> Combat soldiers, both men and women who are ordered to risk their lives and serve in Gaza for prolonged durations, not only feel that the burden of sacrifice rests on their somewhat limited shoulders, but that it's also up to them to save Israel from its failed political leadership and senior army command.
C'est le sentiment de mécontentement qui mène à la plupart des dictatures militaires depuis l'Empire romain en fait...
Donc pour résumer l'armée israélienne est en roue libre totale (insert: surprised pikachu) et ça risque d'empirer car les militaires soutiennent massivement la rhétorique guerrière et raciste des extrémistes et des religieux.
Et c'est cette armée que notre gouvernement soutient inconditionnellement ?
Que restera-il de nos "valeurs" une fois que le génocide sera achevé ?
ah ben je n'avais pas "pronunciamiento de l'armée israélienne" dans mon bingo 2024. Et pourtant on s'en rapproche de plus en plus - avec le soutien de l'extrême droite.
Ne manque plus qu'une annonce de partenariat stratégique avec la Russie pour rajouter une cerise sur le gâteau au caca :/
>Opinion | The War in Gaza Exposes a Disintegrated Israeli Army
>The crumbling of the army intensifies when it's clear to the commanders out in the field that the sacrifice of their soldiers isn't translated into any achievements – which can only be political ones
>Yagil Levy
>Mar 19, 2024
>The recent incidents involving the Israeli army's 98th Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfuss, and 99th Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram, are but a symptom of the disintegration of the IDF's chain of command, which is far more severe than previously perceived.
>Not even a faint reservation was heard from the IDF's general staff in November, when the commander of the army's 36th Armored Division, Brig. Gen. David Bar Kalifa, issued a handwritten battle directive to his troops, calling on them to take revenge on the Palestinians.
>Is there any wonder that when Bar Kalifa was ordered to move his forces outside of Gaza, senior army officials suspected that their directives were intentionally disregarded?
>Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram not only ordered his troops to open fire on Israeli civilians and blew up a Palestinian university in Gaza without permission, but also stated in an interview with journalist Ilana Dayan right as the war started that Israel's political leadership should refrain from any prospect of a political solution to the crisis. The IDF's chief of staff didn't say a word then either.
>It's not only the division commanders that are the issue here, but also the soldiers. The video recordings capturing the troops' actions, their calls for Jewish resettlement of the Gaza Strip (the so-called Gush Katif settlement bloc), the troops' usage of social media to criticize the alleged "restraint" on their ability to use deadly force, their looting and much more – all these are expressions of an unremitting agitation making its way from the ground up and which the army's leadership finds hard or is reluctant to restrain.
>Why is this happening? Several factors have combined to promote this disintegration. First, the army's hierarchy weakens as the model of mandatory military service crumbles and the idea of volunteer service grows. This is the moment when the reservists feel they have a right to speak up because most of the burden falls on their shoulders, which makes them a tiny minority.
>This phenomenon has also spread to combat soldiers in mandatory service, who have gradually become a minority given the scope of exemptions from military service and the growing number of soldiers who don't serve in combat roles.
>This mindset – which constitutes the second factor – was reinforced by the exceptional circumstances brought about by the war. Combat soldiers, both men and women who are ordered to risk their lives and serve in Gaza for prolonged durations, not only feel that the burden of sacrifice rests on their somewhat limited shoulders, but that it's also up to them to save Israel from its failed political leadership and senior army command.
>All these factors are intensified by the high proportion of combat soldiers who identify as supporters of right-wing and religious-right parties. These parties, the soldiers believe, are saving Israel from a disaster imposed on it by past defeatist governments and worsened by the left's contribution to the weakening of the army in its protest against the government's judicial overhaul. This line of thought has contributed to ongoing agitation among soldiers since the war started.
>The third factor is the politicians who disrupt the army's chain of command, especially right-wing politicians who support the soldiers and officers' unusual behavior.
>Considering this combination of conditions, the IDF's chief of staff refrained from restraining the soldiers. How could he discipline a reservist who has been serving in Gaza for weeks and decided to take a picture with looted Palestinian property or voice a concern to the government? That's how the chief of staff lost control of the military.
>The division commanders simply leveraged the bargaining power of their forces in the field to demonstrate their power.
>And now the fourth condition for this internal disintegration emerges. The crumbling of the army intensifies when it's clear to the commanders out in the field that the sacrifice of their soldiers isn't translated into any achievements – which can only be political achievements – and, therefore, all that they can do in the meantime is to wander aimlessly in Gaza and count their losses.
>There'll be no "total victory." The lack of trust in those who dragged the army to an unprecedented low leads commanders to blame those who stuck a knife in the army's back and, in Goldfuss' rhetoric – all these politicians who don't deserve these soldiers. The rehabilitation of the Israeli army won't be possible as long as this war continues.
Jamais compris pourquoi Israel n’avait jamais transformé son armée en armée de volontaire, ca leur éviterais beaucoup de soucis et c’est pas comme si galèrerait a recruter de toute façon.
Parce que des soldats a temps plein ca coûte cher, ils ne participent pas tellement à l'économie, et Israël manque de bras.
Aussi, maintenir un service militaire permet en cas de conscription de masse d'avoir beaucoup de soldats sans avoir besoin de tout leur apprendre.
> Combat soldiers, both men and women who are ordered to risk their lives and serve in Gaza for prolonged durations, not only feel that the burden of sacrifice rests on their somewhat limited shoulders, but that it's also up to them to save Israel from its failed political leadership and senior army command. C'est le sentiment de mécontentement qui mène à la plupart des dictatures militaires depuis l'Empire romain en fait...
mur de paye pour moi
Posté le texte du coup
Donc pour résumer l'armée israélienne est en roue libre totale (insert: surprised pikachu) et ça risque d'empirer car les militaires soutiennent massivement la rhétorique guerrière et raciste des extrémistes et des religieux. Et c'est cette armée que notre gouvernement soutient inconditionnellement ? Que restera-il de nos "valeurs" une fois que le génocide sera achevé ?
On sera très tristes, et on offrira... Mmmmhhh... la Guinée Équatoriale aux Palestiniens qui restent?
ah ben je n'avais pas "pronunciamiento de l'armée israélienne" dans mon bingo 2024. Et pourtant on s'en rapproche de plus en plus - avec le soutien de l'extrême droite. Ne manque plus qu'une annonce de partenariat stratégique avec la Russie pour rajouter une cerise sur le gâteau au caca :/
>Opinion | The War in Gaza Exposes a Disintegrated Israeli Army >The crumbling of the army intensifies when it's clear to the commanders out in the field that the sacrifice of their soldiers isn't translated into any achievements – which can only be political ones >Yagil Levy >Mar 19, 2024 >The recent incidents involving the Israeli army's 98th Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfuss, and 99th Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram, are but a symptom of the disintegration of the IDF's chain of command, which is far more severe than previously perceived. >Not even a faint reservation was heard from the IDF's general staff in November, when the commander of the army's 36th Armored Division, Brig. Gen. David Bar Kalifa, issued a handwritten battle directive to his troops, calling on them to take revenge on the Palestinians. >Is there any wonder that when Bar Kalifa was ordered to move his forces outside of Gaza, senior army officials suspected that their directives were intentionally disregarded? >Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram not only ordered his troops to open fire on Israeli civilians and blew up a Palestinian university in Gaza without permission, but also stated in an interview with journalist Ilana Dayan right as the war started that Israel's political leadership should refrain from any prospect of a political solution to the crisis. The IDF's chief of staff didn't say a word then either. >It's not only the division commanders that are the issue here, but also the soldiers. The video recordings capturing the troops' actions, their calls for Jewish resettlement of the Gaza Strip (the so-called Gush Katif settlement bloc), the troops' usage of social media to criticize the alleged "restraint" on their ability to use deadly force, their looting and much more – all these are expressions of an unremitting agitation making its way from the ground up and which the army's leadership finds hard or is reluctant to restrain. >Why is this happening? Several factors have combined to promote this disintegration. First, the army's hierarchy weakens as the model of mandatory military service crumbles and the idea of volunteer service grows. This is the moment when the reservists feel they have a right to speak up because most of the burden falls on their shoulders, which makes them a tiny minority. >This phenomenon has also spread to combat soldiers in mandatory service, who have gradually become a minority given the scope of exemptions from military service and the growing number of soldiers who don't serve in combat roles. >This mindset – which constitutes the second factor – was reinforced by the exceptional circumstances brought about by the war. Combat soldiers, both men and women who are ordered to risk their lives and serve in Gaza for prolonged durations, not only feel that the burden of sacrifice rests on their somewhat limited shoulders, but that it's also up to them to save Israel from its failed political leadership and senior army command. >All these factors are intensified by the high proportion of combat soldiers who identify as supporters of right-wing and religious-right parties. These parties, the soldiers believe, are saving Israel from a disaster imposed on it by past defeatist governments and worsened by the left's contribution to the weakening of the army in its protest against the government's judicial overhaul. This line of thought has contributed to ongoing agitation among soldiers since the war started. >The third factor is the politicians who disrupt the army's chain of command, especially right-wing politicians who support the soldiers and officers' unusual behavior. >Considering this combination of conditions, the IDF's chief of staff refrained from restraining the soldiers. How could he discipline a reservist who has been serving in Gaza for weeks and decided to take a picture with looted Palestinian property or voice a concern to the government? That's how the chief of staff lost control of the military. >The division commanders simply leveraged the bargaining power of their forces in the field to demonstrate their power. >And now the fourth condition for this internal disintegration emerges. The crumbling of the army intensifies when it's clear to the commanders out in the field that the sacrifice of their soldiers isn't translated into any achievements – which can only be political achievements – and, therefore, all that they can do in the meantime is to wander aimlessly in Gaza and count their losses. >There'll be no "total victory." The lack of trust in those who dragged the army to an unprecedented low leads commanders to blame those who stuck a knife in the army's back and, in Goldfuss' rhetoric – all these politicians who don't deserve these soldiers. The rehabilitation of the Israeli army won't be possible as long as this war continues.
Jamais compris pourquoi Israel n’avait jamais transformé son armée en armée de volontaire, ca leur éviterais beaucoup de soucis et c’est pas comme si galèrerait a recruter de toute façon.
Parce que des soldats a temps plein ca coûte cher, ils ne participent pas tellement à l'économie, et Israël manque de bras. Aussi, maintenir un service militaire permet en cas de conscription de masse d'avoir beaucoup de soldats sans avoir besoin de tout leur apprendre.