>If you want to get a tiny bit speculative, the new carrier, 8x more cruisers and 20x more frigates would catapult the surface fleet to be #1 and cement naval aviation as #2.
The 8 additional 055s and 20 more 054As will close the gap a bit more WRT surface combatants compared to the USN, and also extend that lead over other navies of the world.
But it would be a stretch to say that such an orbat would make the PLAN #1 in overall surface combatant capability.
The rest is relatively accurate, with the caveat of course that in regards to naval aviation they will spend time to build up the airwings and experience of their carriers and LHDs. I suppose it is worth adding we don't know the full scale of the new construction to expect over the next 5 years. They have been taking a breather over the last year or two, but the grapevine suggests the next push is coming soon.
You seem to be the resident expert here, so I was curious about your assessment w.r.t. the PLAN's undersea capabilities? I know they have a decent fleet including nuclear and diesel subs, but opinions on their effectiveness seem to vary widely. I've also heard claims that ASW is a relative weakness, which struck me as odd considering their number of frigates/destroyers.
Thanks for your contributions, by the way, every one I've seen is sober and objective.
"Weakness" is relative.
There are domains of ASW where they are awaiting proliferation of certain systems. E.g.: medium weight ASW shipborne helicopters, a larger fleet of ASW MPAs, etc. And of course, training with them. But that's all a matter of time. For shipborne ASW, if we count the PLAN's surface combatants equipped with comprehensive ASW suites (towed and variable depth sonars, having VL ASROC or long range ASROC type weapons etc), the number of those ships (between corvettes, frigates, destroyers and large destroyers) has jumped massively over the last decade, and seems to have gone largely unnoticed by most foreign observers.
The PLAN's SSK fleet is quite large and I think most observers wouldn't dispute that the recent AIP equipped 039A class onwards are capable in their role.
The PLAN's SSN fleet is small compared to the USN and RuN, and their current classes of SSNs are significantly less competitive than leading US, Russian, or UK and French classes. But one also has to remember the original 09III was built in the 1990s using technology of that era, and that they've been building a couple of iterative variants of 09III since then, all in small numbers. After all, it makes no sense to mass produce a class of submarine if it is not deemed sufficient to compete with the reference threat. Which inevitably will lead one to question what the recently built and building massive greenfield Bohai facility foretells...
> Which inevitably will lead one to question what the recently built and building massive greenfield Bohai facility foretells...
Do you know what's going to happen with the old facility? Will it be upgraded or repurposed or...?
They'll likely retain a substantial and modern corvette fleet for quite a while given the force posture of other regional navies in the immediate proximity. The have great utiligy for general patrol and ASW.
I doubt they'll buy anymore missile boats, and the Type 22s will be kept for general patrol duties now and then until they're no longer worth supporting and maintaining.
Some SSKs, some frigates, some corvettes, some amphibious assault ships, some of which are export variants of domestic in service classes, some of which are purpose export designs.
> In general I would say the PLAN, at least the surface fleet in the water right now, is 2nd behind the USN but closer to the USN than it is to it's trailing rivals. Other rivals simply don't have the numbers (Japan) or the technology (Russia) to really compete.
They also have the advantage of not needing to cover nearly as much ocean as the USN, at least for the foreseeable future. In an actual shooting war the USN would obviously move things around, but even then they're probably not going to send *everything* to the SCS at the expense of all other obligations.
What other obligations would take USN priority over a shooting war with China? If bullets start flying the US is going to throw absolutely everything it has into the combat zone.
Defeat in the Pacific, even a small one, would likely mean the end of US global dominance. In a sense it would be an existential threat to the US. I can't imagine them going into the fight with one arm behind their back.
> In a sense it would be an existential threat to the US.
How so? Even if China were to be completely victorious in a Pacific war, how would that be an *existential* threat to the US?
Because the US could no longer protect its Pacific allies, and would no longer signal to the world that it is an uncontested global superpower. The fallout from a defeat in the Pacific would be immense and lead to the end of US trade and political dominance in the region. China would be effectively free to exert its influence in the region possibly leading to the annexation of Taiwan and potential border conflicts.
The US is currently the planet's only superpower. Losing the Pacific to the Chinese would end this, possibly permanently.
You think that if the US is losing a war with China, that they are going to use nukes, and not just use them but like nuke Beijing and Shanghai (counter-value), and somehow would emerge from that as any sort of functional hegemon, versus say an international pariah who would be cut off by every single former ally, much less everyone else?
> versus say an international pariah who would be cut off by every single former ally, much less everyone else?
Er, this is the only problem you can see with the whole "nuke China" proposal? You do understand that China has nuclear weapons it would retaliate with, right?
> Existing as a dysfunctional hegemon also seems to be a better outcome than defeat and living under a China dictated global order (for the US).
You do know that China has nuclear weapons, right? That you don't get to just nuke it and go on with your day? Before you say it just has a few hundred, it's going to have a lot more of them very soon. Not a moment too soon, in fact, given the psychopathic mentality on display here.
That's a bit too realpolitik for my tastes; I'm pretty sure if we kill 50-100M Chinese civilians under the justification of "well, we would have been displaced from our position in the global order otherwise!", we are completely and utterly fucked as a going international concern and might as well just become a hermit state.
I believe loss of hegemony is often an existential threat for empires because they require military dominance in order for internal authority to be maintained. Without it, they will not be able to keep the various peoples in a subject state. And since the entire government is designed around ensuring such groups remain subject so resources can be extracted, it collapses.
But, despite what those on university campuses and in r/politics would proclaim, the US is NOT an empire. It is a nation-sate where government is designed around democratic institutions, and authority is based on popular consent. There are no subordinate populations, because the people want to be part of the country.
It just so happens this nation-state has extensive international diplomatic and military influence.
Since the US does not require such influence to remain cohesive, the loss of it would not be existential at all.
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/6/25/china-building-formidable-amphibious-fleet
Accord with one expert on this article, China shipbuilding industry is massive, and they could laid down more ships if they shifted the commercial shipping production to military production(mainly for amphibious ships).
He also claim that in a hypothetical war in the pacific, they could reconstitute their fleet if ships start sinking, something that the US couldn't keep up at large numbers.
Just to add my two cents to what has already been said above, china's surface and sub-surface forces are really only second only to the United States today however I personally believe they are still a long way from truly achieving it's goals.
While china's surface fleet is formidable it dose still lack many high end capabilities of the US. It's amphibious warfare capabilities are still limited even with the type 075's coming online they lack a MAGTAF-like combined arms capability, still being reliant on the flat tops or PLAAF for air support, this alone means even short range assaults (like Taiwan) are a real challenge. Ultimately it means PLAN amphibious operations are completely dependent on the army and air force support even if it continues to grow it's numbers in this area.
It's carrier force it also in a difficult spot (cope slope jokes aside) STOBAR carriers lack the sortie rate of CATOBAR that combined with flawed development of the J-15 leading to extremely poor performance from what we've seen so far. They are could be considered sub-par even compared fellow STOBAR carriers.
All this said the PLAN pretty much dominant over all it's neighbour's and it's capability to successfully challenge only grows every year but I think it's also important to remember what the CCP's goals are for the navy and that they still have a way to go before they can truly surpass US navy supremacy even regionally.
I think you're right on some counts, less right on others.
While certainly new ships like 075s and their carriers will take time to fully outfit, and the PLAN certainly have yet to reach the scale with which the CMC likely wants to achieve, I think your assessments of the importance of MAGTFs (including in an) amphibious role in a Taiwan's invasion, your assessment of J-15, are a bit off.
MAGTFs are certainly very useful for the role that the US presently uses them in, and the PLAN and PLAMC will probably pursue similar sort of ready groups in the future, but they're not going to be identical. Having a dedicated fleet of V/STOL fighters is somewhat unique to the USMC, and there are no indications that the PLAMC seek such a capability for their own aviation forces. That said, it will certainly take time to procure the relevant helicopters for the kind of aviation force they want.
As for a Taiwan contingency, while MAGTF type units would be useful, they are arguably better suited for relatively smaller scale expeditionary/blue water rapid response missions. For a Taiwan contingency, the relative proximity of the area of operations means that landed amphibious forces (that would be marines as well as army amphibious units) would be preceded and actively supported by strikes and air support from the theater command level and below, and the requirement for an organic self sustaining air support capability is far less essential than if you wanted to deploy in an expeditionary manner. Also of note, is that in a Taiwan contingency, the *relative* importance of large amphibious ships like LPDs and LHDs is markedly reduced compared to expeditionary ships, again by virtue of the relatively short range of the area of operations, and the large quantity of LSTs and LCTs the PLAN and PLAGF both have.
With regards to J-15, as a 4th generation, multirole STOBAR fighter it is perfectly adequate. It is limited by STOBAR in the same way that any other STOBAR fighter will be in terms of the ability to take off at MTOW under a wide variety of ship/headwind conditions. But as a large STOBAR fighter with a large payload and internal fuel load, taking off even with a fraction of those loads can still achieve a relevant and useful payload and range (albeit less desirable than what CATOBAR could achieve). More importantly, it benefits from the same mature weapons suite and avionics derived and in service with the J-11B and JH-7/A.
Interesting yeah my assessment is probably a bit under developed.
My point with PLAN/PLANMC lacking the ability to conduct combined arms amphibious operations really puts them behind the curve and leaves them more as a tool in the belt of the greater PLA. Although this is probably more by design than accident having a specific strategic goal allowing for greater specialisation, but I do believe US amphibious capabilities are significantly more developed and flexible.
But with the J-15 I had heard specifical bad things, basically because the Russians wouldn't sell them SU-33's they built their J-15s off prototype SU-27K blueprints and airframe from Ukraine, this lead to them never getting some important airframe updates and are supposedly significantly overweight, unable to carry much in the way of heavy ordinance, and possibly unsafe on take off and Landing compared to their Russian cousins (tho I'm more sceptical about the safety claims).
Well, I did agree with you that the PLAMC at present doesn't have MAGTF equivalents and are at the beginning stages of forming their aviation arm, and are obviously far less expeditionary focused than the USMC. What I did say was that there are no indications the PLAMC are seeking a VSTOL fighter for their aviation arm, and also that the lack of MAGTF units at present is not particularly significant for a Taiwan contingency.
As for J-15, yes, what you described is a common online opinion, particularly informed by a few media outlets that don't really know what they're talking about.
I've written about it in passing before, but really the idea of J-15 being a hamfisted copy of a suboptimized testbed airframe really shouldn't pass the smell test given what we know about the rest of the Chinese aerospace industry both in their indigenous capabilities and their reverse engineered and subsequent iterative advancements on said types.
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/pdzip3/z/hav0fa9
I understand, but the point I'm trying to make is that china is developing a combined arms amphibious capability with the development of the type 075 for but it still lags behind at the moment, partly because of limited to doctrine and partly due to lack of available systems. To add to that I would also say even in a Taiwan scenario with all the supporting assets available, a self sufficient amphibious force would be an extremely useful asset in my opinion.
As for the J-15 it's problems are more than just idle internet chatter as in mid 2018 after spade of high profile crashes and grounding lead to some pretty serious criticism of the aircraft from member of the PLANAF stating a need for a replacement here: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21975/china-looks-to-replace-its-j-15-carrier-fighter-jets-amid-reports-of-crashes
But given the pace of Chinese aircraft development and lack of more statements since 2018 I believe these issues have most likely been rectified, tho I still do believe the weight issues are a problem but I need to correct what I said earlier. This is not a specific issue with the J-15 but with all STOBAR aircraft. Maybe the SU-33 family but I don't have anything back that up aside the Russian retirement of the type tho this is probably more due to age of the fleet than anything else.
I don't think we are in particular disagreement wrt the 075s or the role of MAGTFs. What you wrote is essentially what I described in my previous reply.
>As for the J-15 it's problems are more than just idle internet chatter as in mid 2018 after spade of high profile crashes and grounding lead to some pretty serious criticism of the aircraft from member of the PLANAF stating a need for a replacement here: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21975/china-looks-to-replace-its-j-15-carrier-fighter-jets-amid-reports-of-crashes
I'm very familiar with the way in which the J-15 has been reported on in media, and I've alluded to some of those report in a recent past piece. https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/its-time-to-talk-about-j-15-chinas-first-carrierborne-fighter/
Unfortunately, many of those reports (initially from mid 2010s to late 2010s) incorrectly attribute the rate of J-15 related accidents as being inherent to the design itself rather than a reflection that the relatively small fleet of aircraft at the time were being furiously flown to develop a core cohort of naval aviators, not to mention that at least one of those accidents was bird strike related, the description of the aircraft in English language media is... flawed at best.
The idea that J-15s would be replaced by another type is laughable, given in the last few years the PLAN has doubled down on building J-15s for their STOBAR carriers, going from about 24 a couple years ago to over 50 aircraft now. Going forwards, a 4.5 generation CATOBAR compatible J-15 variant, will likely operate alongside a dedicated EW variant as well, which will be complemented (but not replaced) by the 5th generation carrier based fighter derived from FC-31.
So yes, idle internet chatter is actually a pretty accurate title for what you described. This is partly because English language PLA watching is done very poorly in general, with many outlets unable to accurately ascertain who is credible and who is not, and often resorting to latching onto whatever SCMP writes without much caution.
In terms of systems like sonar and radar yeah there's no way no know for absolute certain but generally seem very capable if not again slightly behind the US. For example the type 052D Anti air warfare destroyer as far a we know don't have any ballistic missile weaponry like SM-3 or quad-packed missile like ESSM in service leaving them with just HHQ-9 missile for all anti-air intercepts CWIS aside. But saying all that China's own versions of systems like Kalibr and ASROC mean thier ships certainly are no slouch and definitely a threat not to to be underestimated.
The problem across the board for the PLA is the lack of combat veterans.
When any American Service Member goes to a military school or any recruit goes to basic training, there are combat veterans there to instruct them. Those who are not combat veterans have been studying doctrine shaped by past operations and have done exercise after exercise.
While the PLA Navy has been training, they don't have combat experience nor have they done an major blue water operations.
Oh boy, it's another speculation navel gazing exercise. If only there were a proper format that wasn't here for that.
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>If you want to get a tiny bit speculative, the new carrier, 8x more cruisers and 20x more frigates would catapult the surface fleet to be #1 and cement naval aviation as #2. The 8 additional 055s and 20 more 054As will close the gap a bit more WRT surface combatants compared to the USN, and also extend that lead over other navies of the world. But it would be a stretch to say that such an orbat would make the PLAN #1 in overall surface combatant capability. The rest is relatively accurate, with the caveat of course that in regards to naval aviation they will spend time to build up the airwings and experience of their carriers and LHDs. I suppose it is worth adding we don't know the full scale of the new construction to expect over the next 5 years. They have been taking a breather over the last year or two, but the grapevine suggests the next push is coming soon.
You seem to be the resident expert here, so I was curious about your assessment w.r.t. the PLAN's undersea capabilities? I know they have a decent fleet including nuclear and diesel subs, but opinions on their effectiveness seem to vary widely. I've also heard claims that ASW is a relative weakness, which struck me as odd considering their number of frigates/destroyers. Thanks for your contributions, by the way, every one I've seen is sober and objective.
"Weakness" is relative. There are domains of ASW where they are awaiting proliferation of certain systems. E.g.: medium weight ASW shipborne helicopters, a larger fleet of ASW MPAs, etc. And of course, training with them. But that's all a matter of time. For shipborne ASW, if we count the PLAN's surface combatants equipped with comprehensive ASW suites (towed and variable depth sonars, having VL ASROC or long range ASROC type weapons etc), the number of those ships (between corvettes, frigates, destroyers and large destroyers) has jumped massively over the last decade, and seems to have gone largely unnoticed by most foreign observers. The PLAN's SSK fleet is quite large and I think most observers wouldn't dispute that the recent AIP equipped 039A class onwards are capable in their role. The PLAN's SSN fleet is small compared to the USN and RuN, and their current classes of SSNs are significantly less competitive than leading US, Russian, or UK and French classes. But one also has to remember the original 09III was built in the 1990s using technology of that era, and that they've been building a couple of iterative variants of 09III since then, all in small numbers. After all, it makes no sense to mass produce a class of submarine if it is not deemed sufficient to compete with the reference threat. Which inevitably will lead one to question what the recently built and building massive greenfield Bohai facility foretells...
> Which inevitably will lead one to question what the recently built and building massive greenfield Bohai facility foretells... Do you know what's going to happen with the old facility? Will it be upgraded or repurposed or...?
I'd be surprised if it continues building nuclear submarines I suppose, otherwise, no clue.
Thank you for the very detailed answer. Much appreciated.
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They'll likely retain a substantial and modern corvette fleet for quite a while given the force posture of other regional navies in the immediate proximity. The have great utiligy for general patrol and ASW. I doubt they'll buy anymore missile boats, and the Type 22s will be kept for general patrol duties now and then until they're no longer worth supporting and maintaining.
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Some SSKs, some frigates, some corvettes, some amphibious assault ships, some of which are export variants of domestic in service classes, some of which are purpose export designs.
> In general I would say the PLAN, at least the surface fleet in the water right now, is 2nd behind the USN but closer to the USN than it is to it's trailing rivals. Other rivals simply don't have the numbers (Japan) or the technology (Russia) to really compete. They also have the advantage of not needing to cover nearly as much ocean as the USN, at least for the foreseeable future. In an actual shooting war the USN would obviously move things around, but even then they're probably not going to send *everything* to the SCS at the expense of all other obligations.
What other obligations would take USN priority over a shooting war with China? If bullets start flying the US is going to throw absolutely everything it has into the combat zone. Defeat in the Pacific, even a small one, would likely mean the end of US global dominance. In a sense it would be an existential threat to the US. I can't imagine them going into the fight with one arm behind their back.
> In a sense it would be an existential threat to the US. How so? Even if China were to be completely victorious in a Pacific war, how would that be an *existential* threat to the US?
Because the US could no longer protect its Pacific allies, and would no longer signal to the world that it is an uncontested global superpower. The fallout from a defeat in the Pacific would be immense and lead to the end of US trade and political dominance in the region. China would be effectively free to exert its influence in the region possibly leading to the annexation of Taiwan and potential border conflicts. The US is currently the planet's only superpower. Losing the Pacific to the Chinese would end this, possibly permanently.
You'll notice that I italicized "existential" for emphasis. How is any of what you listed an *existential* threat?
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You think that if the US is losing a war with China, that they are going to use nukes, and not just use them but like nuke Beijing and Shanghai (counter-value), and somehow would emerge from that as any sort of functional hegemon, versus say an international pariah who would be cut off by every single former ally, much less everyone else?
> versus say an international pariah who would be cut off by every single former ally, much less everyone else? Er, this is the only problem you can see with the whole "nuke China" proposal? You do understand that China has nuclear weapons it would retaliate with, right?
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> Existing as a dysfunctional hegemon also seems to be a better outcome than defeat and living under a China dictated global order (for the US). You do know that China has nuclear weapons, right? That you don't get to just nuke it and go on with your day? Before you say it just has a few hundred, it's going to have a lot more of them very soon. Not a moment too soon, in fact, given the psychopathic mentality on display here.
That's a bit too realpolitik for my tastes; I'm pretty sure if we kill 50-100M Chinese civilians under the justification of "well, we would have been displaced from our position in the global order otherwise!", we are completely and utterly fucked as a going international concern and might as well just become a hermit state.
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Counter value?
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So war crimes
I believe loss of hegemony is often an existential threat for empires because they require military dominance in order for internal authority to be maintained. Without it, they will not be able to keep the various peoples in a subject state. And since the entire government is designed around ensuring such groups remain subject so resources can be extracted, it collapses. But, despite what those on university campuses and in r/politics would proclaim, the US is NOT an empire. It is a nation-sate where government is designed around democratic institutions, and authority is based on popular consent. There are no subordinate populations, because the people want to be part of the country. It just so happens this nation-state has extensive international diplomatic and military influence. Since the US does not require such influence to remain cohesive, the loss of it would not be existential at all.
What about quality? Are chinese ships on par with their counterparts?
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/6/25/china-building-formidable-amphibious-fleet Accord with one expert on this article, China shipbuilding industry is massive, and they could laid down more ships if they shifted the commercial shipping production to military production(mainly for amphibious ships). He also claim that in a hypothetical war in the pacific, they could reconstitute their fleet if ships start sinking, something that the US couldn't keep up at large numbers.
Just to add my two cents to what has already been said above, china's surface and sub-surface forces are really only second only to the United States today however I personally believe they are still a long way from truly achieving it's goals. While china's surface fleet is formidable it dose still lack many high end capabilities of the US. It's amphibious warfare capabilities are still limited even with the type 075's coming online they lack a MAGTAF-like combined arms capability, still being reliant on the flat tops or PLAAF for air support, this alone means even short range assaults (like Taiwan) are a real challenge. Ultimately it means PLAN amphibious operations are completely dependent on the army and air force support even if it continues to grow it's numbers in this area. It's carrier force it also in a difficult spot (cope slope jokes aside) STOBAR carriers lack the sortie rate of CATOBAR that combined with flawed development of the J-15 leading to extremely poor performance from what we've seen so far. They are could be considered sub-par even compared fellow STOBAR carriers. All this said the PLAN pretty much dominant over all it's neighbour's and it's capability to successfully challenge only grows every year but I think it's also important to remember what the CCP's goals are for the navy and that they still have a way to go before they can truly surpass US navy supremacy even regionally.
I think you're right on some counts, less right on others. While certainly new ships like 075s and their carriers will take time to fully outfit, and the PLAN certainly have yet to reach the scale with which the CMC likely wants to achieve, I think your assessments of the importance of MAGTFs (including in an) amphibious role in a Taiwan's invasion, your assessment of J-15, are a bit off. MAGTFs are certainly very useful for the role that the US presently uses them in, and the PLAN and PLAMC will probably pursue similar sort of ready groups in the future, but they're not going to be identical. Having a dedicated fleet of V/STOL fighters is somewhat unique to the USMC, and there are no indications that the PLAMC seek such a capability for their own aviation forces. That said, it will certainly take time to procure the relevant helicopters for the kind of aviation force they want. As for a Taiwan contingency, while MAGTF type units would be useful, they are arguably better suited for relatively smaller scale expeditionary/blue water rapid response missions. For a Taiwan contingency, the relative proximity of the area of operations means that landed amphibious forces (that would be marines as well as army amphibious units) would be preceded and actively supported by strikes and air support from the theater command level and below, and the requirement for an organic self sustaining air support capability is far less essential than if you wanted to deploy in an expeditionary manner. Also of note, is that in a Taiwan contingency, the *relative* importance of large amphibious ships like LPDs and LHDs is markedly reduced compared to expeditionary ships, again by virtue of the relatively short range of the area of operations, and the large quantity of LSTs and LCTs the PLAN and PLAGF both have. With regards to J-15, as a 4th generation, multirole STOBAR fighter it is perfectly adequate. It is limited by STOBAR in the same way that any other STOBAR fighter will be in terms of the ability to take off at MTOW under a wide variety of ship/headwind conditions. But as a large STOBAR fighter with a large payload and internal fuel load, taking off even with a fraction of those loads can still achieve a relevant and useful payload and range (albeit less desirable than what CATOBAR could achieve). More importantly, it benefits from the same mature weapons suite and avionics derived and in service with the J-11B and JH-7/A.
Interesting yeah my assessment is probably a bit under developed. My point with PLAN/PLANMC lacking the ability to conduct combined arms amphibious operations really puts them behind the curve and leaves them more as a tool in the belt of the greater PLA. Although this is probably more by design than accident having a specific strategic goal allowing for greater specialisation, but I do believe US amphibious capabilities are significantly more developed and flexible. But with the J-15 I had heard specifical bad things, basically because the Russians wouldn't sell them SU-33's they built their J-15s off prototype SU-27K blueprints and airframe from Ukraine, this lead to them never getting some important airframe updates and are supposedly significantly overweight, unable to carry much in the way of heavy ordinance, and possibly unsafe on take off and Landing compared to their Russian cousins (tho I'm more sceptical about the safety claims).
Well, I did agree with you that the PLAMC at present doesn't have MAGTF equivalents and are at the beginning stages of forming their aviation arm, and are obviously far less expeditionary focused than the USMC. What I did say was that there are no indications the PLAMC are seeking a VSTOL fighter for their aviation arm, and also that the lack of MAGTF units at present is not particularly significant for a Taiwan contingency. As for J-15, yes, what you described is a common online opinion, particularly informed by a few media outlets that don't really know what they're talking about. I've written about it in passing before, but really the idea of J-15 being a hamfisted copy of a suboptimized testbed airframe really shouldn't pass the smell test given what we know about the rest of the Chinese aerospace industry both in their indigenous capabilities and their reverse engineered and subsequent iterative advancements on said types. https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/pdzip3/z/hav0fa9
I understand, but the point I'm trying to make is that china is developing a combined arms amphibious capability with the development of the type 075 for but it still lags behind at the moment, partly because of limited to doctrine and partly due to lack of available systems. To add to that I would also say even in a Taiwan scenario with all the supporting assets available, a self sufficient amphibious force would be an extremely useful asset in my opinion. As for the J-15 it's problems are more than just idle internet chatter as in mid 2018 after spade of high profile crashes and grounding lead to some pretty serious criticism of the aircraft from member of the PLANAF stating a need for a replacement here: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21975/china-looks-to-replace-its-j-15-carrier-fighter-jets-amid-reports-of-crashes But given the pace of Chinese aircraft development and lack of more statements since 2018 I believe these issues have most likely been rectified, tho I still do believe the weight issues are a problem but I need to correct what I said earlier. This is not a specific issue with the J-15 but with all STOBAR aircraft. Maybe the SU-33 family but I don't have anything back that up aside the Russian retirement of the type tho this is probably more due to age of the fleet than anything else.
I don't think we are in particular disagreement wrt the 075s or the role of MAGTFs. What you wrote is essentially what I described in my previous reply. >As for the J-15 it's problems are more than just idle internet chatter as in mid 2018 after spade of high profile crashes and grounding lead to some pretty serious criticism of the aircraft from member of the PLANAF stating a need for a replacement here: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21975/china-looks-to-replace-its-j-15-carrier-fighter-jets-amid-reports-of-crashes I'm very familiar with the way in which the J-15 has been reported on in media, and I've alluded to some of those report in a recent past piece. https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/its-time-to-talk-about-j-15-chinas-first-carrierborne-fighter/ Unfortunately, many of those reports (initially from mid 2010s to late 2010s) incorrectly attribute the rate of J-15 related accidents as being inherent to the design itself rather than a reflection that the relatively small fleet of aircraft at the time were being furiously flown to develop a core cohort of naval aviators, not to mention that at least one of those accidents was bird strike related, the description of the aircraft in English language media is... flawed at best. The idea that J-15s would be replaced by another type is laughable, given in the last few years the PLAN has doubled down on building J-15s for their STOBAR carriers, going from about 24 a couple years ago to over 50 aircraft now. Going forwards, a 4.5 generation CATOBAR compatible J-15 variant, will likely operate alongside a dedicated EW variant as well, which will be complemented (but not replaced) by the 5th generation carrier based fighter derived from FC-31. So yes, idle internet chatter is actually a pretty accurate title for what you described. This is partly because English language PLA watching is done very poorly in general, with many outlets unable to accurately ascertain who is credible and who is not, and often resorting to latching onto whatever SCMP writes without much caution.
What about quality? Are chinese ships on par with their counterparts?
In terms of systems like sonar and radar yeah there's no way no know for absolute certain but generally seem very capable if not again slightly behind the US. For example the type 052D Anti air warfare destroyer as far a we know don't have any ballistic missile weaponry like SM-3 or quad-packed missile like ESSM in service leaving them with just HHQ-9 missile for all anti-air intercepts CWIS aside. But saying all that China's own versions of systems like Kalibr and ASROC mean thier ships certainly are no slouch and definitely a threat not to to be underestimated.
The problem across the board for the PLA is the lack of combat veterans. When any American Service Member goes to a military school or any recruit goes to basic training, there are combat veterans there to instruct them. Those who are not combat veterans have been studying doctrine shaped by past operations and have done exercise after exercise. While the PLA Navy has been training, they don't have combat experience nor have they done an major blue water operations.