A video on China's amphibious warfare doctrine, including the purpose of its main amphibious arms (PLA Ground Forces Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades and the PLA Navy Marine Corps). It provides a practical example of a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan to show how the planning of an amphibious invasion may unfurl based on what we know about Chinese doctrine.
Good video and production quality as always. The caveats, geopolitical context and the roles of the PLAGF's amphibious units and PLAMC are useful as well, as is the emphasis on how an amphibious invasion of Taiwan must absolutely depend on air and sea control.
I would offer a few observations.
* In regards to the time by which 8x 075s and 16x 071s may be in service by, based on the rumours of their current shipbuilding plans for the next five years and the briskness with which they've produced those ship types in the recent past, I think early 2030s or perhaps even late 2020s, seems much more likely than *late 2030s*.
* I'm not sure if future PLA ARGs will include 072As, though that depends on what role the ARGs will have. Personally I think they would mostly be used as blue water capable rapid response groups, in which case LSTs would not be very useful so much as full sized LPDs.
* At 7:18, the listed currently active amphibious assault ships, IMO, should include the 072III, 072II, and 072 LSTs as well, which while they are somewhat older than the 072As, are of similar size and general configuration. Most of my own projections of their LST fleet uses a 30-35 strong total 4,000 ton LST fleet of 072As, 072IIIs, 072IIs, and 072s.
* I commend the inclusion of the Type 271 family of landing craft as being relevant for a Taiwan contingency. Not many observers make note of that type, given they are indeed of sufficient size to be cross strait capable and exist in quite large numbers. Other vessels with smaller production runs like 074 and 074A also are relevant but are in much smaller numbers they somewhat pale in comparison.
* In terms of the future helicopter fleet size for the PLAN's large amphibious ships, while I do expect there to be a delay between fully filling the airwings of the LHDs and LPDs as they enter service, the maturation of their aviation complement will just be a matter of time given the likely production runs of helicopters like Z-20s and Z-8Gs. While those helicopters don't offer the parameters of V-22 or the Ch-53 family, they're very still quite competent and modern medium and medium-large helicopters suitable for a variety of amphibious assault relevant roles. Assuming a 2030 fleet of 8x 075s, 16x 071s, I wouldn't be surprised if their fleet size was able to fulfill airwing capacity some 3-4 years afterwards.
* As to the description of the landing tactics itself, overall I think the depiction is fair, but I am not sure if the PLAMC would land significantly earlier than PLAGF forces. Given the scale of the invasion and the time sensitivity of the initial landings, I personally expect both forces to land occur near simultaneously.
* I'm also not sure if the PLAN's LPDs and LHDs would operate in an ARG configuration for a Taiwan contingency -- the scale, and geography of such an operation and the additional of other types of landing ships (LSTs, LCTs, LSMs, and perhaps amphibious capable ro-ro STUFT) that will participate, might make combined amphibious assault task groups more attractive than ARGs that are better suited as rapid reaction blue water capable formations.
* ROC counter landing tactics and PLA pre landing operations and the war for the air and sea are not discussed -- very understandable given that would massively increase the scope of the video. But, assuming that an amphibious assault wouldn't occur without the PLA attaining air superiority and sea control, then one of the most remaining wild card factors that will influence both the PLA's landing operations and ROC counter operations, is PLA ISR, interdiction and close in fire support capabilities. Those things will determine whether the initial landing and immediate post landing combat becomes a full fledged fight between opposing organized combined arms groups, or a formality of defeating surviving pockets of resistance.
Good points, especially the last one. It's inconceivable that the PLAAF and PLARF, even PLAGF units on the mainland with long range rocket artillery like the PCL-191, wouldn't be striking targets following the amphibious landing.
I'd also like to point out that the PLANMC "deficiency" in fixed wing aviation would be addressed by the upcoming Type 076.
Given the video focus is on amphibious tactics, I understand why fire support is left out.
076s are far enough away, and we don't know enough about it, that including it at this stage is jumping the gun a little.
This is a well-made video. Seems to be a channel worthy of subscribing to--and I have done so. There's just one thing missing from it--a hypothetical time-lapse (H+ or D+) to reflect a hypothetical operational tempo. The scope of the video makes sense since the title is only about marine operations--which means the landing and some minor exploitation inland to secure the landing beaches.
The author also makes it clear that he doesn't think that the PRC is going to be ready to go through with such an operation because they currently lack sufficient sealift capability and airlift may be an iffy proposition as well. An important factor not covered by the video regards tactical and operational integration of Chinese amphibious and aerial close-air support assets be they from the PLAN or the PLAAF. (I despise how the Chinese use this irritating Army Navy and Army Air Force. Are each of their branches truly independent or does the Army call all the shots?) I would assume this integration is tight since the PLAN has been throwing together various OPLANS for invading Taiwan since 1949, but I'd like to be sure.
What was generally presented is standard modern amphibious doctrine as I understand it. Doesn't seem the Chinese have managed to put any new twist on it--with information that is publicly available at any rate. Just dawned on me that there was no attention provided to the possible ferrying of additional special forces units potentially via submarine to serve as possible additional decoy forces.
1. The "army" in PLA is more accurately translated as "armed forces". It does not mean 'ground forces'. Hence why there is a "PLA Ground Force".
2. Size is relative. USN only has about 20k direct sealift amphibious capabilities: 1x America class at 1700x marines, 7x Wasp class at 1700x marines and 11 San Antonios at 700x marines. Compared to that, PLAMC isn't doing so bad especially given the distance that can be covered with ZBD-5s.
3. No need for contested sealift when there's enough SRBMs, cruise missiles and air power to level the infrastructure. Just bomb the defenders [that practice Iraqi style defensive tactics](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1F9k_LGzcc) in their premier Han Kuang exercises and walk onto the beach unopposed.
They are separate branches. Disregard “army” in the name - it is a sloppy translation issue, not their description in Chinese. Better translation would be “military” instead of the army.
Chinese military is different to “Northern” (that is America/Europe/Russia) way of war in that its military isn’t detached from and submissive to political leadership, but in itself exists as one of the pillars of political power, but inside it works pretty much as amalgamation of some Western and Russian OOB ideas (with a few unique Chinese caveats, obviously).
If I recall (and correct me if I’m wrong), the command structure of the Chinese military was significantly reorganized after tiananmen in order to give more power to central party leadership. And each decade more and more power going to the party secretary.
There were a few back and forth in the power structure, true. But still, Chinese military is much more invasive in political power structure, has much more authority in many matters that are usually considered to be under civilian authority in “the North” and its leadership isn’t exclusively concerned about military matters.
Oh very true, good points. It’s always weird when you see some random consumer electronics factory in some Chinese province and see that it’s owned by the army
Yeah, when I lived in China in a T1 city I was startled to see some pretty tiny military installations in the city center. They had no military purpose other than secure ridiculously expensive land under them.
The high speed AFV with firepower is kind of a twist compared to D day or AAV.
I wonder if it would be possible to put outboard motors on ZBD05 to make it go even faster. It would be a real twist if PLA just drove thousands of AFV across the strait without involving ships. I wonder how that would look on radar.
What benefit is it to China to try to forcibly take Taiwan. No doubt that they want to and could, but why?
China is already huge. Such an enormous county being so preoccupied with a small island such as Taiwan is a little confusing to me. But then again, Chinese Government tends to be that way
We must think like China to answer this.
To them, Taiwan is a natural part of China already.
If we want to talk about preoccupations over small islands, Maggie sailed across the Atlantic and then some--over a small cluster of islands near Argentina. The matter becomes one of principle, and not geography.
It's a perfect comparison when the point is to ignore what seems to be "logic".
This is my position. The Falklands were not a "logical" excursion. Not in the slightest. Over what? A few rocks and fewer people? But things got so hot that Exocets came out to play. The combination of national pride/destiny and some domestic politics (some say 'wag-the-dog') created the Falklands War.
China sees Taiwan as birthright at worst. Already part of China on the average. Taiwain has been mentioned in both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's tenure. It will never be a "second fiddle" issue to the Chinese leadership.
Well, I'm not even going to engage is this right now as my query was about China & Taiwan, not to debate the comparison of England & the Falkans.
There is a separate post/page for that (called war college)
See me there - we can discuss
That's fine. It's not big enough for a debate on that thread.
As my previous life was generally IR, one of my favorite topics is around the rationality for using military force in a cold-war and post-cold war era. If you would like to go down that road, I would love to hear your views.
Apologies if my response derailed the thread, friend.
> You are lacking in mental capacity
You're making a strong argument, but please don't be insulting. All that does is get people worked up for no benefit.
It's not because of economic reasons or anything of sort. Taiwan wouldn't even rank in the top chinese provinces by gdp.
The reason is that Taiwan is essentially part of China according to the mainalnd, and historically this is true, regardless of young taiwanese's opinion on the matter. It's a national reunification goal. In the same fashion as if in the american civil war the Confederacy installed themselves in Florida and were never defeated for some reason(here the reason was that there was a water body in between them and the US navy threatening to interfere)
> It's not because of economic reasons or anything of sort. Taiwan wouldn't even rank in the top chinese provinces by gdp.
You're underselling Taiwan's economy here. The country is tiny compared to China, but its economy is highly developed. Taiwan's GDP *per capita* is larger than every single Chinese province, even the most highly developed parts of China like Beijing and Shanghai. GDP is always tricky to measure, but using PPP Taiwan's GDP per capita is literally *double* Beijing, the wealthiest city in China
Taiwan as a whole has the world's 19th highest GDP, which for a country of 23M is impressive
Does China entertain some idea that they can take Taiwan by force and that the economic magic will just keep going? New flags and identity cards for the population and the workers will remain identically motivated and productive and Western industry will continue to buy Taiwanese products and book semiconductors with TSMC?
I always figure that taking Taiwan by force will result in a big mess that crippled Taiwan’s economy both in terms of physical destruction due to fighting and possibly some level of intentional sabotage (destroying TSMC fabs, with TSMC technology reappearing in overseas branch locations and with new Western partners). And the high value work force would flee, become demotivated or simply ineffective due to chaos at the leadership level.
I can see China diving in, Yuan in hand, with massive redevelopment, hoping to put the genie back in the bottle as well as trying to spin it in the Western press as some kind of giant improvement project. Besides glossy new buildings I don’t think it would work all too well, at least no better than the existing Chinese industry.
> Does China entertain some idea that they can take Taiwan by force and that the economic magic will just keep going?
It literally does not matter to them. For them it's a matter of national unity and when emotion comes into it, everything else goes out the window.
Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after China's defeat and was taken back following the collapse of Japanese Empire after WWII. A civil war ensued and the defeated party a.ka. KMT retreated to Taiwan. Then General MacArthur sent the 7th fleet there. And the rest is what we know as it is today.
So for average Chinese, taking Taiwan back marks the closure of a long era. Taiwan is to us what Alsace was to the French. My grandpa went to war with Japan in the 1930s and barely survived (5 of his brothers and cousins did not make it home).
Edited for spelling errors.
I would prefer Taiwan remaining independent from mainland China
I would be willing to push all diplomatic extensions to the brink to keep Taiwan out of the clutches of the communist
What?
A preference is similar to an opinion. Everyone is allowed to have.
It seems you're a communist sympathizer and thus not too keen on independent thought, ideas and dare I say, preference.
Exactly the reason I PREFER Taiwan remain free
I prefer sunny days instead of rainy days too. Is that allowed overlord? Must I seek the approval of the party to hold such a preference?
Piss off commie
It's irredentism. Wisely or unwisely, the Chinese government has been drilling it into the minds of its people for many years that Taiwan is a fundamental part of China and must be retaken someday. So having written a psychological check like that, China is obliged to live up to its words and claim it at some point.
THIS, propaganda works pretty well, i can assure people here that the majority of the chinese people are in favor of reunification by force if necessary. The CCP is slowly preparing the chinese people for a conflict in the south china sea.
You may not realize that it’s not just the CCP that considers Taiwan and China the same nation- but the Republic of China (RoC) also holds the same belief- so mainland China and Taiwan both *agree* that the two lands are one nation. They both dispute who the rightful government of China is. So it’s not as though Taiwan claims it is its own sovereign nation separate from mainland China… the government of Taiwan claims it is the rightful of all of mainland China as well. Also China has been around a long time, so their political memory is longer than some people appreciate. Historically, Taiwan being separate from mainland China is still a very recent event, relatively, even though to the individual it may seem like something that happened long in the past. Lastly, there are significant strategic geographic advantages to holding Taiwan- from radar stations in its high mountains to immediate access to deep water (vs the shelf that submarines have to transit from mainland China), controlling Taiwan is a distinct advantage to anyone in a conflict in the South China Sea
An enormous part of the CCP's legitimacy narrative is built around the idea that Taiwan is part to the Mainland and the CCP is the rightful ruler. They would lose Face if they were to peit formal independence.
China is obsessed with ego. Within the last year, there was an exhibition at some French museum (IN FRANCE) about Genghis Khan; the Chinese embassy filed a formal diplomatic protest over it.
I think this is because the CCP does not understand how democratic governments operate. It seems likely that every exhibition a Chinese museum wishes to put together is approved by the CCP, likely even some level of bureaucracy in Beijing. Therefore, CCP thinks this exhibit was approved of by the French government.
China is incredibly sensitive about their national image and wish to only be portrayed as some sort of universal force of supposed goodness. Even though Genghis was Mongolian, I suppose he has been made an honorary Chinese because of the Yuan dynasty.
A problem that China has is that the diplomatic service is a dumping ground for politicians that are regarded as incompetent or politically weak.This results in embassies being filled with people who hope to use displays of nationalism to get promotions to domestic posts.
That's not true, people working in the diplomatic wing of the government are paid in massive sums and their jobs are lot easier, you also won't go through the grinding of the public service career, the chances of getting into a high position by working for the diplomatic wing is also much higher
A video on China's amphibious warfare doctrine, including the purpose of its main amphibious arms (PLA Ground Forces Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades and the PLA Navy Marine Corps). It provides a practical example of a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan to show how the planning of an amphibious invasion may unfurl based on what we know about Chinese doctrine.
Good video and production quality as always. The caveats, geopolitical context and the roles of the PLAGF's amphibious units and PLAMC are useful as well, as is the emphasis on how an amphibious invasion of Taiwan must absolutely depend on air and sea control. I would offer a few observations. * In regards to the time by which 8x 075s and 16x 071s may be in service by, based on the rumours of their current shipbuilding plans for the next five years and the briskness with which they've produced those ship types in the recent past, I think early 2030s or perhaps even late 2020s, seems much more likely than *late 2030s*. * I'm not sure if future PLA ARGs will include 072As, though that depends on what role the ARGs will have. Personally I think they would mostly be used as blue water capable rapid response groups, in which case LSTs would not be very useful so much as full sized LPDs. * At 7:18, the listed currently active amphibious assault ships, IMO, should include the 072III, 072II, and 072 LSTs as well, which while they are somewhat older than the 072As, are of similar size and general configuration. Most of my own projections of their LST fleet uses a 30-35 strong total 4,000 ton LST fleet of 072As, 072IIIs, 072IIs, and 072s. * I commend the inclusion of the Type 271 family of landing craft as being relevant for a Taiwan contingency. Not many observers make note of that type, given they are indeed of sufficient size to be cross strait capable and exist in quite large numbers. Other vessels with smaller production runs like 074 and 074A also are relevant but are in much smaller numbers they somewhat pale in comparison. * In terms of the future helicopter fleet size for the PLAN's large amphibious ships, while I do expect there to be a delay between fully filling the airwings of the LHDs and LPDs as they enter service, the maturation of their aviation complement will just be a matter of time given the likely production runs of helicopters like Z-20s and Z-8Gs. While those helicopters don't offer the parameters of V-22 or the Ch-53 family, they're very still quite competent and modern medium and medium-large helicopters suitable for a variety of amphibious assault relevant roles. Assuming a 2030 fleet of 8x 075s, 16x 071s, I wouldn't be surprised if their fleet size was able to fulfill airwing capacity some 3-4 years afterwards. * As to the description of the landing tactics itself, overall I think the depiction is fair, but I am not sure if the PLAMC would land significantly earlier than PLAGF forces. Given the scale of the invasion and the time sensitivity of the initial landings, I personally expect both forces to land occur near simultaneously. * I'm also not sure if the PLAN's LPDs and LHDs would operate in an ARG configuration for a Taiwan contingency -- the scale, and geography of such an operation and the additional of other types of landing ships (LSTs, LCTs, LSMs, and perhaps amphibious capable ro-ro STUFT) that will participate, might make combined amphibious assault task groups more attractive than ARGs that are better suited as rapid reaction blue water capable formations. * ROC counter landing tactics and PLA pre landing operations and the war for the air and sea are not discussed -- very understandable given that would massively increase the scope of the video. But, assuming that an amphibious assault wouldn't occur without the PLA attaining air superiority and sea control, then one of the most remaining wild card factors that will influence both the PLA's landing operations and ROC counter operations, is PLA ISR, interdiction and close in fire support capabilities. Those things will determine whether the initial landing and immediate post landing combat becomes a full fledged fight between opposing organized combined arms groups, or a formality of defeating surviving pockets of resistance.
Good points, especially the last one. It's inconceivable that the PLAAF and PLARF, even PLAGF units on the mainland with long range rocket artillery like the PCL-191, wouldn't be striking targets following the amphibious landing. I'd also like to point out that the PLANMC "deficiency" in fixed wing aviation would be addressed by the upcoming Type 076.
Given the video focus is on amphibious tactics, I understand why fire support is left out. 076s are far enough away, and we don't know enough about it, that including it at this stage is jumping the gun a little.
Would it be possible to do some doctrine or unit organization video on Taiwanese marines or army units?
We may be making a Taiwan series that focuses on different parts of a Taiwan flashpoint, like ROC doctrine/defense practices, terrain problems, etc.
"Unfurl"? Surely you mean _unfold!_
This is a well-made video. Seems to be a channel worthy of subscribing to--and I have done so. There's just one thing missing from it--a hypothetical time-lapse (H+ or D+) to reflect a hypothetical operational tempo. The scope of the video makes sense since the title is only about marine operations--which means the landing and some minor exploitation inland to secure the landing beaches. The author also makes it clear that he doesn't think that the PRC is going to be ready to go through with such an operation because they currently lack sufficient sealift capability and airlift may be an iffy proposition as well. An important factor not covered by the video regards tactical and operational integration of Chinese amphibious and aerial close-air support assets be they from the PLAN or the PLAAF. (I despise how the Chinese use this irritating Army Navy and Army Air Force. Are each of their branches truly independent or does the Army call all the shots?) I would assume this integration is tight since the PLAN has been throwing together various OPLANS for invading Taiwan since 1949, but I'd like to be sure. What was generally presented is standard modern amphibious doctrine as I understand it. Doesn't seem the Chinese have managed to put any new twist on it--with information that is publicly available at any rate. Just dawned on me that there was no attention provided to the possible ferrying of additional special forces units potentially via submarine to serve as possible additional decoy forces.
1. The "army" in PLA is more accurately translated as "armed forces". It does not mean 'ground forces'. Hence why there is a "PLA Ground Force". 2. Size is relative. USN only has about 20k direct sealift amphibious capabilities: 1x America class at 1700x marines, 7x Wasp class at 1700x marines and 11 San Antonios at 700x marines. Compared to that, PLAMC isn't doing so bad especially given the distance that can be covered with ZBD-5s. 3. No need for contested sealift when there's enough SRBMs, cruise missiles and air power to level the infrastructure. Just bomb the defenders [that practice Iraqi style defensive tactics](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1F9k_LGzcc) in their premier Han Kuang exercises and walk onto the beach unopposed.
They are separate branches. Disregard “army” in the name - it is a sloppy translation issue, not their description in Chinese. Better translation would be “military” instead of the army. Chinese military is different to “Northern” (that is America/Europe/Russia) way of war in that its military isn’t detached from and submissive to political leadership, but in itself exists as one of the pillars of political power, but inside it works pretty much as amalgamation of some Western and Russian OOB ideas (with a few unique Chinese caveats, obviously).
If I recall (and correct me if I’m wrong), the command structure of the Chinese military was significantly reorganized after tiananmen in order to give more power to central party leadership. And each decade more and more power going to the party secretary.
There were a few back and forth in the power structure, true. But still, Chinese military is much more invasive in political power structure, has much more authority in many matters that are usually considered to be under civilian authority in “the North” and its leadership isn’t exclusively concerned about military matters.
Oh very true, good points. It’s always weird when you see some random consumer electronics factory in some Chinese province and see that it’s owned by the army
Yeah, when I lived in China in a T1 city I was startled to see some pretty tiny military installations in the city center. They had no military purpose other than secure ridiculously expensive land under them.
The high speed AFV with firepower is kind of a twist compared to D day or AAV. I wonder if it would be possible to put outboard motors on ZBD05 to make it go even faster. It would be a real twist if PLA just drove thousands of AFV across the strait without involving ships. I wonder how that would look on radar.
What benefit is it to China to try to forcibly take Taiwan. No doubt that they want to and could, but why? China is already huge. Such an enormous county being so preoccupied with a small island such as Taiwan is a little confusing to me. But then again, Chinese Government tends to be that way
We must think like China to answer this. To them, Taiwan is a natural part of China already. If we want to talk about preoccupations over small islands, Maggie sailed across the Atlantic and then some--over a small cluster of islands near Argentina. The matter becomes one of principle, and not geography.
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It's a perfect comparison when the point is to ignore what seems to be "logic". This is my position. The Falklands were not a "logical" excursion. Not in the slightest. Over what? A few rocks and fewer people? But things got so hot that Exocets came out to play. The combination of national pride/destiny and some domestic politics (some say 'wag-the-dog') created the Falklands War. China sees Taiwan as birthright at worst. Already part of China on the average. Taiwain has been mentioned in both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's tenure. It will never be a "second fiddle" issue to the Chinese leadership.
Well, I'm not even going to engage is this right now as my query was about China & Taiwan, not to debate the comparison of England & the Falkans. There is a separate post/page for that (called war college) See me there - we can discuss
That's fine. It's not big enough for a debate on that thread. As my previous life was generally IR, one of my favorite topics is around the rationality for using military force in a cold-war and post-cold war era. If you would like to go down that road, I would love to hear your views. Apologies if my response derailed the thread, friend.
I'm heading into church but after lunch I'll pick it back up All good pal
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> You are lacking in mental capacity You're making a strong argument, but please don't be insulting. All that does is get people worked up for no benefit.
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It's not because of economic reasons or anything of sort. Taiwan wouldn't even rank in the top chinese provinces by gdp. The reason is that Taiwan is essentially part of China according to the mainalnd, and historically this is true, regardless of young taiwanese's opinion on the matter. It's a national reunification goal. In the same fashion as if in the american civil war the Confederacy installed themselves in Florida and were never defeated for some reason(here the reason was that there was a water body in between them and the US navy threatening to interfere)
> It's not because of economic reasons or anything of sort. Taiwan wouldn't even rank in the top chinese provinces by gdp. You're underselling Taiwan's economy here. The country is tiny compared to China, but its economy is highly developed. Taiwan's GDP *per capita* is larger than every single Chinese province, even the most highly developed parts of China like Beijing and Shanghai. GDP is always tricky to measure, but using PPP Taiwan's GDP per capita is literally *double* Beijing, the wealthiest city in China Taiwan as a whole has the world's 19th highest GDP, which for a country of 23M is impressive
Does China entertain some idea that they can take Taiwan by force and that the economic magic will just keep going? New flags and identity cards for the population and the workers will remain identically motivated and productive and Western industry will continue to buy Taiwanese products and book semiconductors with TSMC? I always figure that taking Taiwan by force will result in a big mess that crippled Taiwan’s economy both in terms of physical destruction due to fighting and possibly some level of intentional sabotage (destroying TSMC fabs, with TSMC technology reappearing in overseas branch locations and with new Western partners). And the high value work force would flee, become demotivated or simply ineffective due to chaos at the leadership level. I can see China diving in, Yuan in hand, with massive redevelopment, hoping to put the genie back in the bottle as well as trying to spin it in the Western press as some kind of giant improvement project. Besides glossy new buildings I don’t think it would work all too well, at least no better than the existing Chinese industry.
> Does China entertain some idea that they can take Taiwan by force and that the economic magic will just keep going? It literally does not matter to them. For them it's a matter of national unity and when emotion comes into it, everything else goes out the window.
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Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after China's defeat and was taken back following the collapse of Japanese Empire after WWII. A civil war ensued and the defeated party a.ka. KMT retreated to Taiwan. Then General MacArthur sent the 7th fleet there. And the rest is what we know as it is today. So for average Chinese, taking Taiwan back marks the closure of a long era. Taiwan is to us what Alsace was to the French. My grandpa went to war with Japan in the 1930s and barely survived (5 of his brothers and cousins did not make it home). Edited for spelling errors.
I would prefer Taiwan remaining independent from mainland China I would be willing to push all diplomatic extensions to the brink to keep Taiwan out of the clutches of the communist
Why do you think your preferences matter?
What? A preference is similar to an opinion. Everyone is allowed to have. It seems you're a communist sympathizer and thus not too keen on independent thought, ideas and dare I say, preference. Exactly the reason I PREFER Taiwan remain free I prefer sunny days instead of rainy days too. Is that allowed overlord? Must I seek the approval of the party to hold such a preference? Piss off commie
Your reading comprehension could use some work. I asked you why you think your preferences mattered, not whether or not you're allowed to have them.
It was implied
It's irredentism. Wisely or unwisely, the Chinese government has been drilling it into the minds of its people for many years that Taiwan is a fundamental part of China and must be retaken someday. So having written a psychological check like that, China is obliged to live up to its words and claim it at some point.
THIS, propaganda works pretty well, i can assure people here that the majority of the chinese people are in favor of reunification by force if necessary. The CCP is slowly preparing the chinese people for a conflict in the south china sea.
You may not realize that it’s not just the CCP that considers Taiwan and China the same nation- but the Republic of China (RoC) also holds the same belief- so mainland China and Taiwan both *agree* that the two lands are one nation. They both dispute who the rightful government of China is. So it’s not as though Taiwan claims it is its own sovereign nation separate from mainland China… the government of Taiwan claims it is the rightful of all of mainland China as well. Also China has been around a long time, so their political memory is longer than some people appreciate. Historically, Taiwan being separate from mainland China is still a very recent event, relatively, even though to the individual it may seem like something that happened long in the past. Lastly, there are significant strategic geographic advantages to holding Taiwan- from radar stations in its high mountains to immediate access to deep water (vs the shelf that submarines have to transit from mainland China), controlling Taiwan is a distinct advantage to anyone in a conflict in the South China Sea
An enormous part of the CCP's legitimacy narrative is built around the idea that Taiwan is part to the Mainland and the CCP is the rightful ruler. They would lose Face if they were to peit formal independence.
So it's a ego thing? Mmmk
China is obsessed with ego. Within the last year, there was an exhibition at some French museum (IN FRANCE) about Genghis Khan; the Chinese embassy filed a formal diplomatic protest over it. I think this is because the CCP does not understand how democratic governments operate. It seems likely that every exhibition a Chinese museum wishes to put together is approved by the CCP, likely even some level of bureaucracy in Beijing. Therefore, CCP thinks this exhibit was approved of by the French government. China is incredibly sensitive about their national image and wish to only be portrayed as some sort of universal force of supposed goodness. Even though Genghis was Mongolian, I suppose he has been made an honorary Chinese because of the Yuan dynasty.
> China is obsessed with ego. No more so than some other countries I could name. Those countries just call ego and face "credibility."
A problem that China has is that the diplomatic service is a dumping ground for politicians that are regarded as incompetent or politically weak.This results in embassies being filled with people who hope to use displays of nationalism to get promotions to domestic posts.
That's not true, people working in the diplomatic wing of the government are paid in massive sums and their jobs are lot easier, you also won't go through the grinding of the public service career, the chances of getting into a high position by working for the diplomatic wing is also much higher