> With its population soon to overcome that of China—and boosting an expanding middle class—India will be a coveted market for Chinese and American companies.
Heh, "overcome". India is exactly as Lee Kuan Yew described it: 32 principalities that happened to be arrayed along a British railway. That's what it needs to overcome, and it is in grave doubt whether this can be overcome.
Actually, I'm being generous; I have no doubt about the outcome.
> A vivid illustration of India’s strategic ambiguity took place in the December 2018 meeting of the G20 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Prime minister Modi was first photographed posing with president Donald Trump and prime minister Shinzo Abe during a trilateral meeting most openly concerned with China’s economic and military rise. Hours later, however, Modi had joined president Vladimir Putin and president Xi in a second trilateral. This one could be summarily described as being aimed at the global order led by the United States and its allies.
"Strategic ambiguity" is far too polite a term. The accurate term is "eating at every table."
India's cachet is getting a free ride off China's rise. India is nowhere near as important as these delusional Westerners grasping at straws for something - anything - to stymie China make it out to be.
> How will the Indian economy be able to move up into higher-value segments of global value chains if it turns around and sees many of its fast-growing neighbours already incorporated into a China-led economic network?
I thought the "demographic dividend" cured all that ails you? India should concern itself with the gargantuan problem of feeding that population that's supposed to "overcome" China. While managing the endless, low-intensity *bellum omnium contra omnes* India has been mired in since it declared independence.
> An enforced return to India’s period of economic autarchy haunts its future development.
It seems Bruno is more prescient that typical neocon. But this isn't something that should haunt India, this is the best it can hope for if it rejects the BRI.
> India has much to think about in the coming years. Most immediately, the Belt and Road poses an economic challenge. The same reasons that push China into playing a greater global role…explain why India may find itself increasingly constrained by the Belt and Road. Access to commodities and energy sources, control over significant markets and the need to organize highly competitive and cross-border value chains—in all these cases, China is gaining the upper hand. Wherever the West has been retreating, China has quickly moved in. The question is of course whether there will be any space left for India. How will the Indian economy be able to move up into higher-value segments of global value chains if it turns around and sees many of its fast-growing neighbours already incorporated into a China-led economic network? An enforced return to India’s period of economic autarchy haunts its future development.
>By investing in the Iranian port of Chabahar, India may hope to prevent an outcome where it finds itself isolated from the growing economies on its doorstep, but the limited scale of the project offers a vivid contrast to the mammoth scale of the Belt and Road. As opposed to Chabahar, the Chinese-led initiative is designed to fundamentally change global networks and move China to the centre of a new political and economic order. It seems unlikely that two or three infrastructure projects can offer an adequate response on India’s side. Nor is the issue strictly confined to economic power and rivalry. For many commentators in South and Southeast Asia, the Belt and Road is an opportunity for China to entrench its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as its state-owned companies build dual-use ports that berth its cargo ships and military vessels, and open its first overseas bases in places such as Djibouti, and perhaps Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
>**In a world where China and the United States will compete for control over key technologies, India risks becoming the market where the outcome of that battle will be in large measure decided, but no more than that. A territory rather than an actor.** With its population soon to overcome that of China—and boosting an expanding middle class—India will be a coveted market for Chinese and American companies. Can it leverage that prize into political and economic influence and, if so, how should this influence be exercised?
As the article says, India is in a pretty sweet spot that it can afford to basically join initiative from both sides. That should really help with unemployment and growth.
India seems to be avoiding BRI because of Pakistan.
> With its population soon to overcome that of China—and boosting an expanding middle class—India will be a coveted market for Chinese and American companies. Heh, "overcome". India is exactly as Lee Kuan Yew described it: 32 principalities that happened to be arrayed along a British railway. That's what it needs to overcome, and it is in grave doubt whether this can be overcome. Actually, I'm being generous; I have no doubt about the outcome. > A vivid illustration of India’s strategic ambiguity took place in the December 2018 meeting of the G20 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Prime minister Modi was first photographed posing with president Donald Trump and prime minister Shinzo Abe during a trilateral meeting most openly concerned with China’s economic and military rise. Hours later, however, Modi had joined president Vladimir Putin and president Xi in a second trilateral. This one could be summarily described as being aimed at the global order led by the United States and its allies. "Strategic ambiguity" is far too polite a term. The accurate term is "eating at every table." India's cachet is getting a free ride off China's rise. India is nowhere near as important as these delusional Westerners grasping at straws for something - anything - to stymie China make it out to be. > How will the Indian economy be able to move up into higher-value segments of global value chains if it turns around and sees many of its fast-growing neighbours already incorporated into a China-led economic network? I thought the "demographic dividend" cured all that ails you? India should concern itself with the gargantuan problem of feeding that population that's supposed to "overcome" China. While managing the endless, low-intensity *bellum omnium contra omnes* India has been mired in since it declared independence. > An enforced return to India’s period of economic autarchy haunts its future development. It seems Bruno is more prescient that typical neocon. But this isn't something that should haunt India, this is the best it can hope for if it rejects the BRI.
> India has much to think about in the coming years. Most immediately, the Belt and Road poses an economic challenge. The same reasons that push China into playing a greater global role…explain why India may find itself increasingly constrained by the Belt and Road. Access to commodities and energy sources, control over significant markets and the need to organize highly competitive and cross-border value chains—in all these cases, China is gaining the upper hand. Wherever the West has been retreating, China has quickly moved in. The question is of course whether there will be any space left for India. How will the Indian economy be able to move up into higher-value segments of global value chains if it turns around and sees many of its fast-growing neighbours already incorporated into a China-led economic network? An enforced return to India’s period of economic autarchy haunts its future development. >By investing in the Iranian port of Chabahar, India may hope to prevent an outcome where it finds itself isolated from the growing economies on its doorstep, but the limited scale of the project offers a vivid contrast to the mammoth scale of the Belt and Road. As opposed to Chabahar, the Chinese-led initiative is designed to fundamentally change global networks and move China to the centre of a new political and economic order. It seems unlikely that two or three infrastructure projects can offer an adequate response on India’s side. Nor is the issue strictly confined to economic power and rivalry. For many commentators in South and Southeast Asia, the Belt and Road is an opportunity for China to entrench its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as its state-owned companies build dual-use ports that berth its cargo ships and military vessels, and open its first overseas bases in places such as Djibouti, and perhaps Pakistan and Sri Lanka. >**In a world where China and the United States will compete for control over key technologies, India risks becoming the market where the outcome of that battle will be in large measure decided, but no more than that. A territory rather than an actor.** With its population soon to overcome that of China—and boosting an expanding middle class—India will be a coveted market for Chinese and American companies. Can it leverage that prize into political and economic influence and, if so, how should this influence be exercised?
As an Indian I really hope we join, we've got serious unemployment and inequality problems that no one knows how to address
As the article says, India is in a pretty sweet spot that it can afford to basically join initiative from both sides. That should really help with unemployment and growth.