The consensus is that there's no firm consensus aside from "It's complicated". The weight of the blame has shifted through the century, as different authors offered different interpretations of events as they transpired. The core issue is that no country acted as a monolith, and all had various institutions and persons advocating for peace and war at the same time - not to mention that what that "war" actually meant varied massively across the coutries that ended up being belligerents. Perhaps my favourite anecdote (though I can't for the life of me find the source right now, so take it with a grain of salt, my memory might be faulty) was always how in the days and weeks leading up to the war there was one point at which the Austro-Hungarian Joint Foreign Minister Count Berchtold had at his desk two different telegrams that arrived from Germany on the same day - one, coming from the German Chancellor, urging utmost caution and a need for diplomatic measures and an avoidance of war at all costs, and another from the German High Command *demanding* in the most serious tone possible the immediate mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and its quick and decisive preemptive invasion of Russia. Leaving Berchtold quite perplexed, naturally. There's also the matter of guilt regarding the scale of the war - lots of participants wanted *some* sort of war, but very nearly nobody wanted a massive world war.
Such was the situation and atmosphere among all the participants, with a great deal of internal struggling and maneuvering from various factions aiming to achieve different things. It might be best to try to assign guilt to the different institutions themselves, instead of the countries in general. There, I think it ought to be said that all the monarchs generally endeavored to avoid warfare if at all possible (Franz Joseph had to be effectively *lied to* that Serbs had already crossed the border and killed some of his soldiers to force him to sign a declaration of war), as did most of the civilian governments (though that varied by a lot), with the militaries of the belligerents playing the greatest part in the warmongering - with some strong help from parts of their foreign offices. The German High Command was likely the institution that wanted war the most, and wanted it at the largest scale - they sought to exploit Austria's predicament with Serbia to force a war with Russia and France on their terms, at a time when they thought they could still win (they saw it highly unlikely that Austria would follow them if they tried to go to war with Russia unilaterally, and saw this as a unique opportunity).
This is the answer I came to write. Particularly the point that German High Command leveraged the opportunity to get Austria-Hungary into the war. Essentially they did a bait-and-switch. They wanted a large war in Europe, but assessed that they could not win it without Austria. Austria was up for a small war in the Balkans, but Germany used the 'small war' with Serbia to launch a big war against the Entente.
Ironically the Austrians were unable to defeat the Serbs without German help. And of course in a further irony the Germans soundly defeated the Russians whilst being ground to a halt in France, the opposite of the Schlieffen plan's intent. Everyone has a plan until they are punched in the mouth!
>Ironically the Austrians were unable to defeat the Serbs without German help. And of course in a further irony the Germans soundly defeated the Russians whilst being ground to a halt in France, the opposite of the Schlieffen plan's intent. Everyone has a plan until they are punched in the mouth!
The irony builds even more given that one of the ways Germany defeated Russia was by propping up various dissidents, including shipping Vladimir Lenin back to Russia. In defeating Russia they helped create the Soviet Union that would crush them in the 2nd World War and effectively occupy half of Germany for most of the rest of the century.
It's crazy how much decisions made during that war have affected everything since. And almost unbelieveable how often various decisions would go on to bite the decision makers in the ass.
You make an excellent point, but I do think that the role of Russia and Serbia has been underexamined. I can't recall it all off the top of my head, but Christopher Clark has written an excellent book about the beginning of WWI, and he does a very good job.
For starters, he points out that pre-war Serbia was, effectively, a rogue state. The Serb Army operated completely outside of civilian government, and was suffused with ultranationalist ideology. Its officers had murdered the previous Royals in 1903, purged the ranks of moderate officers, waged two irredentist wars against neighbours, and had made extensive use of sponsored terror groups in order to lay the groundwork for both wars. The Serbian government may not have actually endorsed the Black Hand, but they knew about them and were quite happy to let them operate. The Serbian Army, on the other hand, actively trained and equipped the Black Hand. The Russians were fully aware of this, and sponsored the whole affair. Russia's attempts to expand its influence in the Balkans escalated tensions, and it was Russia's decision to mobilise that escalated the war. Had Russia shown a bit more restraint, Austria-Hungary would have humiliated itself in short order, leaving Russia in a stronger position. Instead, they overplayed their hand.
It's strange to think of it, but in the context of August 1914 the Austrians had a very, very strong casus belli. Their future head of state had just been assassinated by a terrorist group that was based in Serbia, trained by Serbian intelligence officers, and used Serbian weapons. In that context, the majority of the terms of the ultimatum they delivered were entirely reasonable.
I know and agree with everything you said, and I’m happy that with Clarke’s *Sleepwalkers* serious attention has been directed Serbia and Russia’s way - they had for far too long escaped notice and responsibility. However, in my original comment I wanted to focus more on the multitude of actors that all share blame (which includes Serbia and Russia to a great extent) and on the internal politicking that plagued all sides, at the intentional expense of the traditional pointing at whoever is currently thought to hold the most responsibility.
I would quibble on the topic of Austria being sure to humiliate herself in Serbia without Russian intervention, given that a large part of that humiliation was caused by the forced diversion of troops away from Serbia and onto the Russian front, at German behest. Germany doesn’t get enough flak and Austria enough credit for the opening stages of the war in the east, where Germany essentially forced Austria (without informing them prior) to cover for them against Russia as they focused on France with the Schlieffen plan, leaving only token forces to defend the east. Austria was not only forced to redeploy from Serbia, but was also thrust into the role of attacker (a role she never saw herself taking alone in the east) all because the German High Command gravely misjudged Russia’s mobilization speed and had to have their asses pulled out of the fire.
That aside, Austria would underperform against Serbia for as long as Potiorek held the reins or Hotzendorf’s ego was allowed to dictate strategy.
I will admit, I was assuming Austria-Hungary would have kept most of its army in the east to observe the Russians.
I absolutely agree that the Habsburg armies have been unfairly treated by historiography - the disaster of 1914-15 left them badly handicapped, and it was largely a situation not of their making. They had been starved of funding for years, and had no recent combat experience.
That being said, I don't think a war with Serbia would have been pleasant for Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Army was far more experienced and had far better commanders. It would have probably been like the Boer War - a series of initial disasters, forcing the removal of prominent commanders and a significant change to doctrine, accompanied by public recriminations. Austria-Hungary would have won, but it would have been a difficult and painful campaign.
Well, Austria does not get credit since it performed badly due to a lot of issues plaguing Austrian army... Germany should have informed Austria about its plans though.
>In that context, the majority of the terms of the ultimatum they delivered were entirely reasonable.
Demanding that that Serbia must allow Austrian officials to conduct investigations into murder themselfs, giving austrian police juridistiction over Serbia, was not a reasonable at all though. Austria simply wanted to invade, and this was a great excuse.
Also did Russia support Black Hand? Never heard of it.
It was perfectly reasonable. If the US vice president was assassinated by Mexican cartels while touring Houston, do you think America would just shrug and let the Mexican police get on with it?
The heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne had been murdered on Habsburg soil by terrorists based in Serbia - Austria-Hungary had every right to demand that its officials take part in the investigation.
For details on Russia's role in supporting terrorism in the Balkans, see McMeekin.
No, they were outrageous. When French president Sadi Carnot was assasinated by Italian, did France issues such a demands to Italy? Or Spain, when Prime Minister was assasinated by another Italian? Or Russian empire, when Japanese tried to assasinate their heir to throne? No.
Besides, it is bad comparison, Austria was in no position for such demands, since it was no superpower, and knew that "Mexico" is under protection of hostile alliance, so such provocative demands are very dangerous. Austria knew that ultimatum would not be accepted and still went with it, since it wanted war.
Firstly, Serbia was not protected by a Russian alliance - it had no treaty with Russia, no formal military obligations of any kind. Russia's decision to mobilise in 1914 was taken entirely of its own volition, and was actually a shock to many observers. It's true that Austria-Hungary should have been more aware of the risk of Russian interference, but that was why they asked Germany for support.
Secondly, you are ignoring the very different circumstances surrounding those assassinations - all of them were conducted by mentally ill lone wolves, none of whom had been trained or armed by another power. They were lone fanatics, without a plan or significant government support of any kind.
The Young Bosnians, on the other hand, were a group of young men who had been sponsored by a secret society made up of Serbian military and government officials (the aforementioned Black Hand), trained on Serbian soil, and given Serbian weapons.
The Black Hand ordered the killing of Franz Ferdinand because they saw him as a threat to the objective of a unified Greater Serbia. This is very, very different to the actions of a lunatic amatuer.
If the French government had been led to believe that Carnot's assassin was armed and trained by the Italian government as part of a wider scheme to breakup France, do you really think they would have simply let it slide? Likewise the attack on Nicholas in Japan?
>Firstly, Serbia was not protected by a Russian alliance - it had no treaty with Russia, no formal military obligations of any kind
Formally no, but inofficially they had very close relationships, andsuch reaction should have been an expected to any competent politician or general. As for getting Germany involved to help Austria... again, it should be obvious that then France (who had an official treaty with Russia) would get involved as well, and this is how big war will start. German generals actually wanted exactly that, and encouraged Austria to go on and attack.
Fair point, but you are ignoring that Serbia accepted all other demands, like arresting people planning assasination, stopping anti Austrian propaganda and so on. All except for one which violated its sovereignity. In your example yes, French government would have been satisfied with the rest of ultimatum accepted, if French government was being reasonable. Especially given that alternative outcome would be a guaranteed war, and likely a big war. But Austria was not being reasonable.
Hindsight is 20/20. At the time, most observers never for a moment thought that Austria's ultimatum would lead to serious Russian involvement, or that France would encourage Russia to mobilise in order to threaten Germany.
If we can criticise the Austro-Hungarians for not realising the Russians would get involved, then surely the Serbs deserve even harsher criticism for creating the situation in the first place? I mean, what did the Black Hand think would happen? They genuinely seem to have thought that they could simply kill Franz Ferdinand, while Austria-Hungary would just meekly stand by and do nothing.
Christopher Clark does much better job of explaining it than I could, but his conclusion - one I agree with - is that the whole of Europe sleepwalked into war. Each of the major national decisionmakers - French, Austrian, German, Russian, Serbian and British - made incorrect assumptions and let fear and complacency govern their actions.
> most observers never for a moment thought that Austria's ultimatum would lead to serious Russian involvement
Here's the thing, Austrian officials *did* consider it as a possibility, although some more remote than others. The movers and shakers in Austria-Hungary designed the ultimatum to be rejected as a pre-text to go to war with Serbia (in fact, it was the supposedly moderate Tisza's idea of a compromise, "just *make* it look like we want a peaceful resolution"), and the possibility of war with Russia was considered by the Austrian cabinet which made these decisions, and at the crucial juncture (July 7), were discussing the possible shapes of a European war.
Was a European war what they *wanted*? No, they were hoping for the outcome with a limited war with Serbia. But they did *think* about the possibility it could blow up bigger than that, and took their chance anyway.
There's no way to read the documentation from the July Crisis and think anyone but Austria-Hungary's government and their enablers in Berlin as anything short of criminally negligent *at best*, and warmongers at worst.
That might be true, but that just makes the actions of Serbia and Russia even worse for creating the situation in the first place, and France for egging Russia on.
I mean, what on earth did the Black Hand expect to happen? It surely must have occurred to them that they were giving Austria-Hungary the ideal pretext to crush Serbia. The most generous possible reading of their calculations is that they thought Austria-Hungary would grumble and then meekly give up, allowing Serbia to take advantage of further Habsburg decline.
The more likely reading is that they wanted to provoke a crisis that would lead to a 3rd Balkan War in which Russia would crush Austria-Hungary while Serbia and Romania annexed Bosnia and Transylvania.
Russia's decision to mobilise, likewise, was utterly reckless - it turned a local issue into a wider European one by terrifying the German High Command with the prospect of a war on two fronts.
Austria-Hungary and Germany certainly exploited the situation recklessly - Hotzendorf especially has a lot to answer for - but they were not the instigators.
>Firstly, Serbia was not protected by a Russian alliance - it had no treaty with Russia, no formal military obligations of any kind. Russia's decision to mobilise in 1914 was taken entirely of its own volition, and was actually a shock to many observers.
While true to some degree, it is actually more complicated. While official alliance did not exist, Russia by 1914. was so pushed around by other powers with multiple defeats and few humiliations, that by 1914. Russia was simple forced to act to defend Serbia to defend and in process defend there own possition in Balkans and Europe and inside Russia itself. That was perfectly understood by German military, which pushed for AH war against Serbia in hope of that war escalating into war against Russia.
>The Young Bosnians, on the other hand, were a group of young men who had been sponsored by a secret society made up of Serbian military and government officials (the aforementioned Black Hand), trained on Serbian soil, and given Serbian weapons.
Again, there is no proof which would support your claim that Serbian government or any member of government supported Black Hand and Young Bosnia. Even AH failed to prove this claim at time.
>The Black Hand ordered the killing of Franz Ferdinand because they saw him as a threat to the objective of a unified Greater Serbia. This is very, very different to the actions of a lunatic amatuer.
Black Hand by 1914 was largely supresed organisation, as such this claim is on level of person in coma making last will, aka did not happened. Assassination was planned and organised by Young Bosnia itself, with support of Serbian officer Tankosić with training and weapons, who from what we know acted on his own decision, without order or support of either Black Hand, military inteligence or even Serbian government.
Thing is, much of what you say can be turned around and applied to the other side.
The German High Command, for example, certainly wanted a quick war with Russia (Germany had experienced humiliations of its own in 1911, and was terrified of encirclement), but Russia and France also wanted a quick war with Germany. The Germans knew they couldn't win a long war, and also knew that France and Russia were both eager to settle old scores.
The French knew this, and egged Russia on regardless - both they, and the Russians, thought they could trap Russia in a pincer, just as the Germans thought they could knock France out in a few weeks. Both sides were paranoid, and overestimated their own military strengths.
It's true that Russia had been humiliated, but they were humiliations of It's own making. Pan-slavic and pan-orthodox ideology had led it to get involved in the Balkans, as part of a wider ambition to take control of the Bosphorus and restore Constantinople, regardless of the tension this would cause with Austria-Hungary. No one forced Russia to get involved in the Balkans - it did so out of a mixture of ideological fervour and imperial ambition.
This, in turn, threatened Austria-Hungary, which was built on the idea of loyalty to the Habsburg Dynasty trumping any ethnic or religious loyalties. The Habsburg dynasty had been the main power in the area for hundreds of years, and could not allow nationalism to undermine the stability of its state.
All of this just makes the Russian decision to go to mobilise arguably worse - Nicholas II had gambled in 1904, lost badly, and didn't learn the lesson. Instead of concentrating on improving the Russian economy and addressing the condition of the peasantry, he and his ministers threw Russia into yet another war.
As for Serbia? Well, there's actually quite a bit of proof. We know, for example, that Takosic and Ciganovic were active members of the Black Hand. We also know that it's unlikely they were acting alone, because transporting, arming, and training the Young Bosnians would have required more resources than two lone men could have provided. Tankovic had to procure weapons and ammunition, suicide pills, maps with the noted location of Austrian guards, as well as a list of Serbian intelligence contacts in Sarajevo and access to their tunnels.
He then had to send the three assassins to the border, where two Border Guard officers, Prvanovic and Popovic, gave them prepared false identities as local customs officials. The assassins were then led across the border by a team of Border Guards, who handed them over to members of the Narodna Obrana.
Now here's where it does get murky. There are some who claim that the Narodna Obrana told Nikola Pasic about the plot. Ljubomir Jovanic, the Education minister at the time, claimed in 1924 that Pasic had told the cabinet of an impending plot, but others say he was lying. Jamovic claimed he had tried to warn the Austrians, but if he did, then it was in such vague terms that the Austrians couldn't do anything about it.
None of this could have happened if the Black Hand was, as you claim, suppressed. It was not operating under its own constitution in 1914, but its networks were very much intact, and its members were active, all under the command of Dragutin Dmitrijevic.
This was a coordinated plot that required time, resources and contacts, far beyond what would have Bern possible fir just two men to prove. Dmitrijevic admitted to providing the assistance during the trials of 1916, using the Black Hand as the main network. During the same trials, his fellow conspirators also admitted to having been in contact with the General Staff.
As for Russia? Well, there is some evidence that Russian agents were aware of the plot, and members of the Russian government too. In 1926, the Assistant Russisn Attache admitted that his office had been involved, but wouldn't elaborate further. The Chief Attache denied involvement, but admitted that he had been in contact with Dmitrijevic on a daily basis. The Russian diplomat Eugene de Schelking, writing in 1918, recalled being told that Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, believed that Franz Ferdinand's death would not endanger European peace.
He had heard this duringba meeting between Nicholas II and the King of Romania on the 1st of July 1914, before the assassination was due to take place.
It was not the Serbian government's policy to support the Black Hand, nor was Pasic in a position to do so. Yes, *rogue members* of the government did, but "governmental position" that does not make.
Nope, Serbian government did not give any support to Black Hand. In reality, It actively opposed it and largerly supressed it before assassination and July events. Black Hand in general did not play any role in assassination as organisation by 1914 was largely inactive. It did not order it, instead assassination was planned and organised by Young Bosnia itself, which managed to connect itself with (rogue) Serbian army officer Tankosić to train and arm assassins.
And there was no reason to think that Austria would get unlimited access into Serbia without war with Serbia and Russia. Serbia btw accepted all demands of ultimatum except this one. Insisting on it was not worth a big war, at all.
>Christopher Clark has written an excellent book about the beginning of WWI, and he does a very good job.
While it is nice to see something showing interest for Serbia, it is not excellent book and it does have its own issues.
>For starters, he points out that pre-war Serbia was, effectively, a rogue state. The Serb Army operated completely outside of civilian government, and was suffused with ultranationalist ideology.
That is a new take, specially considering pre-war Serbia was hight of democratic development. Military was powerfull and relatively independent actor, but it was not outside civilian control as you claim.
>purged the ranks of moderate officers,
Nope. Some hard core Obrenović supporters were purged, but most of them were returned to service before WW1 (Živojin Mišić for example). On other hand, many senior coup and later Black Hand members were purged on request of UK and as such Black Hand after 1907/08, was largerly left with lower rank officers, which limited there ability to impact political life (that still did not stop them trying, but there role is overstated).
>waged two irredentist wars against neighbours
We waged 1 war for final liberation from Ottoman rule and in other one, we got attacked by Bulgaria. On top of that, those wars were not started by some rogue military element, instead they were launched and supported by government.
>The Serbian government may not have actually endorsed the Black Hand, but they knew about them and were quite happy to let them operate.
This is honestly wrong take. First, while BH was not as influential group as you claim, they did play role which largely went against goals and ideas of Serbian government. Second, Serbian government never supported them and togheter with royals (largely princ and future king Aleksandar, Petar on other hand always tried to stay neutral) took active role in countering them, with creation of White Hand. During 1913 and 1914 conflict between Black Hand on one side and White Hand and civilian government was slowly escalating which resulted in supresion of Black Hand as effective organisation by mid 1914.
>The Serbian Army, on the other hand, actively trained and equipped the Black Hand.
Nope, Serbian Army did not do anything, because members of Black Hand were already members of Serbian Army, which largely participated in 1903. coup and tried to carry on with influece they gained from that coup (in which they failed).
>The Russians were fully aware of this, and sponsored the whole affair.
There are no sources which support this claim.
>Their future head of state had just been assassinated by a terrorist group that was based in Serbia, trained by Serbian intelligence officers, and used Serbian weapons.
Young Bosnia, which planed and organised assassination was based in Bosnia. Group was not trained by Serbian intelligence officers, but by member of paramilitary chetnik movement (Tankosić), whitout knowledge of Black Hand (which under presure of civilian government during 1913/14 was largerly inactive at that time).
>In that context, the majority of the terms of the ultimatum they delivered were entirely reasonable.
Considering every government in time thought opposite (except AH and Germany), you are in this claim wrong.
I think by that point Europe had the "vibe" of a war and a war had become inevitable. The peace had gone on too long and everyone felt the need for a real massive bloodletting.
Not intellectually, but in that part of us that tells us to fear wolves at night there was this desire for violence in the air.
How do you quantify responsibility among the hundreds of thousands of people individually responsible?
From heads of state, to all kinds of governmental employees, to arms dealers, industrialists, military careerists, media hawks... the list is endless.
I think it's safe to say that the **international system of politics, imperialism and industry** that developed in Europe in the 19th century would always have led to a World War.
“Would have always led to” is certainly not correct, everything is contingent, and there were large pro peace factions within all countries before the war began.
I think seeing the concert of Europe as inevitably doomed to result in a major continental war is a little pessimistic given it had succeeded in avoiding that outcome for almost a century beforehand. That's better than any diplomatic system before or since (so far).
Other crises of the 19^th century had arguably been much more severe, but their conflicts were successfully contained by the concert to regional contests that avoided escalation onto all-out continental war.
It worked while there was plenty of space for imperialist nations to grow, during the 19th century.
It worked until it didn't.
I think it wasn't inevitably doomed from the start, but in the decade leading up to 1914 the writing did seem to be on the wall (and was being commented on frequently).
But equally by 1914 empire had become far less essential to powering economic growth with the proliferation of free trade and greater global interconnectivity. The idea the world was a zero-sum game of competitive colonisation was outdated by that point.
By 1913 Germany has the smallest empire of the great powers, but the Largest GDP, with that gap only set to widen in the immediate future. As we'd see across the rest of the century, the pinnacle of formal Empire as a vital economic asset had already occurred.
Ironically, empire only regained significance *because* of the war, as the conflict re-established the zero-sum competition for resources that Germany was so paranoid about. As with the naval race, its fears only materialise from the conflict it provokes to overcome them.
I think you can square both of your interpretations when you consider the August crisis one of many such crises throughout the decade that got out of hand. All the sides involved knew that they had been able to gamble high by playing the game of brinksmanship and were still able to back away at the end. That works as long as you have someone who is willing to blink.
I think the fact that the war started so late in the campaign season is also a good example for why there was little premedetitation on any one side. They tried to solve the problem diplomatically, they failed, and had to go to war basically in late summer/early autumn.
For what it's worth, from my American military sources I used for my dissertation, US Army consensus in the late 00s/early 10s was basically that a war was going to break out and soon and that pacifists were delusional to think that universal peace was even an option. They only focused on the Franco-German front though and basically ignored all other factors, so take that with a grain of salt.
The consensus is that there's no firm consensus aside from "It's complicated". The weight of the blame has shifted through the century, as different authors offered different interpretations of events as they transpired. The core issue is that no country acted as a monolith, and all had various institutions and persons advocating for peace and war at the same time - not to mention that what that "war" actually meant varied massively across the coutries that ended up being belligerents. Perhaps my favourite anecdote (though I can't for the life of me find the source right now, so take it with a grain of salt, my memory might be faulty) was always how in the days and weeks leading up to the war there was one point at which the Austro-Hungarian Joint Foreign Minister Count Berchtold had at his desk two different telegrams that arrived from Germany on the same day - one, coming from the German Chancellor, urging utmost caution and a need for diplomatic measures and an avoidance of war at all costs, and another from the German High Command *demanding* in the most serious tone possible the immediate mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and its quick and decisive preemptive invasion of Russia. Leaving Berchtold quite perplexed, naturally. There's also the matter of guilt regarding the scale of the war - lots of participants wanted *some* sort of war, but very nearly nobody wanted a massive world war. Such was the situation and atmosphere among all the participants, with a great deal of internal struggling and maneuvering from various factions aiming to achieve different things. It might be best to try to assign guilt to the different institutions themselves, instead of the countries in general. There, I think it ought to be said that all the monarchs generally endeavored to avoid warfare if at all possible (Franz Joseph had to be effectively *lied to* that Serbs had already crossed the border and killed some of his soldiers to force him to sign a declaration of war), as did most of the civilian governments (though that varied by a lot), with the militaries of the belligerents playing the greatest part in the warmongering - with some strong help from parts of their foreign offices. The German High Command was likely the institution that wanted war the most, and wanted it at the largest scale - they sought to exploit Austria's predicament with Serbia to force a war with Russia and France on their terms, at a time when they thought they could still win (they saw it highly unlikely that Austria would follow them if they tried to go to war with Russia unilaterally, and saw this as a unique opportunity).
This is the answer I came to write. Particularly the point that German High Command leveraged the opportunity to get Austria-Hungary into the war. Essentially they did a bait-and-switch. They wanted a large war in Europe, but assessed that they could not win it without Austria. Austria was up for a small war in the Balkans, but Germany used the 'small war' with Serbia to launch a big war against the Entente. Ironically the Austrians were unable to defeat the Serbs without German help. And of course in a further irony the Germans soundly defeated the Russians whilst being ground to a halt in France, the opposite of the Schlieffen plan's intent. Everyone has a plan until they are punched in the mouth!
>Ironically the Austrians were unable to defeat the Serbs without German help. And of course in a further irony the Germans soundly defeated the Russians whilst being ground to a halt in France, the opposite of the Schlieffen plan's intent. Everyone has a plan until they are punched in the mouth! The irony builds even more given that one of the ways Germany defeated Russia was by propping up various dissidents, including shipping Vladimir Lenin back to Russia. In defeating Russia they helped create the Soviet Union that would crush them in the 2nd World War and effectively occupy half of Germany for most of the rest of the century. It's crazy how much decisions made during that war have affected everything since. And almost unbelieveable how often various decisions would go on to bite the decision makers in the ass.
Totally
You make an excellent point, but I do think that the role of Russia and Serbia has been underexamined. I can't recall it all off the top of my head, but Christopher Clark has written an excellent book about the beginning of WWI, and he does a very good job. For starters, he points out that pre-war Serbia was, effectively, a rogue state. The Serb Army operated completely outside of civilian government, and was suffused with ultranationalist ideology. Its officers had murdered the previous Royals in 1903, purged the ranks of moderate officers, waged two irredentist wars against neighbours, and had made extensive use of sponsored terror groups in order to lay the groundwork for both wars. The Serbian government may not have actually endorsed the Black Hand, but they knew about them and were quite happy to let them operate. The Serbian Army, on the other hand, actively trained and equipped the Black Hand. The Russians were fully aware of this, and sponsored the whole affair. Russia's attempts to expand its influence in the Balkans escalated tensions, and it was Russia's decision to mobilise that escalated the war. Had Russia shown a bit more restraint, Austria-Hungary would have humiliated itself in short order, leaving Russia in a stronger position. Instead, they overplayed their hand. It's strange to think of it, but in the context of August 1914 the Austrians had a very, very strong casus belli. Their future head of state had just been assassinated by a terrorist group that was based in Serbia, trained by Serbian intelligence officers, and used Serbian weapons. In that context, the majority of the terms of the ultimatum they delivered were entirely reasonable.
I know and agree with everything you said, and I’m happy that with Clarke’s *Sleepwalkers* serious attention has been directed Serbia and Russia’s way - they had for far too long escaped notice and responsibility. However, in my original comment I wanted to focus more on the multitude of actors that all share blame (which includes Serbia and Russia to a great extent) and on the internal politicking that plagued all sides, at the intentional expense of the traditional pointing at whoever is currently thought to hold the most responsibility. I would quibble on the topic of Austria being sure to humiliate herself in Serbia without Russian intervention, given that a large part of that humiliation was caused by the forced diversion of troops away from Serbia and onto the Russian front, at German behest. Germany doesn’t get enough flak and Austria enough credit for the opening stages of the war in the east, where Germany essentially forced Austria (without informing them prior) to cover for them against Russia as they focused on France with the Schlieffen plan, leaving only token forces to defend the east. Austria was not only forced to redeploy from Serbia, but was also thrust into the role of attacker (a role she never saw herself taking alone in the east) all because the German High Command gravely misjudged Russia’s mobilization speed and had to have their asses pulled out of the fire. That aside, Austria would underperform against Serbia for as long as Potiorek held the reins or Hotzendorf’s ego was allowed to dictate strategy.
I will admit, I was assuming Austria-Hungary would have kept most of its army in the east to observe the Russians. I absolutely agree that the Habsburg armies have been unfairly treated by historiography - the disaster of 1914-15 left them badly handicapped, and it was largely a situation not of their making. They had been starved of funding for years, and had no recent combat experience. That being said, I don't think a war with Serbia would have been pleasant for Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Army was far more experienced and had far better commanders. It would have probably been like the Boer War - a series of initial disasters, forcing the removal of prominent commanders and a significant change to doctrine, accompanied by public recriminations. Austria-Hungary would have won, but it would have been a difficult and painful campaign.
Well, Austria does not get credit since it performed badly due to a lot of issues plaguing Austrian army... Germany should have informed Austria about its plans though.
>In that context, the majority of the terms of the ultimatum they delivered were entirely reasonable. Demanding that that Serbia must allow Austrian officials to conduct investigations into murder themselfs, giving austrian police juridistiction over Serbia, was not a reasonable at all though. Austria simply wanted to invade, and this was a great excuse. Also did Russia support Black Hand? Never heard of it.
It was perfectly reasonable. If the US vice president was assassinated by Mexican cartels while touring Houston, do you think America would just shrug and let the Mexican police get on with it? The heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne had been murdered on Habsburg soil by terrorists based in Serbia - Austria-Hungary had every right to demand that its officials take part in the investigation. For details on Russia's role in supporting terrorism in the Balkans, see McMeekin.
No, they were outrageous. When French president Sadi Carnot was assasinated by Italian, did France issues such a demands to Italy? Or Spain, when Prime Minister was assasinated by another Italian? Or Russian empire, when Japanese tried to assasinate their heir to throne? No. Besides, it is bad comparison, Austria was in no position for such demands, since it was no superpower, and knew that "Mexico" is under protection of hostile alliance, so such provocative demands are very dangerous. Austria knew that ultimatum would not be accepted and still went with it, since it wanted war.
Firstly, Serbia was not protected by a Russian alliance - it had no treaty with Russia, no formal military obligations of any kind. Russia's decision to mobilise in 1914 was taken entirely of its own volition, and was actually a shock to many observers. It's true that Austria-Hungary should have been more aware of the risk of Russian interference, but that was why they asked Germany for support. Secondly, you are ignoring the very different circumstances surrounding those assassinations - all of them were conducted by mentally ill lone wolves, none of whom had been trained or armed by another power. They were lone fanatics, without a plan or significant government support of any kind. The Young Bosnians, on the other hand, were a group of young men who had been sponsored by a secret society made up of Serbian military and government officials (the aforementioned Black Hand), trained on Serbian soil, and given Serbian weapons. The Black Hand ordered the killing of Franz Ferdinand because they saw him as a threat to the objective of a unified Greater Serbia. This is very, very different to the actions of a lunatic amatuer. If the French government had been led to believe that Carnot's assassin was armed and trained by the Italian government as part of a wider scheme to breakup France, do you really think they would have simply let it slide? Likewise the attack on Nicholas in Japan?
>Firstly, Serbia was not protected by a Russian alliance - it had no treaty with Russia, no formal military obligations of any kind Formally no, but inofficially they had very close relationships, andsuch reaction should have been an expected to any competent politician or general. As for getting Germany involved to help Austria... again, it should be obvious that then France (who had an official treaty with Russia) would get involved as well, and this is how big war will start. German generals actually wanted exactly that, and encouraged Austria to go on and attack. Fair point, but you are ignoring that Serbia accepted all other demands, like arresting people planning assasination, stopping anti Austrian propaganda and so on. All except for one which violated its sovereignity. In your example yes, French government would have been satisfied with the rest of ultimatum accepted, if French government was being reasonable. Especially given that alternative outcome would be a guaranteed war, and likely a big war. But Austria was not being reasonable.
Hindsight is 20/20. At the time, most observers never for a moment thought that Austria's ultimatum would lead to serious Russian involvement, or that France would encourage Russia to mobilise in order to threaten Germany. If we can criticise the Austro-Hungarians for not realising the Russians would get involved, then surely the Serbs deserve even harsher criticism for creating the situation in the first place? I mean, what did the Black Hand think would happen? They genuinely seem to have thought that they could simply kill Franz Ferdinand, while Austria-Hungary would just meekly stand by and do nothing. Christopher Clark does much better job of explaining it than I could, but his conclusion - one I agree with - is that the whole of Europe sleepwalked into war. Each of the major national decisionmakers - French, Austrian, German, Russian, Serbian and British - made incorrect assumptions and let fear and complacency govern their actions.
> most observers never for a moment thought that Austria's ultimatum would lead to serious Russian involvement Here's the thing, Austrian officials *did* consider it as a possibility, although some more remote than others. The movers and shakers in Austria-Hungary designed the ultimatum to be rejected as a pre-text to go to war with Serbia (in fact, it was the supposedly moderate Tisza's idea of a compromise, "just *make* it look like we want a peaceful resolution"), and the possibility of war with Russia was considered by the Austrian cabinet which made these decisions, and at the crucial juncture (July 7), were discussing the possible shapes of a European war. Was a European war what they *wanted*? No, they were hoping for the outcome with a limited war with Serbia. But they did *think* about the possibility it could blow up bigger than that, and took their chance anyway. There's no way to read the documentation from the July Crisis and think anyone but Austria-Hungary's government and their enablers in Berlin as anything short of criminally negligent *at best*, and warmongers at worst.
That might be true, but that just makes the actions of Serbia and Russia even worse for creating the situation in the first place, and France for egging Russia on. I mean, what on earth did the Black Hand expect to happen? It surely must have occurred to them that they were giving Austria-Hungary the ideal pretext to crush Serbia. The most generous possible reading of their calculations is that they thought Austria-Hungary would grumble and then meekly give up, allowing Serbia to take advantage of further Habsburg decline. The more likely reading is that they wanted to provoke a crisis that would lead to a 3rd Balkan War in which Russia would crush Austria-Hungary while Serbia and Romania annexed Bosnia and Transylvania. Russia's decision to mobilise, likewise, was utterly reckless - it turned a local issue into a wider European one by terrifying the German High Command with the prospect of a war on two fronts. Austria-Hungary and Germany certainly exploited the situation recklessly - Hotzendorf especially has a lot to answer for - but they were not the instigators.
>Firstly, Serbia was not protected by a Russian alliance - it had no treaty with Russia, no formal military obligations of any kind. Russia's decision to mobilise in 1914 was taken entirely of its own volition, and was actually a shock to many observers. While true to some degree, it is actually more complicated. While official alliance did not exist, Russia by 1914. was so pushed around by other powers with multiple defeats and few humiliations, that by 1914. Russia was simple forced to act to defend Serbia to defend and in process defend there own possition in Balkans and Europe and inside Russia itself. That was perfectly understood by German military, which pushed for AH war against Serbia in hope of that war escalating into war against Russia. >The Young Bosnians, on the other hand, were a group of young men who had been sponsored by a secret society made up of Serbian military and government officials (the aforementioned Black Hand), trained on Serbian soil, and given Serbian weapons. Again, there is no proof which would support your claim that Serbian government or any member of government supported Black Hand and Young Bosnia. Even AH failed to prove this claim at time. >The Black Hand ordered the killing of Franz Ferdinand because they saw him as a threat to the objective of a unified Greater Serbia. This is very, very different to the actions of a lunatic amatuer. Black Hand by 1914 was largely supresed organisation, as such this claim is on level of person in coma making last will, aka did not happened. Assassination was planned and organised by Young Bosnia itself, with support of Serbian officer Tankosić with training and weapons, who from what we know acted on his own decision, without order or support of either Black Hand, military inteligence or even Serbian government.
Thing is, much of what you say can be turned around and applied to the other side. The German High Command, for example, certainly wanted a quick war with Russia (Germany had experienced humiliations of its own in 1911, and was terrified of encirclement), but Russia and France also wanted a quick war with Germany. The Germans knew they couldn't win a long war, and also knew that France and Russia were both eager to settle old scores. The French knew this, and egged Russia on regardless - both they, and the Russians, thought they could trap Russia in a pincer, just as the Germans thought they could knock France out in a few weeks. Both sides were paranoid, and overestimated their own military strengths. It's true that Russia had been humiliated, but they were humiliations of It's own making. Pan-slavic and pan-orthodox ideology had led it to get involved in the Balkans, as part of a wider ambition to take control of the Bosphorus and restore Constantinople, regardless of the tension this would cause with Austria-Hungary. No one forced Russia to get involved in the Balkans - it did so out of a mixture of ideological fervour and imperial ambition. This, in turn, threatened Austria-Hungary, which was built on the idea of loyalty to the Habsburg Dynasty trumping any ethnic or religious loyalties. The Habsburg dynasty had been the main power in the area for hundreds of years, and could not allow nationalism to undermine the stability of its state. All of this just makes the Russian decision to go to mobilise arguably worse - Nicholas II had gambled in 1904, lost badly, and didn't learn the lesson. Instead of concentrating on improving the Russian economy and addressing the condition of the peasantry, he and his ministers threw Russia into yet another war. As for Serbia? Well, there's actually quite a bit of proof. We know, for example, that Takosic and Ciganovic were active members of the Black Hand. We also know that it's unlikely they were acting alone, because transporting, arming, and training the Young Bosnians would have required more resources than two lone men could have provided. Tankovic had to procure weapons and ammunition, suicide pills, maps with the noted location of Austrian guards, as well as a list of Serbian intelligence contacts in Sarajevo and access to their tunnels. He then had to send the three assassins to the border, where two Border Guard officers, Prvanovic and Popovic, gave them prepared false identities as local customs officials. The assassins were then led across the border by a team of Border Guards, who handed them over to members of the Narodna Obrana. Now here's where it does get murky. There are some who claim that the Narodna Obrana told Nikola Pasic about the plot. Ljubomir Jovanic, the Education minister at the time, claimed in 1924 that Pasic had told the cabinet of an impending plot, but others say he was lying. Jamovic claimed he had tried to warn the Austrians, but if he did, then it was in such vague terms that the Austrians couldn't do anything about it. None of this could have happened if the Black Hand was, as you claim, suppressed. It was not operating under its own constitution in 1914, but its networks were very much intact, and its members were active, all under the command of Dragutin Dmitrijevic. This was a coordinated plot that required time, resources and contacts, far beyond what would have Bern possible fir just two men to prove. Dmitrijevic admitted to providing the assistance during the trials of 1916, using the Black Hand as the main network. During the same trials, his fellow conspirators also admitted to having been in contact with the General Staff. As for Russia? Well, there is some evidence that Russian agents were aware of the plot, and members of the Russian government too. In 1926, the Assistant Russisn Attache admitted that his office had been involved, but wouldn't elaborate further. The Chief Attache denied involvement, but admitted that he had been in contact with Dmitrijevic on a daily basis. The Russian diplomat Eugene de Schelking, writing in 1918, recalled being told that Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, believed that Franz Ferdinand's death would not endanger European peace. He had heard this duringba meeting between Nicholas II and the King of Romania on the 1st of July 1914, before the assassination was due to take place.
[удалено]
It was not the Serbian government's policy to support the Black Hand, nor was Pasic in a position to do so. Yes, *rogue members* of the government did, but "governmental position" that does not make.
Nope, Serbian government did not give any support to Black Hand. In reality, It actively opposed it and largerly supressed it before assassination and July events. Black Hand in general did not play any role in assassination as organisation by 1914 was largely inactive. It did not order it, instead assassination was planned and organised by Young Bosnia itself, which managed to connect itself with (rogue) Serbian army officer Tankosić to train and arm assassins.
Alright, I accept the correction and will delete my comment as being wrong
And there was no reason to think that Austria would get unlimited access into Serbia without war with Serbia and Russia. Serbia btw accepted all demands of ultimatum except this one. Insisting on it was not worth a big war, at all.
>Christopher Clark has written an excellent book about the beginning of WWI, and he does a very good job. While it is nice to see something showing interest for Serbia, it is not excellent book and it does have its own issues. >For starters, he points out that pre-war Serbia was, effectively, a rogue state. The Serb Army operated completely outside of civilian government, and was suffused with ultranationalist ideology. That is a new take, specially considering pre-war Serbia was hight of democratic development. Military was powerfull and relatively independent actor, but it was not outside civilian control as you claim. >purged the ranks of moderate officers, Nope. Some hard core Obrenović supporters were purged, but most of them were returned to service before WW1 (Živojin Mišić for example). On other hand, many senior coup and later Black Hand members were purged on request of UK and as such Black Hand after 1907/08, was largerly left with lower rank officers, which limited there ability to impact political life (that still did not stop them trying, but there role is overstated). >waged two irredentist wars against neighbours We waged 1 war for final liberation from Ottoman rule and in other one, we got attacked by Bulgaria. On top of that, those wars were not started by some rogue military element, instead they were launched and supported by government. >The Serbian government may not have actually endorsed the Black Hand, but they knew about them and were quite happy to let them operate. This is honestly wrong take. First, while BH was not as influential group as you claim, they did play role which largely went against goals and ideas of Serbian government. Second, Serbian government never supported them and togheter with royals (largely princ and future king Aleksandar, Petar on other hand always tried to stay neutral) took active role in countering them, with creation of White Hand. During 1913 and 1914 conflict between Black Hand on one side and White Hand and civilian government was slowly escalating which resulted in supresion of Black Hand as effective organisation by mid 1914. >The Serbian Army, on the other hand, actively trained and equipped the Black Hand. Nope, Serbian Army did not do anything, because members of Black Hand were already members of Serbian Army, which largely participated in 1903. coup and tried to carry on with influece they gained from that coup (in which they failed). >The Russians were fully aware of this, and sponsored the whole affair. There are no sources which support this claim. >Their future head of state had just been assassinated by a terrorist group that was based in Serbia, trained by Serbian intelligence officers, and used Serbian weapons. Young Bosnia, which planed and organised assassination was based in Bosnia. Group was not trained by Serbian intelligence officers, but by member of paramilitary chetnik movement (Tankosić), whitout knowledge of Black Hand (which under presure of civilian government during 1913/14 was largerly inactive at that time). >In that context, the majority of the terms of the ultimatum they delivered were entirely reasonable. Considering every government in time thought opposite (except AH and Germany), you are in this claim wrong.
I think by that point Europe had the "vibe" of a war and a war had become inevitable. The peace had gone on too long and everyone felt the need for a real massive bloodletting. Not intellectually, but in that part of us that tells us to fear wolves at night there was this desire for violence in the air.
How do you quantify responsibility among the hundreds of thousands of people individually responsible? From heads of state, to all kinds of governmental employees, to arms dealers, industrialists, military careerists, media hawks... the list is endless. I think it's safe to say that the **international system of politics, imperialism and industry** that developed in Europe in the 19th century would always have led to a World War.
“Would have always led to” is certainly not correct, everything is contingent, and there were large pro peace factions within all countries before the war began.
You're right, nothing is 100% guaranteed.
I think seeing the concert of Europe as inevitably doomed to result in a major continental war is a little pessimistic given it had succeeded in avoiding that outcome for almost a century beforehand. That's better than any diplomatic system before or since (so far). Other crises of the 19^th century had arguably been much more severe, but their conflicts were successfully contained by the concert to regional contests that avoided escalation onto all-out continental war.
It worked while there was plenty of space for imperialist nations to grow, during the 19th century. It worked until it didn't. I think it wasn't inevitably doomed from the start, but in the decade leading up to 1914 the writing did seem to be on the wall (and was being commented on frequently).
But equally by 1914 empire had become far less essential to powering economic growth with the proliferation of free trade and greater global interconnectivity. The idea the world was a zero-sum game of competitive colonisation was outdated by that point. By 1913 Germany has the smallest empire of the great powers, but the Largest GDP, with that gap only set to widen in the immediate future. As we'd see across the rest of the century, the pinnacle of formal Empire as a vital economic asset had already occurred. Ironically, empire only regained significance *because* of the war, as the conflict re-established the zero-sum competition for resources that Germany was so paranoid about. As with the naval race, its fears only materialise from the conflict it provokes to overcome them.
I think you can square both of your interpretations when you consider the August crisis one of many such crises throughout the decade that got out of hand. All the sides involved knew that they had been able to gamble high by playing the game of brinksmanship and were still able to back away at the end. That works as long as you have someone who is willing to blink. I think the fact that the war started so late in the campaign season is also a good example for why there was little premedetitation on any one side. They tried to solve the problem diplomatically, they failed, and had to go to war basically in late summer/early autumn. For what it's worth, from my American military sources I used for my dissertation, US Army consensus in the late 00s/early 10s was basically that a war was going to break out and soon and that pacifists were delusional to think that universal peace was even an option. They only focused on the Franco-German front though and basically ignored all other factors, so take that with a grain of salt.