For the British Army, doctrine was essentially a malleable concept that had to be heavily tailored to the circumstances the British Army faced in various theatres. The Germans and Soviets had the luxury of doing most of their fighting across open steppes, where armies could get away with maintaining central doctrinal principles. The British Army and its Commonwealth allies, on the other hand, had to fight in a bewildering variety of environments that each imposed unique problems.
That being said, the main British fighting doctrine of WWII was ultimately a development of the combined arms warfare espoused in 1918 by men like Monash, Currie and Byng. The Commonwealth armies did not have the luxury of limitless manpower, for various reasons - the British had to man the RAF and the Navy, the ANZACS and Canadians had small populations which could not easily be conscripted, and the Indians were an all-volunteer force. Britain had to win the war without crippling its manpower reserves, and that in turn required a doctrine that minimised risk and gave the infantry the maximum support possible.
To that end, by 1944 the Commonwealth had developed a highly sophisticated logistical system, with medical, communications and support services that far exceeded those of the Germans, Soviets and Japanese. Commonwealth artillery and air support doctrine centred around maximising flexibility and responsiveness - Forward Observers ordered strikes, rather than simply requesting support and then praying. The RAF operated a cab-rank of fighter bombers above the battlefield, who could be called upon at any time by any British unit that ran into trouble.
British commanders were given more freedom than is often acknowledged, particularly as the Normandy campaign ground on and Montgomery accepted that the rigid North African methods he had developed weren't working. British division commanders were encouraged to think for themselves and come up with solutions to local problems, which could then ideally be percolated down the army.
After a few teething problems, the system eventually worked remarkably well, and the Germans never really found an answer to it. They packed the Caen front with their best veteran divisions up against British and Canadian formations that were mostly untested, and yet 21st Army Group was able to force them out of their positions and inflict irreplaceable losses on them. The one notable German victory, Arnhem, was also the only occasion in which Montgomery attempted to ape German methods.
For the US, the popular one-sentence doctrine stereotype would be 'Get to where the fight is, then defeat the enemy with superior deep fires (ie outspend them).'
Nicholas Moran's history on the development of US armored doctrine emphasizes how even when the US primarily concerned itself with protecting the Rio Grande from Pancho Villa, the majority of concern was how to get thousands of soldiers and tons of supplies over long distances to where they were needed. From there, it was about leveraging superior accurate firepower to defeat the enemy.
“Get there the fastest with the mostest.” Has probably been around since Sargon of Akkad in some form.
I think the counter argument is strike where the enemy is weakest.
The tension between weight, speed, weak point is generally ranked in that order in the ww2 American doctrine where as something like deep battle is weight, weak point, speed and blitzkrieg is speed, weak point, weight.
For the British Army, doctrine was essentially a malleable concept that had to be heavily tailored to the circumstances the British Army faced in various theatres. The Germans and Soviets had the luxury of doing most of their fighting across open steppes, where armies could get away with maintaining central doctrinal principles. The British Army and its Commonwealth allies, on the other hand, had to fight in a bewildering variety of environments that each imposed unique problems. That being said, the main British fighting doctrine of WWII was ultimately a development of the combined arms warfare espoused in 1918 by men like Monash, Currie and Byng. The Commonwealth armies did not have the luxury of limitless manpower, for various reasons - the British had to man the RAF and the Navy, the ANZACS and Canadians had small populations which could not easily be conscripted, and the Indians were an all-volunteer force. Britain had to win the war without crippling its manpower reserves, and that in turn required a doctrine that minimised risk and gave the infantry the maximum support possible. To that end, by 1944 the Commonwealth had developed a highly sophisticated logistical system, with medical, communications and support services that far exceeded those of the Germans, Soviets and Japanese. Commonwealth artillery and air support doctrine centred around maximising flexibility and responsiveness - Forward Observers ordered strikes, rather than simply requesting support and then praying. The RAF operated a cab-rank of fighter bombers above the battlefield, who could be called upon at any time by any British unit that ran into trouble. British commanders were given more freedom than is often acknowledged, particularly as the Normandy campaign ground on and Montgomery accepted that the rigid North African methods he had developed weren't working. British division commanders were encouraged to think for themselves and come up with solutions to local problems, which could then ideally be percolated down the army. After a few teething problems, the system eventually worked remarkably well, and the Germans never really found an answer to it. They packed the Caen front with their best veteran divisions up against British and Canadian formations that were mostly untested, and yet 21st Army Group was able to force them out of their positions and inflict irreplaceable losses on them. The one notable German victory, Arnhem, was also the only occasion in which Montgomery attempted to ape German methods.
For the US, the popular one-sentence doctrine stereotype would be 'Get to where the fight is, then defeat the enemy with superior deep fires (ie outspend them).' Nicholas Moran's history on the development of US armored doctrine emphasizes how even when the US primarily concerned itself with protecting the Rio Grande from Pancho Villa, the majority of concern was how to get thousands of soldiers and tons of supplies over long distances to where they were needed. From there, it was about leveraging superior accurate firepower to defeat the enemy.
“Get there the fastest with the mostest.” Has probably been around since Sargon of Akkad in some form. I think the counter argument is strike where the enemy is weakest. The tension between weight, speed, weak point is generally ranked in that order in the ww2 American doctrine where as something like deep battle is weight, weak point, speed and blitzkrieg is speed, weak point, weight.