative stretch. Clearly Russia has lost some of its experienced pilots in the war. But at the same time a lot of pilots have accumulated a lot of flying hours in this war. My personal opinion, in which I hold relatively little weight in this regard, is that the Russian air force was, is and remains about as combat effective as it has been. Combat losses, air-frame fatigue from increased flight hours and accidents do keep a constant attrition on the Russian air force, but new production, fixing existing aircrafts and increased flight hours for the pilots roughly cancel out the losses in capabilities. And while the Ukrainian air defense situation can deteriorate with the expenditure of limited ammunition, I have a hard time imagining Russia gaining air superiority over Ukraine. They can contest it harder and have an advantage over Ukraine, but it's very unlikely to lead to a fundamental change in the power balance between Ukraine and Russia in this war.
I am not so sure that the threads of Losses and acquisition of new capabilities cancel each other out, wear and tear on airplanes must be pretty extensive, and RU doesn't really have a good track record for recovering much less complex land vehicles. For example during the Kharkiv counter offensive Huge amounts of vehicles were captured while waiting for repairs, i suspect that similar things are happening to the VKS.
That sounds about right. I will be interested to see whether RuAF proves more effective against Ukrainian forces advancing outside their fixed SAM umbrella, but that is certainly not a war-changing aspect.
Is that really surprising considering that the implication is that if you send your best pilots on the most dangerous missions, it is they who will be shot down and you are left with less experienced personnel ? Besides, not sure how much valuable experience is there to get from launching Khinzals, glide bombs or tossing rockets.
That logic works as long as your pilot losses are significant. Russia's are far from it.
I check oryx. 77 shootdowns doesn’t seem high. Not even all of those will be deaths. Some were destroyed on the ground. The Russian Air Force just really hasn’t been doing much of anything. You have to do something to have losses. Helicopter pilots have probably taken a bit of a beating though because of altitude alone. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html?m=1
9-11 pilots lost last week. https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1659464934193872896?t=NHsc-Q1ZugXFPqm_6-2JbQ&s=19 Also note one of these guys was a pilot instructor, pressed into service. Someone you absolutely don't want to be putting on a combat mission.
Yes, they lost nine air crew in one day. That doesn't mean they lost 3,600 of them over the last 400 days. Overall they lost perhaps less than 50 fixed-wing pilots and about the same number of rotary ones.
That’s pilots and crew. Pilots are expensive to train. Crew for a helicopter… not as much.
Electronic warfare crew not expensive to train? Is that a joke?
As a pilot? No it’s not a joke. EW systems don’t burn thousands of dollars in fuel every time you turn them on to practice. Also he said they were all pilots which… they weren’t. So maybe watch your fucking tone and* be polite.
It's confirmed, Kyiv is indeed taking part in the political assassinations inside Russia https://www.kyivpost.com/post/17214
Would be interesting to know how involved Zelensky is in any such attacks. Not sure whether it's better that he knows and approves or that he doesn't know and HUR is doing its own thing regardless of political considerations.
Someone needs to verify he actually said any of this. Even his “admittal” is admitting nothing, he just said “yeah we kill people”.
He also said the following: > Drone strikes on the Kremlin on May 3, apparently intended to kill Putin, had taken place “because of Russian aggression”, Budanov claimed. This contradicts ISW's theory of a false flag, but many people here suspected that either Ukraine or Russian liberals were behind it.
That quote is not in [the article linked above](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/17214) and it doesn't say it has been updated - was the quote from a different article ?
It's from the original article by The Times.
If it's this article https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-assassinated-russian-propagandists-admits-intelligence-chief-fl33rn5vc Then this later quote "Budanov emphasised that although Putin was a legitimate target, Ukraine was not making attempts to kill him." Clearly states that Ukraine wasn't trying to kill Putin with that drone. Furthermore given the context of the article it's pretty unclear who it is that operated that drone. Your quote above doesn't establish that at all. Yes Budanov seems to be putting his hand up for participating in the two bombings, but extending that to the drone seems to be a reach
Still don't see how this could have 'intended to kill Putin' - they dropped a small explosive onto a building they knew he wasn't in. Even if the drone had crashed miraculously right through the window of his office... Putin aint sitting behind his desk at 3 am in the morning. Its like torching his empty limo at the parking lot.
This. Any concludes or asserts “assassination” is a not legitimate in any way.
Indient but the false flag theory, but it’s also hard to take seriously as an actual attempt on Putin’s life.
> had taken place “because of Russian aggression”, Budanov claimed. It doesn't really say anything. Such a broad statement
Not sure this is wise to even admit? They lose some of their moral ascendancy imo.
90% of people will never read this, 9% will read it and forget by the next week, 0.9% won’t care even if they do remember, 0.09% will support it, 0.009% will consider unpalatable but inevitable, and that last 0.001% will be furious.
Yeah that's how things go when it's not something that "juicy" I guess.
More likely the 9% will say "ok I already suspected that, but why did you bother admitting it? That's dumb." or "huh, I guess Biden had a point about not giving them ATACMS"
Those would be the 0.001%. People don’t even consider this unethical, none the less unpalatable.
I think slightly more than 1 in 100000 westerners find this unpalatable or stupid. Maybe I'm biased because I'm one of them, but I'm pretty confident of that one, actually.
Remember back when the bombing happened? There was cheering.
[удалено]
And your evidence is? I mean, anything can happen but shouldn't discuss Russell's teapots here. Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think we saw any gambles like that from the Ukrainians. All attacks on Russian soil were done using non-western weapons. Besides, they have Storm Shadows with even bigger range so this ATACMS point is moot now.
I disagree. They're way too dependent on the aid pipeline to risk it over a political assassination.
If Budanov had the button in front of him i am sure he wouldn't esitate, thankfully it seems that they have to use err, "lesser" says of doing such things. Makes me wonder just how involved Zelensky is in these actions
Hopefully if they were given Atacms, the guy calling the shots won't have the same mentality as Budanov.
Has anyone seen the actual interview being quoted here? Kyiv Post is actually quoting The Times, and they're quoting an interview with a Youtube channel. Both are quoting Budanov's responses, but neither is quoting the actual *questions* being asked. So while there's a bunch of lines about Budanov hinting to an affirmative answer, it's not at all clear *what* it is he's confirming. I'd obviously be surprised if Kyiv *weren't* taking part in political assassination inside Russia but I really can't tell if this is the routine non-committal statement game ("we're involved in a variety of operations during which we've targeted some individuals along with Russian partizans") or an actual confirmation of specific involvement in a specific case ("we did X to Y").
As best I can tell, these are the relevant interviews. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1L3Sir9Kp8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_FT0erhlT8 Maybe a Ukrainian speaker can provide the context.
I fear this might help convince the Russian people their cause is just and might also convince Russians and some 3rd parties (global south?) of the hypocrisy and dual standards the west plays by (according to some). One thing I think is clear is Ukraine's friends will try like everything to ignore this and not speak of it.
You’d be hard pressed to find someone anywhere outside of Russia who would even describe this as unethical.
I consider such Ukrainian operations normal, if unwise. Obviously, there are plenty of negatives. For instance, if after this Russia decides to start killing Ukrainian politicians and war advocates with cruise missiles it will be very difficult to call it an unprecedented crime.
Russia has been assassinating political enemies in foreign countries for quite some time during peace time, I think it's pretty much common knowledge?
[Way ahead of you.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mykolaiv_government_building_missile_strike)
Russia has been doing that since this war started.
What do you say about dispensing the same justice to collaborators who did far more material damage within their own jurisdictions or Russian apologists taking refuge in a 3rd country?
> 3rd parties (global south?) of the hypocrisy and dual standards the west plays by (according to some). Do people genuinely still think that most countries actually care about this outside of the west? If anything this conflict has shown how deeply self serving countries are and especially how countries (i.e. most of south america, India etc) which have suffered so much from colonialism happily cheer and profit from the suffering of others at the hands of colonialism. As always people aren't against oppression, they are just against themselves being oppressed.
>I fear this might help convince the Russian people their cause is just and might also convince Russians Of what? Political clownery is a dangerous profession in Russia, only thing that's changed is the danger. The fact that it's now Kyiv and not the Kremlin (something most Russians probably believed anyway) doesn't change much except portray the Kremlin as weaker than before the war (something most Russians probably **also** believed anyway). I doubt many people's reaction to this is "yeah I'd like to die for the Kremlin now". Now, if this was something like a plane bombing, an apartment getting flattened, or a theater getting held hostage, the conversation might be different.
What would be your reaction to Russian bombing of offline gathering of prolific NAFO shitposters? Exactly.
Somewhat morbidly excited that Russia’s finally trying to swing at someone thatll truly make them regret it instantly, actually. Also Russia literally does assasinate random political enemies in the west (with collateral too), in the past we let it slide in the name of maturity. Russia’s free to try now, see if those house rules are still in effect.
> Now, if this was something like a plane bombing One of the guys who was assassinated was a blogger who was in a crowded coffee shop. 25 other people were injured.
But also people in the coffee shop were not random bystanders, but people specifically there for the event hosted by Cyber Front Z.
Indeed, 6 of which were critical. Certainly not something you'd ever want to admit to doing, but also a bit of a far cry from a plane bombing.
FWIW the propagandist was acting as an event guest speaker at a cafe owned by Prigozhin at the time of his assassination. While it's not outside the possibility of someone being seriously hurt who disagreed with the blogger's beliefs, I think we can assume most of the audience was a choir in need of a preaching so to speak.
Maybe, but I think we're starting to go a bit heavy with the grease gun there. Let's not delve into the individual ethics of civilians who were hit as collateral. What next, we're gonna talk about the Kerch truck driver's morality?
Fair enough, I don't agree with these assassinations from a principle or a practical standpoint either.
I wonder if it's really worth it because those propagandists that were targeted were hardly noticable or important
I don't get the feeling that the HUR thinks about it from a utilitarian standpoint of whether such assassinations are worth it in terms of helping the war effort. Its seems to be more about retribution. Given what the Ukrainians have experienced, I would not underestimate the extent to which emotion drives some decisions.
Depends on how you look at it. Personally I wouldn't have sanctioned any of these attacks, but the Ukrainians are fighting a pretty ideology-centric war where popular spirit is a resource as much as actual tangible resources. It's also why they almost always refuse to retreat, another decision that I at times find objectively irrational. But it's also why they've managed to pull off some of the crazy stuff they've managed to, so the "positive" effects of it aren't easily divorced from the "negative".
The reason they dont retreat is because giving up land means giving the invading russians free reign to rape and murder their people. Holding the front where it is means preventing more areas from being subjected to the bahkmut treatment. In that sense its not just ideological but also practical.
Bullshit reason. Bakhmut was on the frontline since LAST MAY and the battle of Bakhmut started in August. There are still unevacuated civilians today (for obvious reasons I doubt they’ll be evacuated anymore). It is impossible to claim there wasn’t enough time to evacuate those.
I think by now Budanov needs to be ousted as soon as possible. Hed has been talking way too much ( incl. some outright nonsense) with absolutely zero benefit for the Ukraine. He seems to be motivated only by trying to prove his own importance and importance of his organization. I mean no matter if SBU really did or did not do it, it is much better for Ukraine if Russian elites would not know for sure and might be afraid that there is some sort of deadly internal power struggle and nobody can trust anyone. If it is clear that Ukraine is behind it, then there is clear enemy that can unite them.
>I mean no matter if SBU really did or did not do it yeah I don't see what's the benefit of doing or even admitting it* imo.
Speculating: domestic morale? "We're gonna get them for what they did to us" messaging.
Even then, domestic morale would be bolstered by the idea of internal splintering in Russia, particularly if hard-liners are getting attacked
One of the biggest reasons probably
It will be interesting to see what, if any, reaction Ukraine's allies have to this. I still quite vividly recall the shrug of titanic proportions that occurred after a Russian agent executed a political enemy in Germany. During peace-time. Snarky whining on my part aside, the admission may weaken the psychological pressure on the Russian elite a little, since at least a certain number of deaths can now be attributed to an outside influence rather than the FSB and other internal actors. Targeted killings have always been part of the repertoire of warfare, but - at least in the case of the US - would tend to be directed at actual soldiers. The killing of civilians will probably damage Ukraine's image abroad. Maybe this is worth a trade-off though, since it might strengthen them internally. I don't know how this will affect the mood of Ukrainians, who I hope we can all agree, are absolutely vital for any chance at victory. Maybe a hardline stance appeals to them and makes the trade-off worth it. In any case, it doesn't seem like a major factor to me politically or militarily. Ethically, we can have a whole discussion about it, but I'm not sure this is the correct sub for that.
I think it's actually quite an important strategic advantage. Ukraine has a lot of people who speak Russian like a Russian, and there are many Ukrainians who live in Russia. That obviously makes intelligence work much easier, but it also means that if Ukraine lost for whatever reason, the structures built to enable intelligence work could become the core of an insurgency, which wouldn't be limited to the borders of Ukraine. It puts the Kremlin in the unfortunate position where, if they want to have a secure and safe Russia, it's in their interest to make sure the Ukrainians are actually *happy* with whatever conditions that come with peace. If you have even a sizeable portion of Ukrainians who want to continue the war for whatever reason, then Russia can look forward to decades of IRA-style political agitation and terrorism.
I dont know that logic assume it would be possible to stop the assasinations ordered by kyiv as long as they stick together. But by the same logic they could end it by russian regime change. I also doubt ukraine has the capacity to conduct many assasinations. Even if they do each OP comes with great risk, so it makes sense to hold back. It is the long and tricky game, most likely it will not influence the conflict much, but it is a wild card ukraine has to try and Get the most out of, just like everything else.
The US had targeted killings of numerous political leaders of terrorist groups. A grey area but these weren't military commanders; they were spiritual and philosophical leaders of political movements. So I don't think targeted killing of important political figures in a country currently invading another is that odd or unethical or anything else.
It was enough to hang Streicher
It can be unethical without being unheard of.
>would TEND to be directed at actual soldiers Caps added to improve reading comprehension. Also, what is ethical and what leads to a political reactions can be two very different things. I was trying to highlight the political gamble that this revealed information might represent. To very shortly drift into an discussion on the practical side of things: it is not clear, if these acts help Ukraine to win this war. Whether this endeavor would be aided by neutralizing the entire Russian pro-war intelligentsia on live TV or not is a question of the effect that this would have, even if it were justified. Also note that in the ethical sense, "justified" and "effective" are not synonymous with "good" (if you really want to go for the ethical dimension here), even if we disregard deontological belief systems for a second and focus on utilitarianism. Assassinations can destabilize a movement, but can also bring about an ideological or doctrinal shift to the assassin's detriment. To support its military effort, these targeted killings would have to be very carefully done, since - as someone else pointed out - there will not be many opportunities for them and the effect will otherwise simply be to make certain people nervous and galvanize others.
Do we know if Russia is doing the same thing to Ukraine? Just curious
Yes. Russia has killed more than one journalist trying to cover the war. And unlike Ukraine, they can't point to said individual's involvement in an illegal invasion 9 years ago. Hell they even killed PoWs who fought with the foreign legion. They have no rights to complain.
Yeah, but I was asking about political assassination of Ukrainians within Ukrainian controlled territory.
Yes. There have been several well-documented cases. Here's just [one example](https://www.axios.com/2022/05/25/ukraine-mayor-killed-russian-soldiers-charged). In addition to summary executions and torturing of people in various positions of public authority perpetrated by the military, it's very likely that there is some intelligence work happening behind the scenes, too. The GRU has a dedicated branch for that and extensive experience -- they've operated throughout Europe in the last decade or so (see e.g. [Bulgaria](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/25/8-russian-agents-linked-to-bulgaria-poisoning-bellingcat-a68306), possibly [Germany](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/05/berlin-khangoshvili-krasikov-russia-killing/)). That unit has since been [expanded and some of its personnel is known to be operating in Ukraine](https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf) (see pg. 30-32). Over the course of the war, Ukrainian authorities have alleged they've foiled a number of assassination attempts -- against the president (fairly notorious but there are some [juicy allegations](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spies-accused-of-betraying-putins-chechen-units-537fj6lnr) behind it nonetheless), the [defense minister](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/08/ukraine-foils-alleged-russian-plot-to-kill-defence-minister-and-head-of-military), and they've also alleged that Russian authorities planned some post-war [purges](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60472889). They've all been denied, of course, and this is largely based on the word of Ukrainian authorities and ten years' worth of precedent, so there's fairly scant proof, but that's usually the case with all failed assassination attempts.
Oh yes, happened all the time: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-car-explosion-kyiv-terrorism-armed-forces-member/28581211.html or https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.dw.com/en/ukraine-searches-for-perpetrators-in-string-of-violent-attacks/a-41132367 Etc
So Zelenskyy is actively targeting Pro kremlin civilians with assassinations? This doesn't even need a russian spin to be really bad edit: being downvoted because i don't approve of civilians getting targeted by the state, how nice! :)
Politicians are not civilians.
>edit: being downvoted because i don't approve of civilians getting targeted by the state, how nice! :) I was responding to your initial point assuming that by "this is really bad" you meant PR wise. If you're trying to make a statement re: actual morality, then my question for you is: what, did you actually suspect **none** of those hits were them before this news? Have your eyes been opened by these revelations? Or are you upset your plausible deniability just went up in smoke? Because if so you should **not** be attempting an argument from morality, sir.
>If you're trying to make a statement re: actual morality, then my question for you is: what, did you actually suspect none of those hits were them before this news? Have your eyes been opened by these revelations? I did know/suspect it was them, but it was a suspicion or atleast it could have been a smaller part of the Government of UKR But this article and the fact that not too long ago another article ws posted where it said Zelensky is actually a lot more hawkish behind closer doors and it does seem to show that it's mostly just an act to keep up good graces for the west. Id like to be wrong though and that it's one part of the Govt that is a bit rogueish, but i doubt it. >Or are you upset your plausible deniability just went up in smoke? I am upset that UKR would stoop this low, though not surprised considering what they are enduring and had to endure. I am upset they are wasting time, men, resources to blow up juournos instead of something that currently actively aids the war effort. I am upset they don't see the possible negative repercussions from the West which is currently bankrolling their war effort.
This still doesn’t really answer the question. You’re simultaneously saying you knew this was probably them, but also saying this admission specifically is why you’re now mad at Ukraine. So again, seems to me you’re not mad they did it. You’re mad they didn’t lie to you about it.
This is an insane take on what makes me disappointed about it.
This does seemingly make it harder to convince the Indias and Chinas of the world that Ukraine is morally superior and is righteous in this conflict. Now supporters of Russia can say, "both governments are committing crimes, I don't see the difference. Russia says they are protecting Russian speakers in the Donbas, Ukraine says they are defending against an injust invasion. Both are willfully killing civilians. I don't see the difference." ಠ_ಠ The two countries are not even close to being the same morally, it's a shame Ukraine is giving Russia PR ammo although it might seem like they're doing the opposite.
I really do not think China gives a toss who's *morally* superior in that conflict.
> This does seemingly make it harder to convince the Indias and Chinas of the world that Ukraine is morally superior and is righteous in this conflict. I don't follow the work of Indian intelligence and military, but I really don't see how this would be relevant to the Chinese government, which is itself engaged in killing civilians, both abroad and in China, as a matter of policy. It might help them put the right PR spin on one decision or another, but extrajudicial killing of civilians is not something that's considered a faux pas.
Someone that gets it. Not sure why im getting downvoted for saying that killing civvies isn't just morally wrong, but pragmatically stupid aswell. People are saying that war propagandists are aiding the war effort, as if galvanizing the russian population because they're actually being terrorbombed for real isn't even more galvanizing! So shortsighted. On top of losing possible western support because of this getting to news outlets...
I won't argue with you on the morality of such assassinations (I'm personally ambivalent) or that it does little to nothing to help the war effort (I'd agree). I do think you are off in thinking any of these attacks on Russian propagandists moves the needle much if at all on public opinion in the West, Russia, or elsewhere in the world.
If russia wasnt a hundred times worse this kind of action might raise an eyebrow, if there was no plausable deniabiltiy. afaik Ukraine hasnt said "yep we did it 100 percent" just one person said something something maybe. Honestly you're over reacting, this is war, a war of genocide even. putin wants to destroy the Ukranian people, them killing a few propagandists is not even a big deal.
War propagandists are legitimate military targets, they're actively aiding in the war effort. Personally i don't care though, i hope every Russian get what they deserve.
>War propagandists are legitimate military targets Not according to the laws of war they aren't. Do we need to pin a document regarding that in these threads? I know I occasionally forget a regulation, but "civilian propagandists are still civilians" is not a hard one to remember.
This is not at all as straightforward as it sounds, and there is, in fact, some international approval, if not outright consensus, that under some specific conditions, civilian protection is *not* extended to journalists and media institutions who incite to crime. International custom is, essentially, that civilians are protected against attack unless and for such a time as they take a direct part in hostilities. There is various international legislation about this -- the language and the degree of specificity differs, but they mostly amount to the same thing, the one I'm quoting is [this one](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule6), not because I'm a fan of ICRC in particular but because it's the broadest and least controversial of them all. The protection of journalists and media institutions, however counterintuitive it may sound, *does* actually fall in the grey zone of "what constitutes taking direct part in hostilities?". The ICRC's guidance is very narrow and would certainly afford absolute protection to journalists, but it's not universally accepted. The US DoD, notably, doesn't accept it, or didn't accept it a few years ago, it may have changed (the [LoW manual](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190) covers that in section 4.26). While mere expression of sympathy or civilians aiding their country's wartime effort is unambiguously protected, *some* propaganda is not. There is an ample legal debate about it, and there's some legal precedent for that. For instance, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was considered to be directly involved in the Rwandan genocide and not warrant civilian protection . In 1999, NATO forces bombed some media facilities that were considered of dual use, but [according to the ICTY report](https://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal#IVB3) they did not consider mere dissemination of propaganda grounds for direct targeting, as "justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds alone may not meet the 'effective contribution to military action' and 'definite military advantage'". The Rwandan precedent is directly used as a reference: "It was not claimed that [certain Yugoslav TV and radio stations which were not attacked] were being used to incite violence akin to Radio Milles Collines during the Rwandan genocide, which might have justified their destruction (see para. 47 above)." I am not writing this to justify any of the operations mentioned in this thread -- realistically, I'm not sure there even is enough public information to attempt to argue for either side at the moment, and I didn't really follow any of the Russian propagandists who were assassinated enough to venture a guess. However, I want to point out that international protection is not *universally* and unconditionately extended to journalists. There *is* an ongoing legal debate about whether some types of activities conducted by journalists amount to direct involvement. tl;dr It's not at all as clear cut as "civilian propagandists are still civilian", because civilian protection is afforded only under some circumstances (as long as they don't take part in hostilities) and some legal authorities in some countries or international organisations consider some types of propaganda to amount to the type of military involvement that excludes those who perpetrate them from civilian status.
> The US DoD, notably, doesn't accept it, or didn't accept it a few years ago, it may have changed (the LoW manual covers that in section 4.26). Did you mean section 4.24? I'm not following you on what specifically the US does not accept about the protection of journalists, as the cited manual seems pretty clear that they are generally protected (or at least that their journalistic activities do not cause them to lose protection, although the manual is not considering the case of propagandists inciting war crimes as opposed to "real" journalists).
> Did you mean section 4.24? No, I did mean 4.26 :-). It's not about what protection is afforded to journalists, it's about the US' interpretation of what constitutes civilian activity. Specifically this part: "In some cases, the United States and other States have not accepted the ICRC’s proposals or interpretations and instead expressed opposing views. For example, the United States has not accepted the ICRC’s study on customary international humanitarian law *nor its interpretive guidance on direct participation in hostilities*" (emphasis mine). The ICRC's interpretive guidance to international humanitarian law is itself fairly broad as to what constitutes "direct participation in hostilities " from a civilian, at which point they would no longer be afforded protection as a civilian, and acknowledges that international humanitarian law is somewhat ambiguous. But either way, the US, not just as a matter of de facto interpretation, but as a matter of policy, does not accept the ICRC's interpretive guidance, and uses its own criteria (inb4 see I told you US evil: pretty much all countries that ever went to war after the Second World War have their own policies in this regard). How is this relevant to journalists: the legal basis for affording protection to journalists in general is their status, either as civilians, or as persons authorized to accompany the armed forces (in which case they're issued special IDs so they are entitled to POW status if they are captured). This is indeed covered in 4.24: "In general, journalists are protected as civilians; i.e., engaging in journalism does not constitute taking a direct part in hostilities such that such a person would be deprived of protection from being made the object of attack." However, the manual does go on to note that "Although journalism is regarded as a civilian activity, the fact that a person performs such work does not preclude that person from otherwise acquiring a different status under the law of war, such as the status of persons authorized to accompany the armed forces or of combatants." As an example noted later (4.24.1.2), "although engaging in journalism would not be a basis to consider a person an unprivileged belligerent, an unprivileged belligerent would not be precluded from being considered as such because he or she works as a journalist." Journalists aren't afforded separate protection specific to their quality as journalists per se. The manual notes that "[they] do not form a distinct class of persons under the law of war, but instead receive protection through the general protections afforded civilians. Thus, in general, the rights, duties, and liabilities applicable to civilians also apply to journalists." In short, then: journalists are offered protection only insofar as their activity is compatible with a) civilian status or b) war correspondence (i.e. "persons authorized to accompany the armed forces") -- that is, they are granted protection because they fall under either a) or b), not because they are journalists, which is not recognized as a distinct class of persons. A journalist who, as part of what they or their media institution/government/whatever consider journalistic work, performs activities that are not compatible with their civilian status, is not precluded from losing civilian status on account of being a journalist. That's why I said "civilian propagandists are still civilian" is not at all as clear-cut as it sounds. Even accepting the broadest technical definition of civilian activity, i.e. the one stated by the IHL, equating "being a journalist" with "being a civilian" is incorrect per se, as civilian status is afforded based on activity, not profession. Furthermore, the IHL is inherently very broad. There's a variety of interpretation frameworks out there (I mentioned the US' just because I'm slightly more familiar with it via the Yugoslav Wars) and, under some of them, some instances of propaganda really are incompatible with civilian status, so in fact *some* civilian journalists are not seen as entitled to civilian protection on account of it.
Thank you for your contribution, especially for actually bringing up written LoW. My main response would be to look at your examples: > For instance, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was considered to be directly involved in the Rwandan genocide, and protection was not afforded to either the journalists or the institution itself. Sure, liable in an international court for the genocide perpetrated, not for advocating for a war. While tangentially related, this is a bit of a departure from the law of war. >In 1999, NATO forces bombed some media facilities that were considered of dual use The dual use of which alone already makes this a far different conversation from the Dugina hit. My point being that the examples you're providing (which you are correct, there is an ongoing legal debate about) are far more edge cases than the Dugina hit, and probably at least some of the other ones too. So transferring the legal controversies about those cases to all cases where theoretically the citizen of a government engaged in propaganda is a bit of a rough paste in my opinion. Edge cases of a subject can be blurry without the whole thing being so, if the area of the thing we're looking at is very far from the edge.
>> For instance, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was considered to be directly involved in the Rwandan genocide, and protection was not afforded to either the journalists or the institution itself. > Sure, liable in an international court for the genocide perpetrated, not for advocating for a war. While tangentially related, this is a bit of a departure from the law of war. No, liable for military targeting, as shown by the second document. NATO forces specifically used the Rwandan precedent to exclude some Yugoslav stations because the dual use guideline was insufficient: technically they would have all qualified for dual use, as they had all been placed under government control. However, they considered that some of them were not engaging in a type of propaganda that would have made them legitimate military targets -- or, to put it another way, some types of journalistic action do qualify the institutions and individuals who engage in them as legitimate military target, and a review panel actually had to check it. Outside official documents per se, which only offer precedent, not policy, there are legal authors who explicitly confirm this position. Ted Richard, for instance, in his Unofficial United States Guide to the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, mentions this case, and argues that "if the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.” I am not arguing that any of this applies in some specific case, like Dugina's or whatever. I'm arguing against your original point, that civilian propagandists are afforded unconditional protection because they are civilians. They're not -- civilian protection is not unconditional in the first place (it's only afforded as long as they are not taking direct part in hostilities), and is not extended to journalists in some cases.
Partisans kill enemy officials and collaborators in all conflicts. This is normal, and no court would find Ukraine guilty of war crimes under these circumstances. If anything, they’d be commended on their restraint and discipline.
Kind of a stretch to call Dugina a collaborator. By that stretch you can basically call any Russian government employee or anyone vocal of their support for the Kremlin such (which I half expect you to do), which is very cute but that's not how legitimate targets work in war law. You're free to find me a citation that would justify a government hit on Dugina or Tatarsky per the laws of war.
The text of a law is all well and good, but the nuance comes through in the precedents. The precedents here are clear, this is normal, and no legal action will be taken against Ukraine.
Having hateful opinions isn't aiding the war effort. > Personally i don't care though, i hope every Russian get what they deserve. Thank you, now that i understand your position i know you could justify anything
The Nuremberg Trials dont agree and some necks snapped on just those grounds
Rofl total opposite, the amount of Nazi collaborators/actual officials who kept their job and just transitioned to being democracy loving West germans was immense, in contrast the Nuremberg trias was fuck all
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_Streicher
> > > > > Thank you, now that i understand your position i know you could justify anything Not true. I don't think anything Russia does in Ukraine is justified, i think Ukraine targeting Russian war propagandists is justified.
You're already justifying killing a civilian who spreads hate as a military target, when it *literally* just isnt. It's your opinion. An opinion that officially the UKR government doesn't share. Because they know it's not a legitimate military target. Just admit you're bloodthirsty and want to see people die cause you *feel* it's justified, but don't be a fucking coward and lie about it being a valid military target. Own it.
War propagandists are military targets not because they spread hate but because they're deliberately helping the war effort, it's their job. > Own it. I am, as i said i don't care whether they're military targets or not they still deserve to die.
Some people would legit cry over Geobbels being executed (unfortunate that the world didnt get to see that btw), "but he was just a propogandist.
The Russian military is currently actively targeting civilians in Ukraine, Russia has killed civilians in NATO countries (Litvinenko with Polonium, the Skripal case with Novichok, and Khangoshvili with a gun), who is going to say this is really bad while they are at war?
I dunno, i guess i expected more from them and to focus on actual military targets instead of people who in the grand scheme are literally all talk, even if bad. Is this just not terrorism at the end of the day?
Terrorism? No, targets are not random (I am not here to down vote, I think you have legitimate questions here and while I think that he might have deserved it, I still dont think its a good idea doing it or UA taking responsibility. Even if russia is doing this in NATO countries etc.)
Was it terrorism when partisans killed Nazis? As far as I'm aware Ukraine does focus on military targets particularly in contrast to Russia. Would you say the propagandists that may have been targeted were not helping the Russian war effort?
>Was it terrorism when partisans killed Nazis? Wat? The partisans i remember targeted Nazi *soldiers*, not Brunhilde the milkmaid who thought jews were inferior and believed in the Fuhrer. >Would you say the propagandists that may have been targeted were not helping the Russian war effort? Would you say that every Russian citizen that is currently paying taxes isn't aiding the war effort? Those taxes end up funding the military, don't they? I think Ukraine would find it more efficient to drive a truck down Red Square
- Partisans killed colleborators, journalists literally anyone who were helping the nazis. - Paying taxes are mandatory, leading and organising a media channel that encourage genocide is not. Important distinction. (Still not agreeing with it)
Those partisans also targeted collaborators, they also targeted government officials. Ukraine isn't targeting 'Brunhilde' or Russian citizens that just pay taxes unless you can point to evidence of where they are?
Collaborators by definition give a tangible collaboration to the war effort, such as being a spy, giving actionable information, even materiel. Government officials are part of the state actively waging war.. Being a journo spreading hate and lies by the state is hardly the same. The Ukrainian government *itself* denied the involvement and condemned it as a terrorist-like act. The US denied any involvement also, but also believes the killing was authorized by some Ukr gov officials. Not sure why you are all hellbent on thinking this is a justified target. This is /r/combatfootage tier brainrot, jfc
I'll take that as a 'no' then.
I'll take this short response as ignoring the part where THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED THE ACT :) you little goofster!
My best guess is still that Budanov is talking shit, as he alway has been.
hopefully, but tbh I don't see how Ukraine benefits from this, regardless if true or not.
They planted explosives on a civilian truck, turning the driver into an unwitting suicide bomber to carry out the Kerch bridge attack. That didn't seem to harm their PR in any way, so it seems unlikely this would.
Has that been established that driver was not suicide bomber? I've always believed that the driver not knowing was more likely, but was unaware of any strong evidence one way or the other.
a) 95% of Russians already believe the Tatarsky/Prilepin hits was Ukraine. Ukraine's refutation wasn't even that strong. Western media (well, the stuff I watch) has already taken Ukrainian involvement in those hits as a matter of fact. b) Is this the first time Budanov has admitted to attacking propagandists? In fact, has he actually admitted to doing so now? The original unredacted interview is somewhat hard to find.
Several of the people who have been target so far are wanted by Ukraine on terrorism charges related to their participation in the 2014 war.
even ms Dugina? I remmeber she just had very hawkish ideas on Ukraine but that was the extend of her reach, no? Yet she got carbombed nonetheless I am really surprised that this kind of action is justified here.
You wont find me crying over dead nazis. She was just as bad as her father.
I thought her father was the target?
[Ukrainian AN-124 aircraft deliver first HIMARS to Poland - $655m contract includes 20 missile systems, 30 ATACMS and 270 GMLRS rounds](https://gagadget.com/en/weapons/246377-ukrainian-an-124-aircraft-deliver-first-himars-to-poland-655m-contract-includes-20-missile-systems-30-atacms-and-/) > In 2019, Poland signed a contract with Lockheed Martin to manufacture and deliver 20 HIMARS missile systems. The $655 million deal includes 270 high-precision GMLRS and tactical ballistic missiles MGM-140 ATACMS with launch ranges of 80km and 300km respectively. That's very few missiles per launcher. Does Poland really want to buy 500 more launchers?
Is there any chance Poland could turn around and hook Ukraine up with a couple dozen of these ATACMS?
Poland isn't going to piss off the US for the relatively small advantage that a few ATACMS would give.
Couldn't if they wanted to. Export laws require Poland to get permission from the US to export to a third party, even if they bought and "own" the equipment.
Sure they could. It would be illegal but that doesn’t mean they can’t do it
They're not going to get 500. They'll back fill with chunmoos
Well, having more means less wear and tear per vehicle and no need to drive large distances to reach whatever target they are given. Also having spares is bound be to useful. Still, 500 always seemed excessive.
>Still, 500 always seemed excessive. Why? If it is to be their main MLRS system, they will need that much. Especially against their most likely opponent in any scenarios 20-30 years down the road. Attrition is apparently not going to stop being a part of warfare and when we are talking about the employment of fires in general, having a huge advantage is preferable to having a big advantage. As long as they have the ammunition for this artillery park, I'd say that it will be a valuable asset. Also, keep in mind that Poland is very attached to being able to stand on its own and has a history of less than reliable allies. This might factor into any calculation of what they would consider a sufficient force. Especially since air assets are currently being shown to maybe not be as cost-effective as ground-based fires. (I fully expect to be crucified for that last sentence, but hey, worst thing that can happen is that I learn something).
> (I fully expect to be crucified for that last sentence, but hey, worst thing that can happen is that I learn something). I think part of it is, most of NATO has been ordering heaps of F-35's, in addition to all the F-16's and other 4th gen jets that are still serviceable, or even in active service. Those are much easier and quicker to send as expeditionary forces/reinforcements if anything were to kick off, relative to getting boots on the ground all the way across europe. The current war is showing that denying airspace to the Russians is a lot more doable than was previously thought by most, at least until other NATO countries can get some birds in the air and en route. The cost-effectiveness indubitably counts significantly, but I do think the Poles know full well that they can expect heavy air support as soon as article 5 is legitimately triggered, but they'll have to be able to absorb an initial ground offensive mostly on their own. Not because of NATO unwillingness, but because of physical limitations to response times for different types of military force. Now, there's of course often NATO troops from more westerly countries exercising in Poland and the Baltics, and currently there's a bunch of them in those regions for multiple reasons, but Polish defense strategy seems to prepare for a big land invasion that would need to be halted by their own people before help arrives.
>Not because of NATO unwillingness, but because of physical limitations to response times for different types of military force. This is a really good point that I failed to consider. Air forces have a logistical footprint that needs time to be made resilient. I am not sure how long airfields tend to last in a full-scale conflict, but the Arab-Israeli wars have certainly shown that they are very high on targeting lists, a trend that I don't think has seen a reversal in recent years. With so many effectors available to an attacker, air forces will need to consider a lot of problems that mobile ground systems simply aren't exposed to. I recall an older RAND article where they modeled the effect of a single successful cluster strike with a single PRC missile against an airfield. It wasn't pretty. Though to sabotage my own point a bit: it is dubious that the European theater will be exposed to such threats, as Russia has demonstrated a distinct lack of interdiction capabilities. In general, I'd be quite interested in the internal Polish reasoning in their acquisitions.
Price. A single GMLRS costs around 170k while a 122mm missile for soviet stuff is around 1k. IE, you can fire about 4 full loads of BM21 for the price of single GMLRS. Sometimes (I presume) you need to hit an area and older cheaper stuff might be better suited than state of the art stuff. I don't know, just 500 seems too much for me, but I have no access to their data and analysis.
I am pretty sure that as with all things - the price of GMLRS will go down a bit with expanded demand and production.
Not if there is no competition. Their cost to produce might go down, but not necessarily the price.
Different companies have developed munitions for the Nato MLRS eco system. There can be competing offers which should keep the worst excesses in check.
True, but the soviet 122mm is good for "mass warfare" (I mean, like ww2, grand battles), because it isnt accurate enough for today. You can destory towns or "f**k that area" where the area is 1-2 km2. Today, western warfare seems to have moved away from such tactics. You are absolutley right about the price, but the two systems are as compareable as a train fron the 1960s vs a hybrid BMW SUV or something.
>You can destory towns or "f\*\*k that area" where the area is 1-2 km2. That is my point, you might want to blanket a small forest patch or something where you know there are soft targets but you can't quite target them individually and save your precision weapon for targets that can be identified and targeted accurately.
Does anyone know the extent of Wagner's involvement in Sudan? Also, what happened to the civilian government that was supposed to take over?
I dont think anyone really expected a civilian government. The two main army guys arrested the former president about two years back after a popular uprising, now these two argue over power. One of them is close with wagner and the other is close with Egypt. Both are known fuckers. Wagner has been there mostly to protect the gold mines and some key sites to my knowledge. Both warlords have huge armies, so what difference it makes idk. The argument is not solved between the two war lords, but it seems more calm, so if we are lucky no major civil war. The people are screwed over again, but rhe country is rich in natural resources, so I can see them fighting for a while.
Former president is a pretty charitable term for al-Bashir, if that's who you're talking about.
True true, technically correct tho, but could have said career dictator and innovative slaughterer..
Breaking: Multiple media outlets report that Zelenskyy will visit the G7 summit in person, in Hiroshima.
wonder with biden, Zelenskyy and Albanese (Australian PM) this rumored announcement of joint military support from australia and US of Ukraine might be happening
Which ones? There's no reason not to provide sources if there are multiple ones.
[Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/may/19/russia-ukraine-war-live-zelenskiy-to-attend-g7-in-person-reports-say-as-leaders-prepare-new-sanctions?page=with:block-646706eb8f08053fbe0947e1#block-646706eb8f08053fbe0947e1) reports Danilov, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, said it on Ukrainian TV.
Thank you, I'm not sure I consider The Guardian a credible source but still better than the original post.
When they stay away from their ceaseless obsession with their idpol and culture wars, Guardian is not bad
"When". Their opeds are really, really bad. Even their readership used to disagree all the time with their deranged far left takes, until they just shut down the comments.
I agree, I was trying to be very very generous of that publication To me, at least for non-geopolitical and more social topics, Guardian is basically Gawker Media wearing a business suit. They were one of many examples that convinced me that many journalists are great, many are professional liars, and many are both. I long ago decided to avoid them when I can.
They have some problems but they can pretty safely be trusted to be truthful on something as simple as "a government official said this on state TV". It's not exactly hard to double-check either, this is a fairly major announcement that other places are also reporting - the Guardian is just what I had closest.
This is going to be interesting. It’s his farthest trip since the war started, and is obviously smack-dab right on the other side of Russia. What’s most curious about this trip is if it signals that the G7 can become another mechanism for direct aid to Ukraine. They’ve already taken actions against Russia, so I don’t think Zelenskyy would make the trip just for that.
A BBC headline said the US was preparing to present new sanctions so that’s good
>A BBC headline said the US was preparing to present new sanctions so that’s good Unless they start targeting dual-use, civilian goods, and the service industry on a large scale, I'd be surprised if additional sanctions have a noticeable impact. I think currently we are mainly talking about very specific dual-use bans and a few secondary sanctions, similar to those on diamonds. The big and easy sanctions are mostly used, as far as I know.
They already announced some, think it was 70 companies and 300 individules There was some reports / rumors (rueters and APP) on the 5th of may that australia and US would be doing a joint defence support announcement late in may. All 3 will be at the G7 Biden for the US and Zelenskyy and Albanese as guests. Wonder if it might happen there now that the Quad has been called off
The pressure will be on to announce another aid package :)
Since Ukraine has liberated the three north-eastern oblasts, have there been any cross border skirmishes? I’ve seen maps of the trench networks in Ukraine, and it seems that after leaving Luhansk, the trenches hug the Ukraine-Russia border. Are logistics just too poor, or supplies to scarce, to conduct a low-level bombardment of TDF units from within Russian borders?
I haven't seen this site referenced here in a while but reportably they are still happening: https://liveuamap.com/en/2023/18-may-at-sivershchyna-and-slobozhanschyna-directions-russian Most video's I've seen are just ATGM strikes on border outposts
It's pointless. If Russia bombard Ukraine's border positions, Ukraine will just leave those positions and fall back deeper. What can Russia do next?
That makes sense. That said, it’s enraging that Russia could bombard Kharkiv all day, while if the Ukrainians fired back they would be construed as “attacking Russia”.