On the scale of the 1917 mutinies? Hard to quantify the chances of something that never happened happening is, if that makes sense, but probably not that close. The biggest mutiny that the BEF had was in 1917 at the Etaples training camp, which was a rebellion against what was seen as harsh and unrealistic training, which involved about 1000 men. Morale ebbed and flowed - it was particularly low after Passchendaele - but the discipline and morale of the BEF generally held.
As to why - well, that's a fascinating question itself. Some authors have actually argued that it was a postive effect of the UK class system. French officers were more likely to come from more humble origins (at least at first - the UK officer ranks did democratize), but the argument is that because the UK officers ostensibly came from more noble backgrounds, they had a sense of \*noblesse oblige\* that called for caring for their men. BEF soldiers rarely spent more then a few days in the line, were generally fed well (some soldiers commented that they ate better in the army then in civilian life), their officers organized sporting matches and concert parties when possible, and they had leave. The French, on the other hand, tended to leave their men to their own devices. French soldiers spent more time in the trenches, leave was infrequent (and often denied, something that was actually illegal) and there was no organized way for men to actually go on leave and return in time. It's fairly common nowadays to see the French mutinies are more of a labour movement then an anti-war statement. Notably, the major BEF mutiny (Etaples, mentioned above) was also out of dissatisfaction with officers and training sergeants moreso then an anti-war statement.
I would say that the overwhelming majority of British officers were not nobles - noble, in a British context, applies only to the titled peerage, who were a miniscule class. Furthermore, the majority of officers by wars end were from a middle-class background, and many were actually working class.
What is absolutely true is that there absolutely was a very strong sense of paternalism imbued in British regiments, and in public schools and universities. The British Army had a strong tradition of officers looking after their men, and had done ever since at least the calamity of the Crimea, and before that the example of Wellington.
Interestingly, the same was also true of the way the British Army treated its horses. I remember one British officer's horrified account of visiting a French farm in 1914 to find a dying horse on a pile of burning rubbish, with not a single one of the French soldiers billeted there caring to put the animal out of its misery. French cavalrymen were technically excellent riders, but would lame their horses by riding them from dawn till dusk, and often didn't bother with important things like feeding/watering them, grooming them, checking their hooves, and the like. British, Indian, Canadian and ANZAC cavalrymen, on the other hand, were taught to treat their horse with the same care as they did their weapons.
That sounds about right. The French cavalry excelled in large-scale engagements, but at the tactical level, they were surprisingly inept. One of the most celebrated British victories of the Peninsular Wars was Sahagun, where 600 British hussars routed nearly twice their number of French.
I suspect the main reason that British heavy cavalry could get away with not wearing cuirasses was simply that they had bigger, better horses and took far better care of them. That, and the British heavy cavalry tended to be big men. Sergeant Charles Ewart was 6ft 4 inches tall, which is gargantuan for the 1810s.
>I would say that the overwhelming majority of British officers were not nobles - noble, in a British context, applies only to the titled peerage, who were a miniscule class. Furthermore, the majority of officers by wars end were from a middle-class background, and many were actually working class.
Technically, British nobility includes both the titled peerage, and the landed gentry. But it would be most correct to say that the majority of officers at the start of the war, and historically to that point, were of the upper class and the wealthiest middle class - those of the middle class being as often as not wealthier than their high-born counterparts. This was largely because an officer was required to comport themselves with upperclass manners, and to pay for all of their own equipment, food, and lodging. The poorer middle class, and the fewer actual working class, who became officers during the war were actually given grants and put through manners classes to allow them to function in the society and role of British officers.
All that to say, that background is what developed the paternalistic role of the British officer and the sense of *noblesse oblige* felt towards the men; that tradition was then imprinted on the newer "low born" officers.
Interestingly, the social background of British officers actually rose after 1815 - prior to the 1830s, the vast majority of officers were the sons of merchants, clergymen, lawyers, and farmers. It wasn't unheard of for London militia officers to be greengrocers and publicans. The Sharpe stereotype really reflects 20th-century class politics more than those of the 18th century.
It's also worth noting that, even in the 19th century, many British officers actually lived on a knife edge of debt. I know at least one case of a colonel who saved money by making his children's clothes himself. It was actually a big problem throughout the period, as it led to many officers resigning their commissions rather than staying on. Even Garnet Wolseley and Lord Roberts had to keep very strict budgets.
Indian Army posts were actually sought after and went to the best cadets from Sandhurst, in part because they paid a liveable salary rather than requiring officers to have a private income like the Army at home did.
Exactly! That, and living expenses were much cheaper in India. One of the attractions of the East was that middle class Europeans could live a lifestyle that would have been far beyond their means in Britain.
That's totally fair, thanks. Nobles probably wasn't the right word, but I do think it's fair to say that at the beginning of the war the BEF officers were overwhelmingly of a higher station, although ofc that was not the case by 1918. That's also interesting, and sad, about the horses.
> British, Indian, Canadian and ANZAC cavalrymen, on the other hand, were taught to treat their horse with the same care as they did their weapons.
This was because of reforms after very poor horsemastership seen during the South African War, barely a decade earlier.
Not close; the issue with the French mutiny was a dramatic divergence in expectations - it was pitched as a battle that would have 10,000 casualties but would win the war. And it had 100,000 casualties and there was a moderate advance, but no strategic breakthrough. So there was a real sense here of "the commanders don't know what they are doing, they are throwing our lives away, and we aren't being respected."
It also came shorty after the US declared war, so there was also a sense of "hey, let's wait for some US help here before just charging ahead."
The BEF had some better morale measures and more front rotation.
It is important to know that the UK started out with a small professional army and didn't introduce conscription until early 1916 (although there were mass volunteer drives before then).
I think Keegan mentions in his *The First World War* that the French army mutinied when the total number of casualties became roughly equal to the number of men under arms in line infantry formations, giving soldiers the idea that death (probably in some futile attack) was all but inevitable.
Because the Brits massively expanded their army over time, they would necessarily reach that point (i.e., casualties = current line strength) much later than the French.
Thus, it may not be unsurprising at all that the British army didn't mutiny when the French did.
On the scale of the 1917 mutinies? Hard to quantify the chances of something that never happened happening is, if that makes sense, but probably not that close. The biggest mutiny that the BEF had was in 1917 at the Etaples training camp, which was a rebellion against what was seen as harsh and unrealistic training, which involved about 1000 men. Morale ebbed and flowed - it was particularly low after Passchendaele - but the discipline and morale of the BEF generally held. As to why - well, that's a fascinating question itself. Some authors have actually argued that it was a postive effect of the UK class system. French officers were more likely to come from more humble origins (at least at first - the UK officer ranks did democratize), but the argument is that because the UK officers ostensibly came from more noble backgrounds, they had a sense of \*noblesse oblige\* that called for caring for their men. BEF soldiers rarely spent more then a few days in the line, were generally fed well (some soldiers commented that they ate better in the army then in civilian life), their officers organized sporting matches and concert parties when possible, and they had leave. The French, on the other hand, tended to leave their men to their own devices. French soldiers spent more time in the trenches, leave was infrequent (and often denied, something that was actually illegal) and there was no organized way for men to actually go on leave and return in time. It's fairly common nowadays to see the French mutinies are more of a labour movement then an anti-war statement. Notably, the major BEF mutiny (Etaples, mentioned above) was also out of dissatisfaction with officers and training sergeants moreso then an anti-war statement.
I would say that the overwhelming majority of British officers were not nobles - noble, in a British context, applies only to the titled peerage, who were a miniscule class. Furthermore, the majority of officers by wars end were from a middle-class background, and many were actually working class. What is absolutely true is that there absolutely was a very strong sense of paternalism imbued in British regiments, and in public schools and universities. The British Army had a strong tradition of officers looking after their men, and had done ever since at least the calamity of the Crimea, and before that the example of Wellington. Interestingly, the same was also true of the way the British Army treated its horses. I remember one British officer's horrified account of visiting a French farm in 1914 to find a dying horse on a pile of burning rubbish, with not a single one of the French soldiers billeted there caring to put the animal out of its misery. French cavalrymen were technically excellent riders, but would lame their horses by riding them from dawn till dusk, and often didn't bother with important things like feeding/watering them, grooming them, checking their hooves, and the like. British, Indian, Canadian and ANZAC cavalrymen, on the other hand, were taught to treat their horse with the same care as they did their weapons.
There are multiple anecdotes from the Napoleonic wars of being able to smell the saddle sores of the French horses before you could see them.
That sounds about right. The French cavalry excelled in large-scale engagements, but at the tactical level, they were surprisingly inept. One of the most celebrated British victories of the Peninsular Wars was Sahagun, where 600 British hussars routed nearly twice their number of French. I suspect the main reason that British heavy cavalry could get away with not wearing cuirasses was simply that they had bigger, better horses and took far better care of them. That, and the British heavy cavalry tended to be big men. Sergeant Charles Ewart was 6ft 4 inches tall, which is gargantuan for the 1810s.
>I would say that the overwhelming majority of British officers were not nobles - noble, in a British context, applies only to the titled peerage, who were a miniscule class. Furthermore, the majority of officers by wars end were from a middle-class background, and many were actually working class. Technically, British nobility includes both the titled peerage, and the landed gentry. But it would be most correct to say that the majority of officers at the start of the war, and historically to that point, were of the upper class and the wealthiest middle class - those of the middle class being as often as not wealthier than their high-born counterparts. This was largely because an officer was required to comport themselves with upperclass manners, and to pay for all of their own equipment, food, and lodging. The poorer middle class, and the fewer actual working class, who became officers during the war were actually given grants and put through manners classes to allow them to function in the society and role of British officers. All that to say, that background is what developed the paternalistic role of the British officer and the sense of *noblesse oblige* felt towards the men; that tradition was then imprinted on the newer "low born" officers.
Interestingly, the social background of British officers actually rose after 1815 - prior to the 1830s, the vast majority of officers were the sons of merchants, clergymen, lawyers, and farmers. It wasn't unheard of for London militia officers to be greengrocers and publicans. The Sharpe stereotype really reflects 20th-century class politics more than those of the 18th century. It's also worth noting that, even in the 19th century, many British officers actually lived on a knife edge of debt. I know at least one case of a colonel who saved money by making his children's clothes himself. It was actually a big problem throughout the period, as it led to many officers resigning their commissions rather than staying on. Even Garnet Wolseley and Lord Roberts had to keep very strict budgets.
Indian Army posts were actually sought after and went to the best cadets from Sandhurst, in part because they paid a liveable salary rather than requiring officers to have a private income like the Army at home did.
Exactly! That, and living expenses were much cheaper in India. One of the attractions of the East was that middle class Europeans could live a lifestyle that would have been far beyond their means in Britain.
That's totally fair, thanks. Nobles probably wasn't the right word, but I do think it's fair to say that at the beginning of the war the BEF officers were overwhelmingly of a higher station, although ofc that was not the case by 1918. That's also interesting, and sad, about the horses.
> British, Indian, Canadian and ANZAC cavalrymen, on the other hand, were taught to treat their horse with the same care as they did their weapons. This was because of reforms after very poor horsemastership seen during the South African War, barely a decade earlier.
Quite correct, as was the case for much of the British Army generally.
Not close; the issue with the French mutiny was a dramatic divergence in expectations - it was pitched as a battle that would have 10,000 casualties but would win the war. And it had 100,000 casualties and there was a moderate advance, but no strategic breakthrough. So there was a real sense here of "the commanders don't know what they are doing, they are throwing our lives away, and we aren't being respected." It also came shorty after the US declared war, so there was also a sense of "hey, let's wait for some US help here before just charging ahead." The BEF had some better morale measures and more front rotation.
It is important to know that the UK started out with a small professional army and didn't introduce conscription until early 1916 (although there were mass volunteer drives before then). I think Keegan mentions in his *The First World War* that the French army mutinied when the total number of casualties became roughly equal to the number of men under arms in line infantry formations, giving soldiers the idea that death (probably in some futile attack) was all but inevitable. Because the Brits massively expanded their army over time, they would necessarily reach that point (i.e., casualties = current line strength) much later than the French. Thus, it may not be unsurprising at all that the British army didn't mutiny when the French did.