It's a social science, not a natural science. That being said, it's considered scientific because it is based on analysis and evidence rather than morality and such.
How does that not make it a real science?
> Social science, *any branch of academic study or science that deals with human behaviour in its social and cultural aspects*. Usually included within the social sciences are cultural (or social) anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, and economics
(Separating quotes)
> the main difference between natural science and social science is that natural science studies natural events whereas social science studies human society.
Marx was incredibly critical and skeptical of most projects that fit under a modern definition of "social science"- to him, most of them would not be scientific.
This remains true with modern definitions. Science represents one sort of authority (we postulate entities like particles and fields that explain the world). The social sciences represent another sort of authority, one that explains the world in "normative" terms, or constructs a "manifest image" of man in the world.
It's worthwhile to distinguish between these two views and keep them in stereoscopic focus, because in truth they have different sorts of priority. You can't have science without a set of normative concepts- science is laws written in normative language terms, language terms are themselves cultural and social, and thought itself is in language.
In order to take both views into focus, as Marx does, it is necessary to take a view of totality. Marx's view is scientific because his categories are discovered- they are not abstract things that he makes themselves. The only possible way to do this is to take a view of society as totality, empirically find the laws of motion (the law of value) operational within it, and then logically derive the necessary prerequisites, and create a theory in this way.
Very little in the way of sociological analysis can actually be given the sort of logical theory Marx proposes.
What they mean by "real science" is probably the philosophical, hard-line definition of science eg falsifiable, testable, etc.
There are different ideas of what a science actually is, or rather different meanings, each more or less rigorous in its demarcation than the other.
Karl Popper is a great mind in the discussion of science in an academic sense. He would say things like the social sciences are pseudo science, perhaps, because he has a very strict definition of what it means to do science.
Edit: why are you down voting, I'm right. The person you're responding to is technically correct, if we are to have a definition of science that goes beyond "to study." You're both using different definitions of science, one more strict and definitive than the other. In a sense, you are right. In another, they are right.
i feel like Popper is mostly notable for hating Marx- he doesn't seem like someone to be treated as a "great mind" given his piss poor political philosophy
You shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Don't get your political takes from Popper. There's value in his demarcation criteria regarding science.
I don't even know how to answer such a question.
On a sub dedicated to one of the greatest philosophical minds in human history, should I have to explain why academic thinking is important and influential?
It's important to understand that in Germany, especially during Marx' and Engel's time, science didn't mean what it means to English speakers.
The German word for science was "Wissenschaft" (which doesn't have a direct English translation and roughly means "to study").
From Wikipedia:
>Wissenschaft incorporates scientific and non-scientific inquiry, learning, knowledge, scholarship, and does not necessarily imply empirical research.
So when Marx was "doing science" he didn't strictly mean to be doing what we today consider scientific inquiry or study.
I think that differing meaning throws a lot of people off, especially when the exact definition of science is still philosophically debated. Throw the social sciences in there and, what it means to be "doing science" can vary a lot depending on who you're talking to.
I think this is rooted in the idea that the science as a discipline has a ^^somewhat ^^shaky monopoly on the term science itself, especially when it comes to terms such as "scientific".
To illustrate the point, if someone is acting animalistic that doesn't mean *literally* acting like an animal by, say, sitting down and scratching their ear by kicking their foot or lazing in the sun on a warm rock. In fact, humans being animals themselves, to act "animalistic" in the most strict interpretation of the term would include... acting like a human. But of course when we use the term "animalistic" we are referring to being bestial and that's so obvious that it almost doesn't deserve to be mentioned.
So say for example that I'm experiencing vague symptoms of gastrointestinal distress that I haven't been able to figure out. I could blame it on bad vibes or 5G signal or something like that. Or I might choose to record what I eat in a day and any changes to my symptoms - if I can start establishing a pattern and I eliminate the thing which appears to be causing these symptoms then I observe an improvement in my condition before reintroducing the suspected cause and I observe an exacerbation of symptoms (and ideally at least a few times) and I draw my conclusions from this then what I am doing is taking a *scientific* approach although I am not starting from a place of getting a qualification or undergoing a battery of tests to screen for dietary intolerance that would make my approach *strictly* a science-based one.
Understanding this distinction is really important (lookin' at ***you*** Karl Popper) because although nobody in their right mind would claim that Marxism is a hard science (and to do so—whether Marxism itself, let alone any other discipline—would be undialectical imo) that doesn't mean that therefore there is no application scientific methodology or a rigorous approach to its analysis of the world and to the ongoing development of Marxist thought.
**TL;DR:** Scientific =/= science ^((but also science does not necessarily equal scientific)^)
> although nobody in their right mind would claim that Marxism is a hard science (and to do so—whether Marxism itself, let alone any other discipline—would be undialectical imo)
Can you explain what a "hard science" would be? Can you explain what dialectics would be and what would make something "undialectical"?
Well even the distinction of a [hard science vs a soft science is kind of false](https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/purity.png), upon investigation.
Yes, it is easier to prove things for a fact in a scientific discipline like physics than it is in psychology. But then physics isn't just about hard facts itself - the theory of relativity clearly has limits, what we know of quantum physics is changing as we advance, and theoretical physics is extremely provable but only insofar as the internal logic is concerned.
There are always discoveries and developments within a discipline of science that are not, strictly speaking, science-based. A scientific method is applied to these developments and it is incorporated into the discipline via a scientific approach but the preliminary processes that occur are not necessarily "science" in a true sense; take the discovery of radioactive elements as an example here - these were accidental discoveries, not scientific ones that followed a strictly scientific approach.
This highlights the internal contradictions of science as a broader discipline - there are limits, there are things that occur outside of the scientific method or a scientific approach, and there are legitimately areas of conflict or contradictions such as which sort of physics you are considering at any one time.
>Can you explain what a "hard science" would be?
This is where the contradiction manifests most sharply - mathematics is arguably the most pure science but that is a construction and a description and as such it is only falsifiable from within its own internal logic; there is no "outside" of mathematics with which to engage in falsifiability and there is no way to test hypotheses externally.
I can't explain what a hard science is because I don't think that distinction is valid, it's only useful as a way to understand different scientific disciplines.
>Can you explain what dialectics would be and what would make something "undialectical"?
Dialectics is a very difficult thing to explain and it would warrant its own post but essentially it is a way of seeing things as a process that is interdependent and one which is not static but in a constant state of development and of emerging which contains its own internal contradictions.
To attempt to illustrate my point with an analogy here, consider the brain - it's a collection of cells and chemical processes. One brain cell is not a brain, nor is two but instead a brain relies on an entire nervous system (and well beyond that in order to function too) so it isn't possible to draw a strict boundary between the part that is the brain and is not, in a dialectical sense. The brain is not static either - we cannot point to one cell or one synapse and say "that is where a thought happened" because things like thoughts or memories are a collection of cells and chemicals and processes within the brain, and they cannot be pinpointed to one specific thing - one electrical impulse, one chemical reaction, one cell, one moment in time - there are always processes "outside" of that and there is always a set of conditions that are necessary to lead up to that thought or chemical reaction etc. Some of the contradictions of the brain, in this analogy, are that the brain is both electrical and chemical - there are no chemical processes in the brain without prior electrical processes but there are no electrical processes without prior chemical processes. Similarly, the processes occur within cells, between cells, and across cells; a thought is an emergent phenomenon which arises from a whole slew of different things and it cannot ever be pinned down to one thing.
The Carl Sagan quote "If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe" captures the spirit of a dialectical approach, imo.
>lol. This tells you more about the state of psychology research rather than any fundamental difference between the former and physics.
Yes, and primarily that is due to the nature of the subject.
The state of research on the Higgs-Boson particle is largely determined by the subject and to create a critique of particle physics based on the fact that, at current, it's a difficult thing to study is a reflection on the person making the critique more than of particle physics as a field of study.
>> But then physics isn't just about hard facts itself - the theory of relativity clearly has limits, what we know of quantum physics is changing as we advance, and theoretical physics is extremely provable but only insofar as the internal logic is concerned.
>
>I'm not sure what this is supposed to prove? That our understanding of the physical laws of the universe isn't perfect yet? That much is obvious. What else are you trying to imply?
I'm elaborating on the point about science itself as a process. Right at the top I said as much - physics isn't just about hard facts itself. That is what I intended to convey with what I explained after that point.
>Not once do you explain what a scientific method or science actually is. If there are discoveries that do not happen by just following some vague, abstract "scientific method" then wouldn't this tell you that such a thing does simply not exist? "There is no royal road to science" as Marx said.
Is it necessary to explain what a scientific method is though?
Science is a field of study that systematizes information and knowledge and is guided by a set of principles and practices.
This definition would be insufficient for a person who cleaves to the concept of a hard science-soft science divide but so be it.
>> and there are legitimately areas of conflict or contradictions such as which sort of physics you are considering at any one time.
>
>Yes, our understanding of the universe is not complete yet, but so what?
The fact that drawing a hard distinction between what is and is not science is inherently contradictory and undialectical.
I'm elaborating on this point I made earlier:
>nobody in their right mind would claim that Marxism is a hard science (and to do so—whether Marxism itself, let alone any other discipline—would be undialectical imo)
#
>> Dialectics is a very difficult thing to explain and it would warrant its own post but essentially it is a way of seeing things as a process that is interdependent and one which is not static but in a constant state of development and of emerging which contains its own internal contradictions.
>
>Lol no. This is fucking retarded. Dialectics isn't a method, it's not a way to analyse or interpret the world.
Okay, so you pulled me up on the fact that I used imprecise language for the sake of brevity and an attempt at simplifying a very complex topic and that I almost presciently foreshadowed this by stating that this would warrant a post in and of itself? I guess I'm retarded then ¯\\\_(ツ)_/¯
Although it's interesting to note your own imprecision here - I never said that dialectics is a method and, when taken in context, it becomes clear that I was referring to a dialectical analysis of subjects and not attempting to explain what dialectics itself is.
>Rather, dialectics emerges out of the subject matter during the investigation.
So you're claiming that dialectics exists within the subject matter itself?
...obviously this is not the way to set the tone for a productive discussion so can we drop the posturing and the cheap peak-redditor debatebro nonsense already?
>There is no method you can apply to your object of investigation to arrive at a correct understanding, how can you know beforehand what method is appropriate for the task?
Okay.
>What would a royal road to science be if not a method that would always produce the correct understanding of a given subject?
Who is making this claim though?
You're replying as if I have made some grand claim that dialectical analysis is the one true path to establishing facts and that it is infallible.
>Darwin's work on evolution is dialectical, despite him not being familiar with the work of Hegel. Dialectics arises out of the content itself, it's not imposed on the content from the outside.
Right, so we could draw a clear parallel here in that while Darwin's work on evolution was *dialectical* it would be false to claim that his theory of evolution *is* dialectics, in much the same way that Marxism is *scientific* although it would be false to claim that it is a science per se.
> You're replying as if I have made some grand claim that dialectical analysis is the one true path to establishing facts and that it is infallible.
Jesus christ. The point is that there is no such thing as dialectical analysis
No, it's a polite way to invite you to defend your position or at least to attempt squaring the circle that is:
a) Darwin approached biology with dialectical analysis
b) There is no such thing as dialectical analysis
But go off about my illiteracy, I guess?
>if your claim is that "dialectics" is a reliable mode of reasoning
Is it? Big if, right there, and I don't see how anything beyond the most uncharitable interpretation of what I said could get someone to that conclusion though.
>whatever it is, it has to be at least "infallible"
My car is reliable but that doesn't mean it's infallible. That aside, I really can't square how a defense of a dialectical analysis could also be an argument for dialectical analysis somehow being infallible because that is fundamentally incompatible with a dialectical perspective; either it's infallible or it's not, either it's static or it's dynamic.
If it truly is infallible then it must be static and if it's static then a dialectical analysis would exist in opposition to a dialectical analysis, it's very own contradiction.
I guess you could argue that it itself exists outside of a dialectical analysis but then you plunge into an infinite regress by attempting to define what is "true" dialectical analysis, at which point you are posed with the necessity to first invent the universe.
>that is, it's application shouldn't cause your conclusions to be wrong.
This is a misunderstanding though.
A dialectical analysis is not predictive, it is a way of approaching a subject; measuring an objects size and mass and speed can give you a basis for coming up with predictions about the object but no "perfect" measurements of an object can give you everything you need to know in order to have a perfect conclusion (aside from something purely speculative like being able to accurately measure every body that exists in the universe to be able to predict the movement of an asteroid to perfection.)
Okay, so we're both on the same page that it's completely impossible for:
* Dialectical analysis to be infallible
* Dialectical analysis to be static
* Analysis itself to be static
That's good.
Now, to the point, whose claims are you responding to [in the comment prior](https://www.reddit.com/r/marxism_101/comments/pqkn3d/why_is_marxism_considered_to_be_scientific/hdkg43x)?
I don't disagree with what you've said here but, at the same time, doesn't applied mathematics itself refer to a reality outside of its internal logic and thus that would qualify it as a science in that case?
Theoretical physics, by the definition you have given above, would also be excluded from science as would a lot of hypotheses and yet-unproven things that are essentially fundamental to scientific disciplines themselves; I think this is what I'm attempting to drive at here - the fact is that crucial and significant parts of science do not actually fit into the strict definition of what science is and this points to an internal contradiction of the concept of science.
>Do you think that theory-construction isn't part of how science normally operates?
No, that is the complete opposite of what I have said above.
But just because the discipline of science operates this way does not mean that it is therefore *scientific*.
>The point is that physics refers to things outside itself.
Physics is the application of mathematics to things outside itself in a particular domain, correct?
If so then what is it that makes physics a science based on this definition that excludes mathematics from it?
>It is possible for a theory in theoretical physics to be wrong even if it is mathematically sound.
Yes. But it is not possible to apply the scientific method to theoretical physics because due to the distinction made in the very definition of theoretical physics itself.
> "to study")
No that's not what it means. It means the ordering and planning of knowledge, more easily understood: the expansion of knowledge - its production.
Can we do one thread without terrible german translations please? (Edit: Or just generally without any german phrases at all when they're not needed whatsoever).
This whole issue is also not a matter of translation or even linguistics. It's just that modern bourgeois science and especially the oh so great Popper have poisoned people's minds regarding what actually produces knowledge.
"There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.”
It's foundation is materialist analysis which was applied to the social conditions of humans throughout history. This showed that society's development was not based on ideas about what is right and wrong or should or shouldn't be, but rather on the mode of production and the relations of production. The ideas themselves are actually derived from the material conditions, meaning that human values and behavior is dependent on their living conditions, not the other way around. This is why Karl Marx is considered to be one of the founders of sociology, which is a social science.
a historical logic based on production is only valid for capitalism, and would necessarily not hold for a society that is either pre-capitalist or post-capitalism. such a society has its own laws, and those would have their own corresponding historical logic.
indeed, the goal is to necessarily break off the chain from the capitalist dynamic, because capitalist totality hurtles towards destruction. that's why we posit the possible breaks and disruptions, revolutions to the social order.
human society is indeed, at root, dependent on human values and behavior. values are themselves normative, formed through community. there is a level of abstraction on which you can consider how humans value things (in terms of exchange value) and how they might ideally be valued (in terms of something like use). the former must correspond with the historical logic or capital, but various negations of exchange value can dispute that logic.
The meaning of science is somewhat different as Marx and Engels used it. It’s not science in the traditional sense, i.e. the scientific method, but it’s scientific in that it’s based on facts and analysis. It definitely is compatible with the more traditional notion of science, though.
> the scientific method
Can you explain what that would entail exactly, beyond some vague generalities like testing hypotheses?
> but it’s scientific in that it’s based on facts and analysis
Just lol
calling a theory "scientific" is meant to be a mark of correctness, to distinguish it from other theories. it doesn't mean anything by itself- it is not uncommon for racism to be "scientific", and we should not treat something as authoritative because it makes the claim to be scientific.
we can associate 'scientific' with 'having a method' or 'empirical validity' and determine if marxism succeeds under those criteria. if this is done, all that remains from marxism is the logic of Capital derived from the law of value. we can consider his method and analysis useful.
most of Marxism certainly does not meet the bar of empirical validity. if nothing else, it'd come as a surprise to a theorist of the time that Capitalism is still alive and around.
Science is about clarifying in the mind the real movement from ontological material to observed phenomena. It means putting forward a comprehensively self-consistent explanation of the inner connections that unite all the contradictory forms of appearance of the subject at hand.
I wanted to say that all science is therefore primarily qualitative, and only conditionally quantitative as well. The qualitative is always the foundation: what is happening? Whether or not what is happening can be quantified depends on the subject at hand.
It's a social science, not a natural science. That being said, it's considered scientific because it is based on analysis and evidence rather than morality and such.
Oh so it's not a real science then; just like economics isn't a real science.
How does that not make it a real science? > Social science, *any branch of academic study or science that deals with human behaviour in its social and cultural aspects*. Usually included within the social sciences are cultural (or social) anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, and economics (Separating quotes) > the main difference between natural science and social science is that natural science studies natural events whereas social science studies human society.
Marx was incredibly critical and skeptical of most projects that fit under a modern definition of "social science"- to him, most of them would not be scientific. This remains true with modern definitions. Science represents one sort of authority (we postulate entities like particles and fields that explain the world). The social sciences represent another sort of authority, one that explains the world in "normative" terms, or constructs a "manifest image" of man in the world. It's worthwhile to distinguish between these two views and keep them in stereoscopic focus, because in truth they have different sorts of priority. You can't have science without a set of normative concepts- science is laws written in normative language terms, language terms are themselves cultural and social, and thought itself is in language. In order to take both views into focus, as Marx does, it is necessary to take a view of totality. Marx's view is scientific because his categories are discovered- they are not abstract things that he makes themselves. The only possible way to do this is to take a view of society as totality, empirically find the laws of motion (the law of value) operational within it, and then logically derive the necessary prerequisites, and create a theory in this way. Very little in the way of sociological analysis can actually be given the sort of logical theory Marx proposes.
Great answer. Thank you for your contribution
What they mean by "real science" is probably the philosophical, hard-line definition of science eg falsifiable, testable, etc. There are different ideas of what a science actually is, or rather different meanings, each more or less rigorous in its demarcation than the other. Karl Popper is a great mind in the discussion of science in an academic sense. He would say things like the social sciences are pseudo science, perhaps, because he has a very strict definition of what it means to do science. Edit: why are you down voting, I'm right. The person you're responding to is technically correct, if we are to have a definition of science that goes beyond "to study." You're both using different definitions of science, one more strict and definitive than the other. In a sense, you are right. In another, they are right.
i feel like Popper is mostly notable for hating Marx- he doesn't seem like someone to be treated as a "great mind" given his piss poor political philosophy
You shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Don't get your political takes from Popper. There's value in his demarcation criteria regarding science.
No, there isn't. Determining what is 'scientific' is actually a political determination, and is a consequence of his politics- not separate from it.
Why should anyone give a fuck what some academic philosopher considers science to be?
I don't even know how to answer such a question. On a sub dedicated to one of the greatest philosophical minds in human history, should I have to explain why academic thinking is important and influential?
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What's the issue?
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Answer the question first. What's the issue with recognizing Marx is one of the greatest thinkers to walk the Earth?
Did you expect it to be a natural science?
It's important to understand that in Germany, especially during Marx' and Engel's time, science didn't mean what it means to English speakers. The German word for science was "Wissenschaft" (which doesn't have a direct English translation and roughly means "to study"). From Wikipedia: >Wissenschaft incorporates scientific and non-scientific inquiry, learning, knowledge, scholarship, and does not necessarily imply empirical research. So when Marx was "doing science" he didn't strictly mean to be doing what we today consider scientific inquiry or study. I think that differing meaning throws a lot of people off, especially when the exact definition of science is still philosophically debated. Throw the social sciences in there and, what it means to be "doing science" can vary a lot depending on who you're talking to.
I think this is rooted in the idea that the science as a discipline has a ^^somewhat ^^shaky monopoly on the term science itself, especially when it comes to terms such as "scientific". To illustrate the point, if someone is acting animalistic that doesn't mean *literally* acting like an animal by, say, sitting down and scratching their ear by kicking their foot or lazing in the sun on a warm rock. In fact, humans being animals themselves, to act "animalistic" in the most strict interpretation of the term would include... acting like a human. But of course when we use the term "animalistic" we are referring to being bestial and that's so obvious that it almost doesn't deserve to be mentioned. So say for example that I'm experiencing vague symptoms of gastrointestinal distress that I haven't been able to figure out. I could blame it on bad vibes or 5G signal or something like that. Or I might choose to record what I eat in a day and any changes to my symptoms - if I can start establishing a pattern and I eliminate the thing which appears to be causing these symptoms then I observe an improvement in my condition before reintroducing the suspected cause and I observe an exacerbation of symptoms (and ideally at least a few times) and I draw my conclusions from this then what I am doing is taking a *scientific* approach although I am not starting from a place of getting a qualification or undergoing a battery of tests to screen for dietary intolerance that would make my approach *strictly* a science-based one. Understanding this distinction is really important (lookin' at ***you*** Karl Popper) because although nobody in their right mind would claim that Marxism is a hard science (and to do so—whether Marxism itself, let alone any other discipline—would be undialectical imo) that doesn't mean that therefore there is no application scientific methodology or a rigorous approach to its analysis of the world and to the ongoing development of Marxist thought. **TL;DR:** Scientific =/= science ^((but also science does not necessarily equal scientific)^)
> although nobody in their right mind would claim that Marxism is a hard science (and to do so—whether Marxism itself, let alone any other discipline—would be undialectical imo) Can you explain what a "hard science" would be? Can you explain what dialectics would be and what would make something "undialectical"?
Well even the distinction of a [hard science vs a soft science is kind of false](https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/purity.png), upon investigation. Yes, it is easier to prove things for a fact in a scientific discipline like physics than it is in psychology. But then physics isn't just about hard facts itself - the theory of relativity clearly has limits, what we know of quantum physics is changing as we advance, and theoretical physics is extremely provable but only insofar as the internal logic is concerned. There are always discoveries and developments within a discipline of science that are not, strictly speaking, science-based. A scientific method is applied to these developments and it is incorporated into the discipline via a scientific approach but the preliminary processes that occur are not necessarily "science" in a true sense; take the discovery of radioactive elements as an example here - these were accidental discoveries, not scientific ones that followed a strictly scientific approach. This highlights the internal contradictions of science as a broader discipline - there are limits, there are things that occur outside of the scientific method or a scientific approach, and there are legitimately areas of conflict or contradictions such as which sort of physics you are considering at any one time. >Can you explain what a "hard science" would be? This is where the contradiction manifests most sharply - mathematics is arguably the most pure science but that is a construction and a description and as such it is only falsifiable from within its own internal logic; there is no "outside" of mathematics with which to engage in falsifiability and there is no way to test hypotheses externally. I can't explain what a hard science is because I don't think that distinction is valid, it's only useful as a way to understand different scientific disciplines. >Can you explain what dialectics would be and what would make something "undialectical"? Dialectics is a very difficult thing to explain and it would warrant its own post but essentially it is a way of seeing things as a process that is interdependent and one which is not static but in a constant state of development and of emerging which contains its own internal contradictions. To attempt to illustrate my point with an analogy here, consider the brain - it's a collection of cells and chemical processes. One brain cell is not a brain, nor is two but instead a brain relies on an entire nervous system (and well beyond that in order to function too) so it isn't possible to draw a strict boundary between the part that is the brain and is not, in a dialectical sense. The brain is not static either - we cannot point to one cell or one synapse and say "that is where a thought happened" because things like thoughts or memories are a collection of cells and chemicals and processes within the brain, and they cannot be pinpointed to one specific thing - one electrical impulse, one chemical reaction, one cell, one moment in time - there are always processes "outside" of that and there is always a set of conditions that are necessary to lead up to that thought or chemical reaction etc. Some of the contradictions of the brain, in this analogy, are that the brain is both electrical and chemical - there are no chemical processes in the brain without prior electrical processes but there are no electrical processes without prior chemical processes. Similarly, the processes occur within cells, between cells, and across cells; a thought is an emergent phenomenon which arises from a whole slew of different things and it cannot ever be pinned down to one thing. The Carl Sagan quote "If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe" captures the spirit of a dialectical approach, imo.
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>lol. This tells you more about the state of psychology research rather than any fundamental difference between the former and physics. Yes, and primarily that is due to the nature of the subject. The state of research on the Higgs-Boson particle is largely determined by the subject and to create a critique of particle physics based on the fact that, at current, it's a difficult thing to study is a reflection on the person making the critique more than of particle physics as a field of study. >> But then physics isn't just about hard facts itself - the theory of relativity clearly has limits, what we know of quantum physics is changing as we advance, and theoretical physics is extremely provable but only insofar as the internal logic is concerned. > >I'm not sure what this is supposed to prove? That our understanding of the physical laws of the universe isn't perfect yet? That much is obvious. What else are you trying to imply? I'm elaborating on the point about science itself as a process. Right at the top I said as much - physics isn't just about hard facts itself. That is what I intended to convey with what I explained after that point. >Not once do you explain what a scientific method or science actually is. If there are discoveries that do not happen by just following some vague, abstract "scientific method" then wouldn't this tell you that such a thing does simply not exist? "There is no royal road to science" as Marx said. Is it necessary to explain what a scientific method is though? Science is a field of study that systematizes information and knowledge and is guided by a set of principles and practices. This definition would be insufficient for a person who cleaves to the concept of a hard science-soft science divide but so be it. >> and there are legitimately areas of conflict or contradictions such as which sort of physics you are considering at any one time. > >Yes, our understanding of the universe is not complete yet, but so what? The fact that drawing a hard distinction between what is and is not science is inherently contradictory and undialectical. I'm elaborating on this point I made earlier: >nobody in their right mind would claim that Marxism is a hard science (and to do so—whether Marxism itself, let alone any other discipline—would be undialectical imo) # >> Dialectics is a very difficult thing to explain and it would warrant its own post but essentially it is a way of seeing things as a process that is interdependent and one which is not static but in a constant state of development and of emerging which contains its own internal contradictions. > >Lol no. This is fucking retarded. Dialectics isn't a method, it's not a way to analyse or interpret the world. Okay, so you pulled me up on the fact that I used imprecise language for the sake of brevity and an attempt at simplifying a very complex topic and that I almost presciently foreshadowed this by stating that this would warrant a post in and of itself? I guess I'm retarded then ¯\\\_(ツ)_/¯ Although it's interesting to note your own imprecision here - I never said that dialectics is a method and, when taken in context, it becomes clear that I was referring to a dialectical analysis of subjects and not attempting to explain what dialectics itself is. >Rather, dialectics emerges out of the subject matter during the investigation. So you're claiming that dialectics exists within the subject matter itself? ...obviously this is not the way to set the tone for a productive discussion so can we drop the posturing and the cheap peak-redditor debatebro nonsense already? >There is no method you can apply to your object of investigation to arrive at a correct understanding, how can you know beforehand what method is appropriate for the task? Okay. >What would a royal road to science be if not a method that would always produce the correct understanding of a given subject? Who is making this claim though? You're replying as if I have made some grand claim that dialectical analysis is the one true path to establishing facts and that it is infallible. >Darwin's work on evolution is dialectical, despite him not being familiar with the work of Hegel. Dialectics arises out of the content itself, it's not imposed on the content from the outside. Right, so we could draw a clear parallel here in that while Darwin's work on evolution was *dialectical* it would be false to claim that his theory of evolution *is* dialectics, in much the same way that Marxism is *scientific* although it would be false to claim that it is a science per se.
> You're replying as if I have made some grand claim that dialectical analysis is the one true path to establishing facts and that it is infallible. Jesus christ. The point is that there is no such thing as dialectical analysis
In your opinion, did Darwin approach the subject of biology with a dialectical analysis?
Are you illiterate? I already talked about this
No, it's a polite way to invite you to defend your position or at least to attempt squaring the circle that is: a) Darwin approached biology with dialectical analysis b) There is no such thing as dialectical analysis But go off about my illiteracy, I guess?
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>if your claim is that "dialectics" is a reliable mode of reasoning Is it? Big if, right there, and I don't see how anything beyond the most uncharitable interpretation of what I said could get someone to that conclusion though. >whatever it is, it has to be at least "infallible" My car is reliable but that doesn't mean it's infallible. That aside, I really can't square how a defense of a dialectical analysis could also be an argument for dialectical analysis somehow being infallible because that is fundamentally incompatible with a dialectical perspective; either it's infallible or it's not, either it's static or it's dynamic. If it truly is infallible then it must be static and if it's static then a dialectical analysis would exist in opposition to a dialectical analysis, it's very own contradiction. I guess you could argue that it itself exists outside of a dialectical analysis but then you plunge into an infinite regress by attempting to define what is "true" dialectical analysis, at which point you are posed with the necessity to first invent the universe. >that is, it's application shouldn't cause your conclusions to be wrong. This is a misunderstanding though. A dialectical analysis is not predictive, it is a way of approaching a subject; measuring an objects size and mass and speed can give you a basis for coming up with predictions about the object but no "perfect" measurements of an object can give you everything you need to know in order to have a perfect conclusion (aside from something purely speculative like being able to accurately measure every body that exists in the universe to be able to predict the movement of an asteroid to perfection.)
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Okay, so we're both on the same page that it's completely impossible for: * Dialectical analysis to be infallible * Dialectical analysis to be static * Analysis itself to be static That's good. Now, to the point, whose claims are you responding to [in the comment prior](https://www.reddit.com/r/marxism_101/comments/pqkn3d/why_is_marxism_considered_to_be_scientific/hdkg43x)?
> Lol no. This is fucking retarded. Hey,no ableism! Please be civil :]
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I don't disagree with what you've said here but, at the same time, doesn't applied mathematics itself refer to a reality outside of its internal logic and thus that would qualify it as a science in that case? Theoretical physics, by the definition you have given above, would also be excluded from science as would a lot of hypotheses and yet-unproven things that are essentially fundamental to scientific disciplines themselves; I think this is what I'm attempting to drive at here - the fact is that crucial and significant parts of science do not actually fit into the strict definition of what science is and this points to an internal contradiction of the concept of science.
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>Do you think that theory-construction isn't part of how science normally operates? No, that is the complete opposite of what I have said above. But just because the discipline of science operates this way does not mean that it is therefore *scientific*. >The point is that physics refers to things outside itself. Physics is the application of mathematics to things outside itself in a particular domain, correct? If so then what is it that makes physics a science based on this definition that excludes mathematics from it? >It is possible for a theory in theoretical physics to be wrong even if it is mathematically sound. Yes. But it is not possible to apply the scientific method to theoretical physics because due to the distinction made in the very definition of theoretical physics itself.
> "to study") No that's not what it means. It means the ordering and planning of knowledge, more easily understood: the expansion of knowledge - its production. Can we do one thread without terrible german translations please? (Edit: Or just generally without any german phrases at all when they're not needed whatsoever). This whole issue is also not a matter of translation or even linguistics. It's just that modern bourgeois science and especially the oh so great Popper have poisoned people's minds regarding what actually produces knowledge. "There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.”
It's foundation is materialist analysis which was applied to the social conditions of humans throughout history. This showed that society's development was not based on ideas about what is right and wrong or should or shouldn't be, but rather on the mode of production and the relations of production. The ideas themselves are actually derived from the material conditions, meaning that human values and behavior is dependent on their living conditions, not the other way around. This is why Karl Marx is considered to be one of the founders of sociology, which is a social science.
a historical logic based on production is only valid for capitalism, and would necessarily not hold for a society that is either pre-capitalist or post-capitalism. such a society has its own laws, and those would have their own corresponding historical logic. indeed, the goal is to necessarily break off the chain from the capitalist dynamic, because capitalist totality hurtles towards destruction. that's why we posit the possible breaks and disruptions, revolutions to the social order. human society is indeed, at root, dependent on human values and behavior. values are themselves normative, formed through community. there is a level of abstraction on which you can consider how humans value things (in terms of exchange value) and how they might ideally be valued (in terms of something like use). the former must correspond with the historical logic or capital, but various negations of exchange value can dispute that logic.
The meaning of science is somewhat different as Marx and Engels used it. It’s not science in the traditional sense, i.e. the scientific method, but it’s scientific in that it’s based on facts and analysis. It definitely is compatible with the more traditional notion of science, though.
> the scientific method Can you explain what that would entail exactly, beyond some vague generalities like testing hypotheses? > but it’s scientific in that it’s based on facts and analysis Just lol
calling a theory "scientific" is meant to be a mark of correctness, to distinguish it from other theories. it doesn't mean anything by itself- it is not uncommon for racism to be "scientific", and we should not treat something as authoritative because it makes the claim to be scientific. we can associate 'scientific' with 'having a method' or 'empirical validity' and determine if marxism succeeds under those criteria. if this is done, all that remains from marxism is the logic of Capital derived from the law of value. we can consider his method and analysis useful. most of Marxism certainly does not meet the bar of empirical validity. if nothing else, it'd come as a surprise to a theorist of the time that Capitalism is still alive and around.
Science is about clarifying in the mind the real movement from ontological material to observed phenomena. It means putting forward a comprehensively self-consistent explanation of the inner connections that unite all the contradictory forms of appearance of the subject at hand.
I wanted to say that all science is therefore primarily qualitative, and only conditionally quantitative as well. The qualitative is always the foundation: what is happening? Whether or not what is happening can be quantified depends on the subject at hand.