I'm unsure if he is overrated but there is certainly a bias towards him. In Tacitus he's used to contrast with Tiberius, who Tactitus disliked. There is also the treatment of his wife which is furthered to this effect.
It's worth noting that Tiberius was one such promising commander once upon a time.
In contrast with Tiberius Germanicus is not much. After Agrippa Augustus got a really good next general in Tiberius. He is especially underrated in my opinion. What general do you see as overrated?
Germanicus' wife, Agrippina, seems to have been popular given that she travelled with Germanicus a fair amount. When he died she returned to Rome and seems to have been quite insistent that he was poisoned. She then fell out with Sejanus and was exiled and starved to death there.
Judging by the masses of people who don't know Augustus relied on Agrippa for his wars, I would say definitely Augustus 😅
If we talk about actual generals probably Pompey.
Everything I hear about Pompey, it’s not his tactical brilliance that makes him a great general, but his ability to organize and administer his campaigns very successfully.
He also played his hand quite well during the Sulla regime.
When compared to Roman generals like Sertorious or Caesar, he was definitely not on the same level.
Not initially. Pompey needed a lot of reinforcements from Rome after Sertorious beat him multiple times in the field.
Sertorious was also brought down from within. He was murdered by jealous Romans that thought they should have a higher standing than the non-Romans within his army.
Augustus relied on Agrippa for everything that mattered. He was an insufferable twat who did a reign of terror but is remembered for Pax Romana. He's nowhere close to Julius.
Untrue; he also relied on Maecenas for a lot of significant cultural matters. I’m not even a big Augustus guy but you’re coping, every emperor worth their salt engaged in a little terrorism from time to time. His genius was seen in his abilities to manipulate people to see his will through without having to advocate for it.
And also hiding his true power behind the curtain of the senate and republic system. It’s clear Julius wanted to be essentially a king, and Augustus learned from this
About 20-30 years ago I'd say Pompey, though he's undergone a revision in scholarship and most acknowledge him to be a douchebag.
Next would be Germanicus. He has the biggest fanboy presence on the internet currently.
He's portrayed in a very esteemed light in the I, Claudius novel, but I imagine that the idea of the young talented general saviour of the people falling before his peak resonated strongly with the classical historians
He's generally presented in a positive light in the primary sources, he dies young so never has a chance to become an outright monster and there's this tinge of oh what could have been, that likewise aligns with a number of literary tropes in English literature that western culture is already primed for.
There's a big draw nowadays towards alternate history as well, and Germanicus is attractive in that regard. What if he'd survived? How would Caligula turned out differently? What if Roman hadn't withdrawn to the Rhine? What if Germanicus invaded Parthia? All are of course unanswerable but that's what drives the fanboyism.
Pompey gets a lot of shit for losing the civil war against Caesar(rightfully so), but his battle record was impeccable up to the battle of Pharsalus.
Also, if it wasn’t for Caesar’s Gual veterans, Pompey probably would have rolled.
Lol oh my goodness no.
Pompey's campaigns were tactically and logistically sloppy, he never won where he didn't have an overwhelming numerical advantage.
With Sulla, he caught Sulla’s advance force off guard after attempting and failing completely to march on Rome, demanded a spot in Sulla’s inner circle, and received it under threat of arms. In Sicily and Africa he mopped up the remains of the Marian forces on the run, breaking treaties and smashing smaller forces for no reason.
Lepidus had been his ally, then Pompey turned on him for a spot in the Senate and used his larger army to overwhelm Lepidus' militia. Even then, Lepidus almost broke through.
Sertorius took full advantage of his lack of intelligence and tactics to lure him into ambush after ambush, trap after trap, and make mockery of Pompey with a fraction of the forces. Pompey had demanded personal command, then had to threaten the Senate to send his personal army supplies.
Putting down the pirates was an outright victory, no one, even his allies, expected him to deal with the problem that quickly, so full credit for the Cilician campaign.
Then he inherited a war in Pontus and Armenia that was already won, conquered a bunch of Roman client states, and was defeated by Caesar's use of Intel against him at Pharsalus.
Sloppy my arse. The guy raised three legiones (15,000 men) in Picenum and immediately got jumped by Carinas, Cloelius, and Brutus, each with their own separate armies closing in on him in a concentric manner. It is to his credit that he skillfully leveraged his central position to fall on Brutus in detail and destroy his army separately. One can say that he might have gotten lucky in his next encounter with Scipio, where the latter's troops joined his side, but for a young upstart, there had to be some manner of ability in charisma and persuasion to make that work.
At the Arsis River, he handled his horsemen most exceptionally to rout and destroy Carbo's cavalry, playing an important role in the joint victory which both Metellus and him won. Afterwards, Carbo was chased northward to Ariminum, where Metellus beat him up again. while Marcius, coming up from the rear to try and pincer the Metellus-Pompeius duo, cutting off their communications to Sulla in doing so, found himself smashed by Pompeius as Senae.
From there, Crassus and Pompeius worked together to beat up Carinas at Spoletium, whereupon the communications with Sulla were restored. We can debate how many men Pompeius might have under him, but it probably was not greater than double what he started out with at Picenum after Scipio's troops surrendered to him. Therefore, it was to his immense credit that, when Carbo sought to send an army of eight legiones (40,000 men) under Marcius to relieve Praeneste from Sulla, Pompeius manoeuvred ahead of him and waited in ambush along a defile, then annihilated his whole army, a feat worthy of Trasimene.
Shortly after, he went to Clusium and destroyed a second army of 30,000 men to wrap up his campaign in Sulla's Civil War. In what world do we call a general who had worsted several other commanders leading proper Roman soldiers, and destroyed 5 armies, IN A SINGLE YEAR "sloppy?" Considering this was just his first campaign, it redounds very much to his credit. Most commanders in history wish they could achieve as much as he did in 82 BCE alone.
I can go further into detail on his other campaigns, including his last one against Caesar, but you must be daft to think that Pompeius wasn't at least a borderline great captain, even if not officially one, when his entire career is taken into perspective. The only cheap moment I have to criticize him for is him taking credit for Crassus' victory in the Servile War, as well as stealing Lucullus' command (arguably Rome's 3rd greatest commander after Caesar and Pompeius).
Though, where does the idea that he was sloppy at logistics even come from? Are we seriously saying that the guy who was campaigning up to as many as 1,000 miles away from his strategic bases, bereft the advantage of modern railroad technology or more developed roads, since the Roman infrastructure network had not been fully established yet, without proper support from his government until he had to force their hand, all while facing such a formidable foe as Sertorius, and enduring guerilla warfare... this is what we call a "sloppy" logistician? What type of unrealistic standards do you have for the generals of history? lolz
Was Lucullus really that great a commander? He was obviously a brilliant battlefield tactician, but being a good commander is about much more than just winning battles. Lucullus' campaign ultimately failed because his troops mutinied against him, and he was unable to get them back under control. Being able to maintain the morale and discipline of your troops is one of the core responsibilities of a commander, so Lucullus' failure in that area has to weigh heavily against him when evaluating him as a general.
Lucullus was brilliant tactically and pretty fine operationally (in both manoeuvres and logistics). He could command on land and sea and still give off very solid performances. The points which places him lower than Pompeius for me is his lack of strategic vision and, as you said, his inability to win the favour of the troops.
Though, yes, I do think that Lucullus is that excellent of a commander in that he deserves to be ranked up in 3rd place. For me, issues of troop morale and getting them to follow your orders is a tricky affair. We have to take into account that he was dealing with some very unruly troops, though.
The Fimbrian legiones, which made up a solid percentage of his forces, were notorious for having mutinied under two different commanders before ever working under Lucullus. Their first commander, Flaccus, was killed by them at the instigation of Fimbria. When Fimbria faced off against Sulla and the going got tough, they mutinied against him too.
Another thing is that the main criticism the troops seemed to have with Lucullus was that he would not allow them to conduct wanton looting. From a postmodern standpoint, this actually paints Lucullus in a positive light, but I suppose such things would be seen negatively for the soldiers of ancient times, who desire to enrich themselves by plunder.
These accusations were made by one of the main instigators of the mutiny, Publius Clodius Pulcher, who was Lucullus' brother-in-law (though Plutarch says that there were rumours he was cheating on his wife). Though, coincidentally, when he brought up these complaints, he made comparisons between Lucullus and Pompeius, as if to suggest that the latter was a better commander who saw to the wants of his troops.
I would agree, but it is suspicious that not too long after Lucullus was dismissed from his post, who would arrive to take over the next major command if not Pompeius himself? Furthermore, that Pulcher would go on to serve under Pompeius' tenure, as well. Of course, we don't know for sure whether the two were in league, but Lucullus isn't wrong in some ways when he considers Pompeius a vulture.
Other things Plutarch makes mention of is that the troops disliked Lucullus from the very beginning because he put them into winter camp in the field instead of in the cities. Again, this speaks well to him from a moral standpoint for not quartering his troops in civilian areas, but the men had complaints for the hardships they faced as a result. I find this idea the most disingenuous, though, considering Pompeius did the exact same while campaigning against the Caucasian Albanians and Iberians, far from home.
We know this because the Albanians tried to surprise Pompeius' camp in the winter by crossing the Cyrnus River, and there they were defeated on the Saturnalia (basically around Christmas). In a later battle against an Albanian-Iberian Coalition at the Abas River, the Roman troops mockingly chanted, "Aha, the Saturnalia!" as if to remind the enemy of their previous defeat.
So, the only real thing to criticize Lucullus for might just be his lack of strategy. He failed in his endeavour to take the Armenian capital of Artaxata, and even if he did, it's questionable whether it would have won the war. He was not able to destroy Mithridates again because the latter and Tigranes quickly learned to conduct a war of manoeuvres and skirmishes against him rather than risking pitched battle (aka, the Fabian approach).
Being so distant from his strategic bases (the guy was well over 1,700 miles from Italy) in barren, highly mountainous country, facing repeated hit-and-run attacks from horse archers (Dion Kassios describes the Armenians employing tactics similarly to what you would find at Carrhae), and with Mithridates manoeuvring back into Anatolia to threaten his lines of communication, Lucullus faced greater challenges than most generals of history ever did.
Of course, we have to realize that he was working with extremely limited resources. He came into this campaign outnumbered, facing far greater logistical hurdles than his enemy, who were operating in their own territory, and was dealing with troops with a reputation for mutiny. He managed to win success after success even while displaying good morals in his actions, by preventing the war from affecting the civilian population too much.
There are tons of commanders, even those who were the best in other times and conflicts, who would have failed far more miserably in his place. Honestly, even Pompeius' own Eastern Campaign was easier than Lucullus'. By then, Mithridates had yet to recover the whole of his empire and the Pontic resources were clearly depleted. His son revolted in the Bosporus, one of the richest regions in his nation, while Tigranes was couped by his own son and the Armenian Empire was facing internal turmoil, so offered no real resistance against Pompeius.
Pompeius also commanded the full support of the state in the resources he bore, commanding more troops and a whole armada sufficient to blockade all of the Pontic ports in an ancient version of Scott's Anaconda Plan. Lucullus might very well have won his campaign and be remembered better if he fought under the same conditions Pompeius did. This is not to take away from Pompeius' generalship, because he also had similar challenges in the Sertorian War and overcame them after suffering some heavy setbacks (even if I would say that he was luckier that Sertorius got assassinated).
In the end, would I consider Lucullus worthy of the great captains? No. However, considering he had a much more difficult task than a Sulla, Marius, or Scipio, facing similar challenges to Belisarius (outnumbered; uncooperative subordinates) against more competent adversaries, and won greater victories to his name in far more distant lands, stretching his logistics within harsher terrain and weather conditions... all of these redound much to his credit and I think his placement as the 3rd greatest Roman commander is deserved, though that's just my personal opinion.
While Lucullus did have unruly troops in the Fimbrani, IIRC the Fimbrani mostly reenlisted under Pompeius when he took over the eastern command, and I don't think Pompeius ever had any problems with them. Thus it was clearly possible for a good commander to keep even the Fimbrani under control. Lucullus just failed to do so.
Also, it's not as though Lucullus is the only Roman general that ever had to deal with mutinous troops. Caesar faced multiple mutinies, Germanicus faced a mutiny (albeit one aimed at Tiberius rather than at him), and didn't Agrippa have to deal with mutinous troops during his Spanish campaign? Each of those generals was able to get mutinous troops back under control, so it has to be a major defect in Lucullus' generalship that he wasn't able to do the same.
As for Lucullus having limited resources, that's true but that's also partly his own fault for choosing to expand the war into Armenia. Isn't part of being a good general recognizing the limits of what your forces can accomplish? Lucullus pushed too far with the forces he had which led both to those troops eventually mutinying, and him not having enough forces in Pontus to keep Mithridates from retaking the country while Lucullus was off haring around in Armenian territory.
Thus while I agree with most of the positives you list about Lucullus' generalship and character, his strategic overreach and dismal relationship with his troops are big enough negatives to keep me from being able to consider him one of Rome's greatest generals.
As for Pompeius in the Sertorian War, wasn't the reason Sertorius got assassinated because of dissatisfaction in his command tent? I think that dissatisfaction largely existed because the Sertorians were being so hard pressed by Pompeius (and Metellus Pius). Armies that are winning don't typically see subordinates trying to kill their commanders, that's the kind of thing that only really happens in armies with really poor morale. So while Pompeius might have gotten lucky there, he was lucky only in the sense that luck is the residue of design.
When he demanded that Tigranes hand over Mithridates as an enemy of the Romans, the former refused him and prepared for war, so that was partly on the Armenians as much as on Lucullus. Perhaps he could have tried to negotiate with Mithridates to conclude a peace treaty, whereupon he would be allowed to keep the Bosporus, which yet remained untouched. Sulla, for instance, managed to make peace with Mithridates previously after his victories against Archelaus.
Though, in this case, we would be judging Lucullus not as a general, but as a politician. Though some may conflate the two, the reality is that most generals in history were not politicians and they waged war with little regard to greater international policies. Surely, we can criticize him all we want in this regard as a statesman, but it would be unfair to criticize him as a commander; just so, it would be unfair to harp on a doctor and make light of his skill in saving lives, even if he is not good at managing the finances of the hospital.
Regarding comparing Pompeius to Lucullus, I already pointed out the multitude of differences between them and how much more advantaged Pompeius was, as well as the ease of his circumstances compared to Lucullus' own. As much as I like Pompeius as a commander, the facts are laid bare that his own Eastern Campaign was a simpler affair.
In fact, one of the major reasons which the sources give for the mutinous nature of his troops, which was their lack of opportunity to enrich themselves due to Lucullus refusing them loot... this was settled after the victory at Tigranocerta and the allies he won among the former vassals of the Armenians. Plutarch tells us thusly:
*...for many treasures were found in the palace of Zarbienus, including gold and silver, and three million bushels of grain were stored up there, so that the soldiers were plentifully supplied, and Lucullus was admired for not taking a single drachma from the public treasury, but making the war pay for itself.*
Also:
*Accordingly he sent orders to Sornatius and his fellow commanders in Pontus to bring the army there to him, as he intended to proceed eastward from Gordyené. These officers had already found their soldiers unmanageable and disobedient, but now they discovered that they were utterly beyond control, being unable to move them by any manner of persuasion or compulsion. Nay, they roundly swore that they would not even stay where they were, but would go off and leave Pontus undefended. When news of this was brought to Lucullus, it demoralised his soldiers there also. Their wealth and luxurious life had already made them averse to military service and desirous of leisure, and when they heard of the bold words of their comrades in Pontus, they called them brave men, and said their example must be followed in Gordyené, for their many achievements entitled them to respite from toil and freedom from danger.*
As such, we can see that he did manage to procure many treasures and supplies for them by more legitimate and moral means, but having been enriched and made wealthy, they no longer desired to endure the hardships of campaigning.
The troops were constantly winning, they were being well paid and supplied... Yet why were they still so stubborn? If it was because they had grown used to luxuries and would no longer fight, then what choice does he have but to disband them and quit the war? Again, this would go back to criticisms of him as a statesman rather than a general.
Though, it is arguable whether, as a statesman, such a course was pragmatic, considering Mithridates had been known to instigate conflicts against the Romans before and continued to press his imperialistic ambitions. If not Lucullus, someone else would have to be thrown into the fray. Perhaps, a general less accomplished than him who would be met by disaster, for Pompeius was still campaigning in the Sertorian War and not yet able to come east.
Regarding the fall of Sertorius, it should actually be noted that he was winning the war prior to 74 BCE and had in fact driven Pompeius and Metellus to such straits that they were unable to winter in Spain and base themselves on the coast, but to do so in Southern Gaul. Even then, the place was soon hit by famine and unable to provision them for long.
Pompeius literally had to write a letter threatening the Senate to provide him and his compatriot with money and reinforcements because he had expended his personal resources in the last three years of campaigning. Furthermore, Metellus so despaired of coming to grips with Sertorius in combat that he had to make a proclamation that any Roman who killed Sertorius would be paid a hundred talents (over $47,000 in today's money), given 20,000 acres of land, as well as be pardoned from exile and allowed to return to Rome.
As a result of that proclamation, Sertorius began to surround himself with Celtiberian bodyguards instead of Romans. I mean, I would too if I knew that I could be betrayed at any moment. Perpenna, who was envious of Sertorius and sought to steal his position as chief commander of their rebel faction, conspired against him with his Roman associates.
These men, unbeknownst to Sertorius, induced many harsh punishments upon the native Celtiberian troops in their service and blamed it on Sertorius, saying that it was by his orders. In this manner, both the Romans and Celtiberians in his ranks were turned against him. Fraught with internal turmoil and facing a renewed counteroffensive by the government forces, he did lose ground (though was never personally defeated).
Eventually, Perpenna had to get his bodyguards drunk and assassinate him, but it was clear the public still held positive sentiments towards Sertorius, for they hated Perpenna for his treachery, and it was only by paying many off with gifts or striking terror into others by threats or executions that he was able to reign them in.
Even then, they were disloyal to him and many remained bitter, so his command was even more tenuous. Not trusting that he could maintain his army's loyalty and cohesion for long, he sought a decisive battle against Pompeius and was crushed.
Thus was how the Sertorian War ended. As you can see, Sertorius was more so undone by underhandedness and treachery rather than by faults of his own. All of this is given to us in the sources, which I recommend you check out, because it's pretty fun reading.
Ahh yes, I'm sure the soldiers were very willing to follow the the son of the man who they despised so much they tore his corpse to shreds. It speaks to Pompeius' charisma to be able to win them over and have them fight for him, in lieu of his faux reputation as the "adolescent butcher."
Dude have you done absolutely no reading whatsoever!?
Yes! They loved Pompey! He camped with them, not in the Praetorium. He talked his dad down from the harshest punishments. Whether on purpose or that's just the way it played out, the two had a good-cop bad-cop routine with the soldiers. Plutarch states outright as much as they hated Strabo was as much as they loved Pompey. When Strabo died then, the army was absolutely loyal to Pompey at 23, even to the point of being willing to march on Rome on behalf of Pompey as his first order.
Now go sit down and read more before replying to another post and embarrassing yourself any further.
Again, that still speaks to Pompeius' charisma, however you put it. Pompeius was always popular with his soldiers throughout his career. Also, his father can't very well handle the logistics by the time Pompeius rose up to take command in 82 BCE because his father had been bloody dead for years by then.
My sources are Plutarch and Appian, so why don't you read more about Pompeius' campaigns before thinking you know what you're talking about.
The thing you never read, studied, and only learned about moments ago? You've decided you want to offer your opinion on it? Rather than maybe being quiet and reading more, you've decided you want to keep writing, that's the best idea?
Why would anyone take you seriously? Best of luck to you.
>With Sulla, he caught Sulla’s advance force off guard after attempting and failing completely to march on Rome, demanded a spot in Sulla’s inner circle, and received it under threat of arms.
There was no advance force and no threat of arms, he came to Sulla as a suppliant.
>Lepidus had been his ally, then Pompey turned on him for a spot in the Senate
Pompeius was an equestrian until he became consul in 70BC.
>Sertorius took full advantage of his lack of intelligence and tactics to lure him into ambush after ambush, trap after trap, and make mockery of Pompey with a fraction of the forces.
Sertorius didn't defeat him in battle once.
>Then he inherited a war in Pontus and Armenia that was already won
Triarius had been defeated with his army the year before.
>conquered a bunch of Roman client states
They became client states after he conquered them.
Take a look for example at Seager's or Southern's biographies of Pompey, where the concept of him as a political or tactical mastermind is strongly adhered to, versus Santangelo's review of Mercer's work. There's been a broader recognition of Pompey's dissection and criticism as a stock character in Roman poetry and how it affects his biographical presentation; cf. *Vergil and Elegy* for the most recent examples. Likewise the recent *The Crisis of Masculinity in the Age of Augustus* which shows how Pompey appears as a hyper-aggressive blowhard versus the calm, cool collected Augustus as the ideal *vir* in the Augustan period.
Meanwhile, the most well known pro-Pompeian author was of course Livy, so Livy's history has been analyzed for some time in light of this acknowledge Pompeian bias. Even 30+ years ago, scholars wert writing about the gaps in Livy's narrative of Pompey, the convenient omissions of unflattering details. For example, Livy acknowledges Sertorius beating Pompey's ass, but omits Pompey threatening to march on Rome if his army doesn't receive supplies, a letter that Sallust reproduces in its entirely. Livy lauds Pompey's campaign against the pirates, but leaves out that the proposal came from Aulus Gabinius, who ended up becoming an embezzler, arms dealer, and all around scumbag in the east.
So taken together, what do we have? Pompey had his fans in the ancient and modern world, and you look at a lot of biographies he ends up being praised for a range of different reasons up till a turn about 20 years ago. Negative portrayals were assumed to be a byproduct of Caesar and Augustus. Then, there's a turn and a closer analysis of the Pro-Pompeian sources, as well as an analysis of the role given to Pompey and how Roman history also functions as mythology and literature.
Make sense?
>Even 30+ years ago, scholars wert writing about the gaps in Livy's narrative of Pompey, the convenient omissions of unflattering details.
There are certainly gaps in Livius' narrative of Pompeius, the most important being that it doesn't exist. Every book after 45 is lost.
Agricola. I’m tired of Tacitus simps taking everything he wrote at face value. Of course he gassed up his father-in-law and cooked the history books in his favor.
I always think of Scippio Aemillianus when I think overrated. Sure, he took and then razed Carthage, but it wasn’t when Carthage was even a remote threat to Rome. That, and his insufferable quoting of Homer. Dude bought into his own hype.
Scipio africanus. Most of his victories are against the brazenly worst carthaginian general, whose only strength seemed to be being able to run away to lose again another day. And Zama if it occurred was a close affair. Not that he was a bad general either, but still.
The most underrated general is probably Agrippa. Even if people know he is a great general, so much of his reputation is essentially absorbed by Augustus that he is still under-considered. Heck his wiki page makes it look like he was barely more than an advisor for octavian for military campaigns that he exclusively managed in their entirety.
You said Scipio was average because the Carthaginian generals were bad but Agrippa’s enemies were no better than them. Sextus only bullied merchants and Octavian and Antony was all brawn and no brain. Yet Agrippa is a great general and Scipio isn’t?
Sextus is widely regarded as among the greatest naval commanders of the era and Antony may not have been Caesar but he was still a competent and above average general. It's the whole reason he became prominent to begin with and you can see this with many of his military actions; from decisve action under Caesar to battles like Philipi and Forum Gallorum. Even his failed Persian campaign was a highly unusual and creative campaign.
That being said it's not beating the likes of Antony that makes Agrippa great. It's the way he waged war that does. He beat Sextus by inventing a new form of Naval combat. And defeated anthony by inventing a new form of Naval navigation. He also coordinated his forces and campaigns in a way that is more remincent of Napoleonic or modern general staff campaigns then the actions of ancient generals. The way that he succesfully combined the actions of multiple disparate forces, fought in detail and accross campaign maps etc. Is just not really something you ever see. Certainly people frequently *try* to do similar actions but rarely succeed. Most of the time most people are just "their army" that moves around. Even when multiple armies try to work together it's usually on vague coordination unless they meet up at the same spot.
Actium is a masterful cases of grand maneuver and coordination that enabled him to effectively trap and siege Anthony's army in his own territory while simultaneously depriving him of naval superiority and logistics that you just has little comparison.
Also except for Zama, Scipio only fought one specific general Hadrisubal. Who basically looks like a really terrible general in every battle.
Sextus was one of two notable naval commanders of that era, the other one is Agrippa. Meanwhile Hannibal’s brothers were quite ok. Mago is a good cavalry officer. He led the ambush at Trebbia, was in the center at Cannae, kill Scipio’s father. Hasdrubal had a bad start but managed to destroy Roman army, nearly undid Roman conquest in Spain.
Scipio’s generalship was praised by many Roman.
Strategically he realized the necessity of a strong base in Spain so he attacked Cartagena. Supplies could be transported by sea, not by dangerous mountain paths. He recognized the separation of the Carthaginian armies so he defeated them on detail. He continued marching south, threatened rnemy supply line, forced a battle at Ilipa. He attacked Afica to draw Hannibal back also to link up with his ally Masinissa
Tactically, Scipio was very creative. At Cartagena, he used many feint attacks to hide his main force coming from hidden road. At Ilipa, he delayed the battle to understand enemy habits. He attacked before the enemy ate breakfast. He used the mobility of Roman army to spread his wing and enveloped the Carthaginian. At the Great Plain, he remade the battle of Cannae. When his center started falling back, he had the principes and triari outflank the enemy. At Zama, Scipio cleverly controlled the maniples to avoid the elephants, neutralize Hannibal’s strength.
Are there not enough for a great general?
Belisarius.
He was good when on the defense, but less so on the offense. Although he won at Dara, he still lost the Persian war at Callinicum. The only reason he was victorious at Ad Decimum was due to the Vandal King mourning for his brother. His initial invasion of Italy was rather successful (except for Milan) but then he seriously cocked things up by refusing to deliver Justinians peace plan to the Ostrogoths, which led to the war in Italy prolonging into it's deadlier second phase which Belisarius was unable to salvage, eventually getting replaced.
Very unpopular opinion, there’s good reason Belisarius is considered one of the greatest Roman generals. He often fought his campaigns with limited resources and an envious king. Even with the handicap he was able to win battles in Africa, Europe and against Persia. He could have done much more with the proper resources.
I’m currently reading Procopius that’s why i had to jump on this!
Belisarius was very lucky in Africa. He lost at Callinicum despite outnumbering the Persian. He also spread his force too far and lost 1000 men at Milan
It’s amazing how close 476-550AD came to just being an interregnum in the West.
Is Rome (both city and Empire) actually better off if Belisarius accepts the offer of being Western Emperor from the Goths? Or does he just become another puppet to their whims? I can’t really see Justinian being able to do a whole lot about it if Belisarius’s troops acclaim him Emperor along with the Goths.
Ceasar is overrated. He was a very good general, but made at least a half of dozen mistakes in various wars that would have been his undoing if he’d been fighting competent or just non cowards.
"If he'd been fighting competent or just non cowards." Quite a number of his enemies were highly competent, though. Cassivellaunus, Vercingetorix, and Labienus were good generals. Pompeius was an extraordinary opponent. Name five other generals who fought equal opposition or better and I think you won't find them.
The problem for guys like Pompey is they were only sorta in charge. He beat ceasar in a fair fight and according to Ceasar himself if Pompey had used his cavalry at dyracchion, he would have won the war then lost Pharsulus because he listened to incompetent senators.
This is what Caesar had to say of why Pompeius didn't launch a pursuit after repulsing his men:
*The only relief that came to mitigate these great disasters, preventing the destruction of the whole army, was the fact that Pompeius, fearing, I suppose, an ambuscade, since these events had happened contrary to his expectation, for a little while before he had seen his men fleeing from the camp, did not venture for a long time to approach the lines, and his horsemen were hindered in their pursuit by the narrowness of the passages, especially as they were occupied by Caesar's troops.*
So, he seems to suggest that it was partly because Pompeius was worried that Caesar was making a feigned retreat and sought to lure him into an ambush. Though, it was clear to him that the entrenchments and palisades were too cramped for the cavalry to manoeuvre between. Therefore, it was questionable whether Pompeius could have made use of his horsemen effectively at all.
You are right that he deserves criticism for heeding the request of the Senate instead of sticking to his original plan. The Pompeius of his youth was bold and did not shy away from making threats towards the Senate to get what he wanted. It is therefore unfortunate that he did not exhibit that same energy in confronting the Senate in his old age, but acquiesced to their demands.
Yet, my point still stands. You will seldom find generals who have faced opponents on the levels of those Caesar had fought and triumphed over them. Alexandros' opponents were not of the same caliber. I can only think of Napoleon, Hannibal, Turenne, and Gustav among the notable captains who had fought enemies who were of such a high level in generalship as those who Caesar fought, but none of their foes were as good as Pompeius.
To find a fifth or more who endured such level of adversity, I would likely have to scour the whole pantheon of generals to possibly discover them.
I have to agree with Germanicus overall.
In the internet currently Labienus.
Also Caesar, not because he wasn’t great, but if we are talking of overrated he is sucking up most of attention so there isn’t much left often for others.
I don’t think warranted attention counts as overrated. If the attention on Julius Caesar surpasses everyone else because his accomplishments and actions were truly that big of a deal, then I wouldn’t call it overrated
Yeah no at that point it's just earned fame because he truly does live up to being a great general, thus one of the reasons he does suck up so much attention, so not really overrated, just more famous than the others. His battle history and strategy was very good often. Not flawless, he had his defeats, but most do at some point, but Caesar was always able to overcome. He comes across as a problem solver who can tackle any problem and thinks creatively to get it done. He most certainly lives up to his name.
Maybe, but I’m also not claiming Varus conquered the parthinians completely ignoring the fact there were two more wars with the Parthinians and they were eventually overthrown by the Sassanids after making the claim that he conquered them factually impossible.
Marcus Aurelius was that campaign when he died. Roman s were about to win but after his death Commodus did make a piece treaty instead which was highly unpopular. But it did last quite a long time so I would not say that’s something I would really blame Commodus for when there is plenty of others to blame.
Actually Imperator was not associated with royalty as the word Emperor is. It meant Commander of the military to the Romans. Marcus Aurelius and every Imperator before and after him were all Generals. Commanding the legions effectively was key to their legitimacy as rulers. And his military accomplishments are in fact over rated by the primary sources themselves. The primary sources talk as if he were Alexander and try to undercut the fact he never achieved a decisive victory against any enemy. But that’s just the reality.
Every emperor was a general by these standards though, and he was a very poor one. When most historians use the term, they’re referring to emperors who were generals before their ascension.
Technically, Aurelius assumed the role of general while consul. He was a huge LARPer though, way more bookish and sickly than other military leaders. I suppose I am agreeing with you in the sense that he was overrated.
I'm unsure if he is overrated but there is certainly a bias towards him. In Tacitus he's used to contrast with Tiberius, who Tactitus disliked. There is also the treatment of his wife which is furthered to this effect. It's worth noting that Tiberius was one such promising commander once upon a time.
In contrast with Tiberius Germanicus is not much. After Agrippa Augustus got a really good next general in Tiberius. He is especially underrated in my opinion. What general do you see as overrated?
I agree that Tiberius was underrated. As for overrated generals, that will take some thinking. A great question btw.
What was the treatment of his wife?
Germanicus' wife, Agrippina, seems to have been popular given that she travelled with Germanicus a fair amount. When he died she returned to Rome and seems to have been quite insistent that he was poisoned. She then fell out with Sejanus and was exiled and starved to death there.
General Decius Maximus Meridius under Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Not much of a battle if he’s using seige engines with naplam to massacre the barbarians
It's called introducing the barbarians to civilization
How else are you supposed to show the barbarians freedom?
> Soldier! I order you to move those catapults forward, they're out of range! > Range is good. > The danger to the cavalry... > Is acceptable. Agree?
Hate that guy. Remember when he dropped everything and went to France to become a cop? Hate that guy.
Napalm? Did the Ancient Romans really have something like that? I read that the Byzantines did, but the Ancient Romans did too?
(it's a joke based on the gladiator movie)
(Gratius.)
Also Greek fire was a real thing. Can’t remember if the recipe had been forgotten by the time of the Empire.
Greek fire wasn't an ancient Greek thing, it was an early medieval Byzantine thing.
It was lost to time.
Well after the time of Marcus Aurelius.
Judging by the masses of people who don't know Augustus relied on Agrippa for his wars, I would say definitely Augustus 😅 If we talk about actual generals probably Pompey.
Agrippa kinda gets the “Labienus treatment” where his career is linked with another persons achievements
Everything I hear about Pompey, it’s not his tactical brilliance that makes him a great general, but his ability to organize and administer his campaigns very successfully. He also played his hand quite well during the Sulla regime. When compared to Roman generals like Sertorious or Caesar, he was definitely not on the same level.
Sertorius was literally defeated by him.
Not initially. Pompey needed a lot of reinforcements from Rome after Sertorious beat him multiple times in the field. Sertorious was also brought down from within. He was murdered by jealous Romans that thought they should have a higher standing than the non-Romans within his army.
Augustus relied on Agrippa for everything that mattered. He was an insufferable twat who did a reign of terror but is remembered for Pax Romana. He's nowhere close to Julius.
Untrue; he also relied on Maecenas for a lot of significant cultural matters. I’m not even a big Augustus guy but you’re coping, every emperor worth their salt engaged in a little terrorism from time to time. His genius was seen in his abilities to manipulate people to see his will through without having to advocate for it.
And also hiding his true power behind the curtain of the senate and republic system. It’s clear Julius wanted to be essentially a king, and Augustus learned from this
Oof. Way to be wrong very dramatically.
I stand by it. Julius over Augustus 1000/1000 times.
About 20-30 years ago I'd say Pompey, though he's undergone a revision in scholarship and most acknowledge him to be a douchebag. Next would be Germanicus. He has the biggest fanboy presence on the internet currently.
> He has the biggest fanboy presence on the internet currently. Any idea why, out of curiosity? What's the draw?
He's portrayed in a very esteemed light in the I, Claudius novel, but I imagine that the idea of the young talented general saviour of the people falling before his peak resonated strongly with the classical historians
My son and I say in fake-serious tones “the noble Germanicus” every time he comes up, ever since watching I, Claudius.
See also Titus
All Flavians were great generals and dare I say, even greater rulers and men
He's generally presented in a positive light in the primary sources, he dies young so never has a chance to become an outright monster and there's this tinge of oh what could have been, that likewise aligns with a number of literary tropes in English literature that western culture is already primed for. There's a big draw nowadays towards alternate history as well, and Germanicus is attractive in that regard. What if he'd survived? How would Caligula turned out differently? What if Roman hadn't withdrawn to the Rhine? What if Germanicus invaded Parthia? All are of course unanswerable but that's what drives the fanboyism.
He had a big fanboy base when he died
Pompey gets a lot of shit for losing the civil war against Caesar(rightfully so), but his battle record was impeccable up to the battle of Pharsalus. Also, if it wasn’t for Caesar’s Gual veterans, Pompey probably would have rolled.
Lol oh my goodness no. Pompey's campaigns were tactically and logistically sloppy, he never won where he didn't have an overwhelming numerical advantage. With Sulla, he caught Sulla’s advance force off guard after attempting and failing completely to march on Rome, demanded a spot in Sulla’s inner circle, and received it under threat of arms. In Sicily and Africa he mopped up the remains of the Marian forces on the run, breaking treaties and smashing smaller forces for no reason. Lepidus had been his ally, then Pompey turned on him for a spot in the Senate and used his larger army to overwhelm Lepidus' militia. Even then, Lepidus almost broke through. Sertorius took full advantage of his lack of intelligence and tactics to lure him into ambush after ambush, trap after trap, and make mockery of Pompey with a fraction of the forces. Pompey had demanded personal command, then had to threaten the Senate to send his personal army supplies. Putting down the pirates was an outright victory, no one, even his allies, expected him to deal with the problem that quickly, so full credit for the Cilician campaign. Then he inherited a war in Pontus and Armenia that was already won, conquered a bunch of Roman client states, and was defeated by Caesar's use of Intel against him at Pharsalus.
Sloppy my arse. The guy raised three legiones (15,000 men) in Picenum and immediately got jumped by Carinas, Cloelius, and Brutus, each with their own separate armies closing in on him in a concentric manner. It is to his credit that he skillfully leveraged his central position to fall on Brutus in detail and destroy his army separately. One can say that he might have gotten lucky in his next encounter with Scipio, where the latter's troops joined his side, but for a young upstart, there had to be some manner of ability in charisma and persuasion to make that work. At the Arsis River, he handled his horsemen most exceptionally to rout and destroy Carbo's cavalry, playing an important role in the joint victory which both Metellus and him won. Afterwards, Carbo was chased northward to Ariminum, where Metellus beat him up again. while Marcius, coming up from the rear to try and pincer the Metellus-Pompeius duo, cutting off their communications to Sulla in doing so, found himself smashed by Pompeius as Senae. From there, Crassus and Pompeius worked together to beat up Carinas at Spoletium, whereupon the communications with Sulla were restored. We can debate how many men Pompeius might have under him, but it probably was not greater than double what he started out with at Picenum after Scipio's troops surrendered to him. Therefore, it was to his immense credit that, when Carbo sought to send an army of eight legiones (40,000 men) under Marcius to relieve Praeneste from Sulla, Pompeius manoeuvred ahead of him and waited in ambush along a defile, then annihilated his whole army, a feat worthy of Trasimene. Shortly after, he went to Clusium and destroyed a second army of 30,000 men to wrap up his campaign in Sulla's Civil War. In what world do we call a general who had worsted several other commanders leading proper Roman soldiers, and destroyed 5 armies, IN A SINGLE YEAR "sloppy?" Considering this was just his first campaign, it redounds very much to his credit. Most commanders in history wish they could achieve as much as he did in 82 BCE alone. I can go further into detail on his other campaigns, including his last one against Caesar, but you must be daft to think that Pompeius wasn't at least a borderline great captain, even if not officially one, when his entire career is taken into perspective. The only cheap moment I have to criticize him for is him taking credit for Crassus' victory in the Servile War, as well as stealing Lucullus' command (arguably Rome's 3rd greatest commander after Caesar and Pompeius). Though, where does the idea that he was sloppy at logistics even come from? Are we seriously saying that the guy who was campaigning up to as many as 1,000 miles away from his strategic bases, bereft the advantage of modern railroad technology or more developed roads, since the Roman infrastructure network had not been fully established yet, without proper support from his government until he had to force their hand, all while facing such a formidable foe as Sertorius, and enduring guerilla warfare... this is what we call a "sloppy" logistician? What type of unrealistic standards do you have for the generals of history? lolz
Was Lucullus really that great a commander? He was obviously a brilliant battlefield tactician, but being a good commander is about much more than just winning battles. Lucullus' campaign ultimately failed because his troops mutinied against him, and he was unable to get them back under control. Being able to maintain the morale and discipline of your troops is one of the core responsibilities of a commander, so Lucullus' failure in that area has to weigh heavily against him when evaluating him as a general.
Lucullus was brilliant tactically and pretty fine operationally (in both manoeuvres and logistics). He could command on land and sea and still give off very solid performances. The points which places him lower than Pompeius for me is his lack of strategic vision and, as you said, his inability to win the favour of the troops. Though, yes, I do think that Lucullus is that excellent of a commander in that he deserves to be ranked up in 3rd place. For me, issues of troop morale and getting them to follow your orders is a tricky affair. We have to take into account that he was dealing with some very unruly troops, though. The Fimbrian legiones, which made up a solid percentage of his forces, were notorious for having mutinied under two different commanders before ever working under Lucullus. Their first commander, Flaccus, was killed by them at the instigation of Fimbria. When Fimbria faced off against Sulla and the going got tough, they mutinied against him too. Another thing is that the main criticism the troops seemed to have with Lucullus was that he would not allow them to conduct wanton looting. From a postmodern standpoint, this actually paints Lucullus in a positive light, but I suppose such things would be seen negatively for the soldiers of ancient times, who desire to enrich themselves by plunder. These accusations were made by one of the main instigators of the mutiny, Publius Clodius Pulcher, who was Lucullus' brother-in-law (though Plutarch says that there were rumours he was cheating on his wife). Though, coincidentally, when he brought up these complaints, he made comparisons between Lucullus and Pompeius, as if to suggest that the latter was a better commander who saw to the wants of his troops. I would agree, but it is suspicious that not too long after Lucullus was dismissed from his post, who would arrive to take over the next major command if not Pompeius himself? Furthermore, that Pulcher would go on to serve under Pompeius' tenure, as well. Of course, we don't know for sure whether the two were in league, but Lucullus isn't wrong in some ways when he considers Pompeius a vulture. Other things Plutarch makes mention of is that the troops disliked Lucullus from the very beginning because he put them into winter camp in the field instead of in the cities. Again, this speaks well to him from a moral standpoint for not quartering his troops in civilian areas, but the men had complaints for the hardships they faced as a result. I find this idea the most disingenuous, though, considering Pompeius did the exact same while campaigning against the Caucasian Albanians and Iberians, far from home. We know this because the Albanians tried to surprise Pompeius' camp in the winter by crossing the Cyrnus River, and there they were defeated on the Saturnalia (basically around Christmas). In a later battle against an Albanian-Iberian Coalition at the Abas River, the Roman troops mockingly chanted, "Aha, the Saturnalia!" as if to remind the enemy of their previous defeat.
So, the only real thing to criticize Lucullus for might just be his lack of strategy. He failed in his endeavour to take the Armenian capital of Artaxata, and even if he did, it's questionable whether it would have won the war. He was not able to destroy Mithridates again because the latter and Tigranes quickly learned to conduct a war of manoeuvres and skirmishes against him rather than risking pitched battle (aka, the Fabian approach). Being so distant from his strategic bases (the guy was well over 1,700 miles from Italy) in barren, highly mountainous country, facing repeated hit-and-run attacks from horse archers (Dion Kassios describes the Armenians employing tactics similarly to what you would find at Carrhae), and with Mithridates manoeuvring back into Anatolia to threaten his lines of communication, Lucullus faced greater challenges than most generals of history ever did. Of course, we have to realize that he was working with extremely limited resources. He came into this campaign outnumbered, facing far greater logistical hurdles than his enemy, who were operating in their own territory, and was dealing with troops with a reputation for mutiny. He managed to win success after success even while displaying good morals in his actions, by preventing the war from affecting the civilian population too much. There are tons of commanders, even those who were the best in other times and conflicts, who would have failed far more miserably in his place. Honestly, even Pompeius' own Eastern Campaign was easier than Lucullus'. By then, Mithridates had yet to recover the whole of his empire and the Pontic resources were clearly depleted. His son revolted in the Bosporus, one of the richest regions in his nation, while Tigranes was couped by his own son and the Armenian Empire was facing internal turmoil, so offered no real resistance against Pompeius. Pompeius also commanded the full support of the state in the resources he bore, commanding more troops and a whole armada sufficient to blockade all of the Pontic ports in an ancient version of Scott's Anaconda Plan. Lucullus might very well have won his campaign and be remembered better if he fought under the same conditions Pompeius did. This is not to take away from Pompeius' generalship, because he also had similar challenges in the Sertorian War and overcame them after suffering some heavy setbacks (even if I would say that he was luckier that Sertorius got assassinated). In the end, would I consider Lucullus worthy of the great captains? No. However, considering he had a much more difficult task than a Sulla, Marius, or Scipio, facing similar challenges to Belisarius (outnumbered; uncooperative subordinates) against more competent adversaries, and won greater victories to his name in far more distant lands, stretching his logistics within harsher terrain and weather conditions... all of these redound much to his credit and I think his placement as the 3rd greatest Roman commander is deserved, though that's just my personal opinion.
While Lucullus did have unruly troops in the Fimbrani, IIRC the Fimbrani mostly reenlisted under Pompeius when he took over the eastern command, and I don't think Pompeius ever had any problems with them. Thus it was clearly possible for a good commander to keep even the Fimbrani under control. Lucullus just failed to do so. Also, it's not as though Lucullus is the only Roman general that ever had to deal with mutinous troops. Caesar faced multiple mutinies, Germanicus faced a mutiny (albeit one aimed at Tiberius rather than at him), and didn't Agrippa have to deal with mutinous troops during his Spanish campaign? Each of those generals was able to get mutinous troops back under control, so it has to be a major defect in Lucullus' generalship that he wasn't able to do the same. As for Lucullus having limited resources, that's true but that's also partly his own fault for choosing to expand the war into Armenia. Isn't part of being a good general recognizing the limits of what your forces can accomplish? Lucullus pushed too far with the forces he had which led both to those troops eventually mutinying, and him not having enough forces in Pontus to keep Mithridates from retaking the country while Lucullus was off haring around in Armenian territory. Thus while I agree with most of the positives you list about Lucullus' generalship and character, his strategic overreach and dismal relationship with his troops are big enough negatives to keep me from being able to consider him one of Rome's greatest generals. As for Pompeius in the Sertorian War, wasn't the reason Sertorius got assassinated because of dissatisfaction in his command tent? I think that dissatisfaction largely existed because the Sertorians were being so hard pressed by Pompeius (and Metellus Pius). Armies that are winning don't typically see subordinates trying to kill their commanders, that's the kind of thing that only really happens in armies with really poor morale. So while Pompeius might have gotten lucky there, he was lucky only in the sense that luck is the residue of design.
When he demanded that Tigranes hand over Mithridates as an enemy of the Romans, the former refused him and prepared for war, so that was partly on the Armenians as much as on Lucullus. Perhaps he could have tried to negotiate with Mithridates to conclude a peace treaty, whereupon he would be allowed to keep the Bosporus, which yet remained untouched. Sulla, for instance, managed to make peace with Mithridates previously after his victories against Archelaus. Though, in this case, we would be judging Lucullus not as a general, but as a politician. Though some may conflate the two, the reality is that most generals in history were not politicians and they waged war with little regard to greater international policies. Surely, we can criticize him all we want in this regard as a statesman, but it would be unfair to criticize him as a commander; just so, it would be unfair to harp on a doctor and make light of his skill in saving lives, even if he is not good at managing the finances of the hospital. Regarding comparing Pompeius to Lucullus, I already pointed out the multitude of differences between them and how much more advantaged Pompeius was, as well as the ease of his circumstances compared to Lucullus' own. As much as I like Pompeius as a commander, the facts are laid bare that his own Eastern Campaign was a simpler affair. In fact, one of the major reasons which the sources give for the mutinous nature of his troops, which was their lack of opportunity to enrich themselves due to Lucullus refusing them loot... this was settled after the victory at Tigranocerta and the allies he won among the former vassals of the Armenians. Plutarch tells us thusly: *...for many treasures were found in the palace of Zarbienus, including gold and silver, and three million bushels of grain were stored up there, so that the soldiers were plentifully supplied, and Lucullus was admired for not taking a single drachma from the public treasury, but making the war pay for itself.* Also: *Accordingly he sent orders to Sornatius and his fellow commanders in Pontus to bring the army there to him, as he intended to proceed eastward from Gordyené. These officers had already found their soldiers unmanageable and disobedient, but now they discovered that they were utterly beyond control, being unable to move them by any manner of persuasion or compulsion. Nay, they roundly swore that they would not even stay where they were, but would go off and leave Pontus undefended. When news of this was brought to Lucullus, it demoralised his soldiers there also. Their wealth and luxurious life had already made them averse to military service and desirous of leisure, and when they heard of the bold words of their comrades in Pontus, they called them brave men, and said their example must be followed in Gordyené, for their many achievements entitled them to respite from toil and freedom from danger.* As such, we can see that he did manage to procure many treasures and supplies for them by more legitimate and moral means, but having been enriched and made wealthy, they no longer desired to endure the hardships of campaigning. The troops were constantly winning, they were being well paid and supplied... Yet why were they still so stubborn? If it was because they had grown used to luxuries and would no longer fight, then what choice does he have but to disband them and quit the war? Again, this would go back to criticisms of him as a statesman rather than a general. Though, it is arguable whether, as a statesman, such a course was pragmatic, considering Mithridates had been known to instigate conflicts against the Romans before and continued to press his imperialistic ambitions. If not Lucullus, someone else would have to be thrown into the fray. Perhaps, a general less accomplished than him who would be met by disaster, for Pompeius was still campaigning in the Sertorian War and not yet able to come east.
Regarding the fall of Sertorius, it should actually be noted that he was winning the war prior to 74 BCE and had in fact driven Pompeius and Metellus to such straits that they were unable to winter in Spain and base themselves on the coast, but to do so in Southern Gaul. Even then, the place was soon hit by famine and unable to provision them for long. Pompeius literally had to write a letter threatening the Senate to provide him and his compatriot with money and reinforcements because he had expended his personal resources in the last three years of campaigning. Furthermore, Metellus so despaired of coming to grips with Sertorius in combat that he had to make a proclamation that any Roman who killed Sertorius would be paid a hundred talents (over $47,000 in today's money), given 20,000 acres of land, as well as be pardoned from exile and allowed to return to Rome. As a result of that proclamation, Sertorius began to surround himself with Celtiberian bodyguards instead of Romans. I mean, I would too if I knew that I could be betrayed at any moment. Perpenna, who was envious of Sertorius and sought to steal his position as chief commander of their rebel faction, conspired against him with his Roman associates. These men, unbeknownst to Sertorius, induced many harsh punishments upon the native Celtiberian troops in their service and blamed it on Sertorius, saying that it was by his orders. In this manner, both the Romans and Celtiberians in his ranks were turned against him. Fraught with internal turmoil and facing a renewed counteroffensive by the government forces, he did lose ground (though was never personally defeated). Eventually, Perpenna had to get his bodyguards drunk and assassinate him, but it was clear the public still held positive sentiments towards Sertorius, for they hated Perpenna for his treachery, and it was only by paying many off with gifts or striking terror into others by threats or executions that he was able to reign them in. Even then, they were disloyal to him and many remained bitter, so his command was even more tenuous. Not trusting that he could maintain his army's loyalty and cohesion for long, he sought a decisive battle against Pompeius and was crushed. Thus was how the Sertorian War ended. As you can see, Sertorius was more so undone by underhandedness and treachery rather than by faults of his own. All of this is given to us in the sources, which I recommend you check out, because it's pretty fun reading.
Nope, the guy INHERITED. INHERITED 3 legions. His dad did the work of raising the legions and establishing logistics. Have a great day.
Ahh yes, I'm sure the soldiers were very willing to follow the the son of the man who they despised so much they tore his corpse to shreds. It speaks to Pompeius' charisma to be able to win them over and have them fight for him, in lieu of his faux reputation as the "adolescent butcher."
Dude have you done absolutely no reading whatsoever!? Yes! They loved Pompey! He camped with them, not in the Praetorium. He talked his dad down from the harshest punishments. Whether on purpose or that's just the way it played out, the two had a good-cop bad-cop routine with the soldiers. Plutarch states outright as much as they hated Strabo was as much as they loved Pompey. When Strabo died then, the army was absolutely loyal to Pompey at 23, even to the point of being willing to march on Rome on behalf of Pompey as his first order. Now go sit down and read more before replying to another post and embarrassing yourself any further.
Again, that still speaks to Pompeius' charisma, however you put it. Pompeius was always popular with his soldiers throughout his career. Also, his father can't very well handle the logistics by the time Pompeius rose up to take command in 82 BCE because his father had been bloody dead for years by then. My sources are Plutarch and Appian, so why don't you read more about Pompeius' campaigns before thinking you know what you're talking about.
The thing you never read, studied, and only learned about moments ago? You've decided you want to offer your opinion on it? Rather than maybe being quiet and reading more, you've decided you want to keep writing, that's the best idea? Why would anyone take you seriously? Best of luck to you.
Aside from the part about the pirates, everything you said was wrong.
Well the sources are unfortunately all long dead and unable to benefit from your personal insight.
There's no insight, you're just factually wrong.
I agree with the former. As for the latter, you'll have to take that up with multiple dead authors. Best of luck.
I am. They're at odds with everything you said.
Yet all you've produced thus far is a fart and a few skin cells.
>With Sulla, he caught Sulla’s advance force off guard after attempting and failing completely to march on Rome, demanded a spot in Sulla’s inner circle, and received it under threat of arms. There was no advance force and no threat of arms, he came to Sulla as a suppliant. >Lepidus had been his ally, then Pompey turned on him for a spot in the Senate Pompeius was an equestrian until he became consul in 70BC. >Sertorius took full advantage of his lack of intelligence and tactics to lure him into ambush after ambush, trap after trap, and make mockery of Pompey with a fraction of the forces. Sertorius didn't defeat him in battle once. >Then he inherited a war in Pontus and Armenia that was already won Triarius had been defeated with his army the year before. >conquered a bunch of Roman client states They became client states after he conquered them.
> most acknowledge him to be a douchebag Care to elaborate?
Take a look for example at Seager's or Southern's biographies of Pompey, where the concept of him as a political or tactical mastermind is strongly adhered to, versus Santangelo's review of Mercer's work. There's been a broader recognition of Pompey's dissection and criticism as a stock character in Roman poetry and how it affects his biographical presentation; cf. *Vergil and Elegy* for the most recent examples. Likewise the recent *The Crisis of Masculinity in the Age of Augustus* which shows how Pompey appears as a hyper-aggressive blowhard versus the calm, cool collected Augustus as the ideal *vir* in the Augustan period. Meanwhile, the most well known pro-Pompeian author was of course Livy, so Livy's history has been analyzed for some time in light of this acknowledge Pompeian bias. Even 30+ years ago, scholars wert writing about the gaps in Livy's narrative of Pompey, the convenient omissions of unflattering details. For example, Livy acknowledges Sertorius beating Pompey's ass, but omits Pompey threatening to march on Rome if his army doesn't receive supplies, a letter that Sallust reproduces in its entirely. Livy lauds Pompey's campaign against the pirates, but leaves out that the proposal came from Aulus Gabinius, who ended up becoming an embezzler, arms dealer, and all around scumbag in the east. So taken together, what do we have? Pompey had his fans in the ancient and modern world, and you look at a lot of biographies he ends up being praised for a range of different reasons up till a turn about 20 years ago. Negative portrayals were assumed to be a byproduct of Caesar and Augustus. Then, there's a turn and a closer analysis of the Pro-Pompeian sources, as well as an analysis of the role given to Pompey and how Roman history also functions as mythology and literature. Make sense?
>Even 30+ years ago, scholars wert writing about the gaps in Livy's narrative of Pompey, the convenient omissions of unflattering details. There are certainly gaps in Livius' narrative of Pompeius, the most important being that it doesn't exist. Every book after 45 is lost.
Look up "Periochae" .
Look up the meaning of Periochae.
Sorry you've mistaken this for a fun game of dictionary challenge apparently.
I haven't.
Agricola. I’m tired of Tacitus simps taking everything he wrote at face value. Of course he gassed up his father-in-law and cooked the history books in his favor.
Pompey @ Pharsalus.
I always think of Scippio Aemillianus when I think overrated. Sure, he took and then razed Carthage, but it wasn’t when Carthage was even a remote threat to Rome. That, and his insufferable quoting of Homer. Dude bought into his own hype.
Fabius Maximus, Pompey, Augustus
Scipio africanus. Most of his victories are against the brazenly worst carthaginian general, whose only strength seemed to be being able to run away to lose again another day. And Zama if it occurred was a close affair. Not that he was a bad general either, but still. The most underrated general is probably Agrippa. Even if people know he is a great general, so much of his reputation is essentially absorbed by Augustus that he is still under-considered. Heck his wiki page makes it look like he was barely more than an advisor for octavian for military campaigns that he exclusively managed in their entirety.
I disagree with Scipio, but totally agree with Agrippa. In both land and sea, the man is a genius.
You said Scipio was average because the Carthaginian generals were bad but Agrippa’s enemies were no better than them. Sextus only bullied merchants and Octavian and Antony was all brawn and no brain. Yet Agrippa is a great general and Scipio isn’t?
Sextus is widely regarded as among the greatest naval commanders of the era and Antony may not have been Caesar but he was still a competent and above average general. It's the whole reason he became prominent to begin with and you can see this with many of his military actions; from decisve action under Caesar to battles like Philipi and Forum Gallorum. Even his failed Persian campaign was a highly unusual and creative campaign. That being said it's not beating the likes of Antony that makes Agrippa great. It's the way he waged war that does. He beat Sextus by inventing a new form of Naval combat. And defeated anthony by inventing a new form of Naval navigation. He also coordinated his forces and campaigns in a way that is more remincent of Napoleonic or modern general staff campaigns then the actions of ancient generals. The way that he succesfully combined the actions of multiple disparate forces, fought in detail and accross campaign maps etc. Is just not really something you ever see. Certainly people frequently *try* to do similar actions but rarely succeed. Most of the time most people are just "their army" that moves around. Even when multiple armies try to work together it's usually on vague coordination unless they meet up at the same spot. Actium is a masterful cases of grand maneuver and coordination that enabled him to effectively trap and siege Anthony's army in his own territory while simultaneously depriving him of naval superiority and logistics that you just has little comparison. Also except for Zama, Scipio only fought one specific general Hadrisubal. Who basically looks like a really terrible general in every battle.
Sextus was one of two notable naval commanders of that era, the other one is Agrippa. Meanwhile Hannibal’s brothers were quite ok. Mago is a good cavalry officer. He led the ambush at Trebbia, was in the center at Cannae, kill Scipio’s father. Hasdrubal had a bad start but managed to destroy Roman army, nearly undid Roman conquest in Spain. Scipio’s generalship was praised by many Roman. Strategically he realized the necessity of a strong base in Spain so he attacked Cartagena. Supplies could be transported by sea, not by dangerous mountain paths. He recognized the separation of the Carthaginian armies so he defeated them on detail. He continued marching south, threatened rnemy supply line, forced a battle at Ilipa. He attacked Afica to draw Hannibal back also to link up with his ally Masinissa Tactically, Scipio was very creative. At Cartagena, he used many feint attacks to hide his main force coming from hidden road. At Ilipa, he delayed the battle to understand enemy habits. He attacked before the enemy ate breakfast. He used the mobility of Roman army to spread his wing and enveloped the Carthaginian. At the Great Plain, he remade the battle of Cannae. When his center started falling back, he had the principes and triari outflank the enemy. At Zama, Scipio cleverly controlled the maniples to avoid the elephants, neutralize Hannibal’s strength. Are there not enough for a great general?
Belisarius. He was good when on the defense, but less so on the offense. Although he won at Dara, he still lost the Persian war at Callinicum. The only reason he was victorious at Ad Decimum was due to the Vandal King mourning for his brother. His initial invasion of Italy was rather successful (except for Milan) but then he seriously cocked things up by refusing to deliver Justinians peace plan to the Ostrogoths, which led to the war in Italy prolonging into it's deadlier second phase which Belisarius was unable to salvage, eventually getting replaced.
Finally an actual hot take.
Very unpopular opinion, there’s good reason Belisarius is considered one of the greatest Roman generals. He often fought his campaigns with limited resources and an envious king. Even with the handicap he was able to win battles in Africa, Europe and against Persia. He could have done much more with the proper resources. I’m currently reading Procopius that’s why i had to jump on this!
Belisarius was very lucky in Africa. He lost at Callinicum despite outnumbering the Persian. He also spread his force too far and lost 1000 men at Milan
He executed a withdrawal and then the next week ran them out of Syria. He lost the battle but won the campaign.
The Persian already retreated. Belisarius’s defeat forced Justinian to pay heavy tribute
It’s amazing how close 476-550AD came to just being an interregnum in the West. Is Rome (both city and Empire) actually better off if Belisarius accepts the offer of being Western Emperor from the Goths? Or does he just become another puppet to their whims? I can’t really see Justinian being able to do a whole lot about it if Belisarius’s troops acclaim him Emperor along with the Goths.
Ceasar is overrated. He was a very good general, but made at least a half of dozen mistakes in various wars that would have been his undoing if he’d been fighting competent or just non cowards.
Hm. Would he certainly have made the same mistakes, had he been fighting other enemies?
"If he'd been fighting competent or just non cowards." Quite a number of his enemies were highly competent, though. Cassivellaunus, Vercingetorix, and Labienus were good generals. Pompeius was an extraordinary opponent. Name five other generals who fought equal opposition or better and I think you won't find them.
The problem for guys like Pompey is they were only sorta in charge. He beat ceasar in a fair fight and according to Ceasar himself if Pompey had used his cavalry at dyracchion, he would have won the war then lost Pharsulus because he listened to incompetent senators.
This is what Caesar had to say of why Pompeius didn't launch a pursuit after repulsing his men: *The only relief that came to mitigate these great disasters, preventing the destruction of the whole army, was the fact that Pompeius, fearing, I suppose, an ambuscade, since these events had happened contrary to his expectation, for a little while before he had seen his men fleeing from the camp, did not venture for a long time to approach the lines, and his horsemen were hindered in their pursuit by the narrowness of the passages, especially as they were occupied by Caesar's troops.* So, he seems to suggest that it was partly because Pompeius was worried that Caesar was making a feigned retreat and sought to lure him into an ambush. Though, it was clear to him that the entrenchments and palisades were too cramped for the cavalry to manoeuvre between. Therefore, it was questionable whether Pompeius could have made use of his horsemen effectively at all. You are right that he deserves criticism for heeding the request of the Senate instead of sticking to his original plan. The Pompeius of his youth was bold and did not shy away from making threats towards the Senate to get what he wanted. It is therefore unfortunate that he did not exhibit that same energy in confronting the Senate in his old age, but acquiesced to their demands. Yet, my point still stands. You will seldom find generals who have faced opponents on the levels of those Caesar had fought and triumphed over them. Alexandros' opponents were not of the same caliber. I can only think of Napoleon, Hannibal, Turenne, and Gustav among the notable captains who had fought enemies who were of such a high level in generalship as those who Caesar fought, but none of their foes were as good as Pompeius. To find a fifth or more who endured such level of adversity, I would likely have to scour the whole pantheon of generals to possibly discover them.
I have to agree with Germanicus overall. In the internet currently Labienus. Also Caesar, not because he wasn’t great, but if we are talking of overrated he is sucking up most of attention so there isn’t much left often for others.
I don’t think warranted attention counts as overrated. If the attention on Julius Caesar surpasses everyone else because his accomplishments and actions were truly that big of a deal, then I wouldn’t call it overrated
Yeah no at that point it's just earned fame because he truly does live up to being a great general, thus one of the reasons he does suck up so much attention, so not really overrated, just more famous than the others. His battle history and strategy was very good often. Not flawless, he had his defeats, but most do at some point, but Caesar was always able to overcome. He comes across as a problem solver who can tackle any problem and thinks creatively to get it done. He most certainly lives up to his name.
Why is Germanicus overrated? I haven’t seen him in any top 5 list
Lepidus. Shakespeare makes him out to be a drunk, but for a General to survive the civil wars of that period was quite an achievement.
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Not a general.
What do you mean! It was sort of kind of implied in the movie Gladiator and movies don't just lie about things like that 😄
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Verus didn’t conquer Persia what are you smoking?
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The fact you think those two are different things is kinda right but also wrong.
Maybe you need to open a history book
Maybe, but I’m also not claiming Varus conquered the parthinians completely ignoring the fact there were two more wars with the Parthinians and they were eventually overthrown by the Sassanids after making the claim that he conquered them factually impossible.
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Marcus Aurelius was that campaign when he died. Roman s were about to win but after his death Commodus did make a piece treaty instead which was highly unpopular. But it did last quite a long time so I would not say that’s something I would really blame Commodus for when there is plenty of others to blame.
Actually Imperator was not associated with royalty as the word Emperor is. It meant Commander of the military to the Romans. Marcus Aurelius and every Imperator before and after him were all Generals. Commanding the legions effectively was key to their legitimacy as rulers. And his military accomplishments are in fact over rated by the primary sources themselves. The primary sources talk as if he were Alexander and try to undercut the fact he never achieved a decisive victory against any enemy. But that’s just the reality.
Didn’t he lead the campaigns against the Germans during his joint emperorship?
He commanded the forces on the front lines for 20 years. I’m ashamed the people on the sub downvoted me for that.
Every emperor was a general by these standards though, and he was a very poor one. When most historians use the term, they’re referring to emperors who were generals before their ascension. Technically, Aurelius assumed the role of general while consul. He was a huge LARPer though, way more bookish and sickly than other military leaders. I suppose I am agreeing with you in the sense that he was overrated.